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LAW MAKING FOR BABY MAKING:
AN INTERPRETIVE APPROACH TO THE
DETERMINATION OF LEGAL PARENTAGE
Marsha Garrison*
This article proposes a new model for analyzing legal issues arising from
technological conception and uses it to develop rules to govern the. legal parentage of
technologically conceived children. Professor Garrison shows that most commentators
on technological conception have employed a "top-down" methodology, deriving rules for
specific cases from an abstract global principle such as reproductive autonomy, freedom
of contract, or anticommodification. Professor Garrison critiques these and several other
approaches, showing that they offer little concrete guidance in many cases, risk the
introduction of discordant values into the law of parentage, and fail to capture all of the
values that have traditionally guided parentage determination. In their place, she
proposes an "interpretive methodology" which, by relying heavily on current rules
governing parentage determination in other contexts, would assimilate technological
conception within the broader law of parental obligation. Professor Garrison argues that
cases of sexual and technological conception should be governed by similar rules because,
despite mechanical differences between these two reproductive methods, there are no
significant differences in the parent-child relationships that they produce. She
demonstrates that the interpretive approach can cabin rule-making disagreements, and
that it can generate comprehensive parentage rules that are based on uniform policy
goals and that ensure consistent treatment of parent-child relationships.
T he past half century has witnessed a revolution in human repro-
duction. Fifty years ago, a man or woman who wanted a child
and had failed to conceive one might, like Henry VIII, discard his or
her current spouse in favor of a new and perhaps more fertile mate;'
or, like the Biblical Abraham, he or she might begin a nonmarital rela-
tionship.2 But almost nothing could be done to improve the odds that
a particular couple would conceive a child. Today, a large and grow-
ing fertility industry offers a wide range of aids to conception.3  Some
of these aids - ovulation predictor kits, fertility-enhancing hormone
treatments, surgical interventions - increase the chance of conception
through sexual intercourse. However, other methods of improving fer-
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Research for this article was supported by
Brooklyn Law School's Faculty Research Fund.
I See ANTONIA FRASER, THE WIVES OF HENRY VIII 2 (1992).
2 See Genesis 16:x-4.
3 Infertility affects "approximately ten to fifteen percent of American couples trying to con-
ceive." 2 HARRISON'S PRINCIPLES OF INTERNAL MEDICINE 2029 (i3 th ed. 1994). Although
the overall incidence of infertility in the American population does not appear to have risen in
recent years, the number of physician visits for treatment of infertility has increased dramatically.
See OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., INFERTILITY: MEDICAL AND SOCIAL
CHOICES 55-56 (1988); Lynne S. Wilcox & William D. Mosher, Use of Infertility Services in the
United States, 82 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 122, 122 (i993).
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tility substitute for coitus a technological method of combining sperm
and ovum. These methods - artificial insemination (AI) and in vitro
fertilization (IVF) - change the manner of conception as well as its
likelihood of success. Because AI and IVF achieve conception without
sex, they may make use of sperm, ova, or gestational services that have
been donated or sold to the individual(s) who want a child.4  When
coupled with such a donation or sale, these technologies pose a wide
range of legal questions.
Current law offers little guidance on many, if not most, of the issues
arising from technological conception.5 The legal parentage of chil-
dren born through AID and IVF is often unclear,6 and laws governing
the use of AI and IVF are largely nonexistent.7
4 In x996, at least 20,659 babies were conceived using IVF technology in the U.S.; 8% of IVF
procedures employed donated eggs, resulting in approximately i6oo donated-egg births. See U.S.
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1996 NAT'L ART FERTILITY REPORT, § I fig. 1 (1999) (vis-
ited July 14, 1999) <http://www.cdc.gov/nccdphp/drh/art96> [hereinafter 1996 ART REPORT]
(relying on data from 300 U.S. fertility clinics representing "almost all clinics in the United States"
employing IVF technology; donated-egg births were calculated based on live births-per-cycle fig-
ures). There are no recent national studies of Al births. The best available information comes
from a 1987 survey conducted by the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment. It reports
that during 1986-87, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination, resulting in 65,0oo total
births, of which 30,000 were from artificial insemination with donor semen (AID). See OFFICE
OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONG., BACKGROUND PAPER, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION:
PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES, SUMMARY OF A 1987 SURVEY 3 (1988) [hereinafter OTA
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT]; see also Sander Shapiro, Diane G. Saphire & William H.
Stone, Changes in American A.I.D. Practice During the Past Decade, 35 INT'L J. FERTILITY
284, 284-85 (i99o) (reporting, based on survey data, that as many as 23,400 infants were con-
ceived using AID during 1987).
5 Technological conception is more often described as "assisted" or "artificial" conception. I
use the term "technological" for two reasons: first, it is more precise than "assisted" because all
fertility treatments, including those that rely on sexual intercourse to achieve conception, provide
reproductive assistance; second, "artificial" generally implies a substitute of lesser quality rather
than the "real" thing (artificial hair, for example, is not generally viewed as the equivalent of natu-
ral hair), but technological conception is real conception and its result - a child - is just as
valuable as that achieved through sexual conception.
6 The state of the law is described in detail in section I.A.
7 See Karen Wright, Human in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction, DISCOVER, May 1998,
at 75, 76 (noting the lack of regulation of technological conception and quoting one specialist de-
scribing the field as "the Wild West of medicine'); see also JANET L. DOLGIN, DEFINING THE
FAMILY: LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND REPRODUCTION IN AN UNEASY AGE 62 (1997) (noting
the inadequacy of legislative responses to technological conception). Although no state currently
regulates access to technological conception or the manner in which it is performed, most do re-
quire sperm banks to screen potential donors for HIV, and a few require screening for other sexu-
ally transmitted diseases and/or genetic disorders. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 1644.5(a) (West 1999) (HIV, hepatitis B and C, syphilis, and HTLV-i); FLA. STAT.
ch. 381.0041(1) (1998) (communicable diseases specified by the Florida Department of Health and
Rehabilitative Services); IND. CODE. ANN. § 16-41-I4-5(a)(I)-(3) (West 1998) (HIV, hepatitis B,
and syphilis). As of x998, only a few states also required the collection of genetic information
about sperm or egg donors. See Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Adoption, Reproductive Tech-
nologies, and Genetic Information, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 125, 135 (1998). Some states also regulate
[Vol. 113:835
LAW MAKING FOR BABY MAKING
Legislatures have been slow to respond to technological conception
for a variety of reasons. One is simply the speed with which the new
methods of baby making have advanced." Another is the rapid shift in
parenting norms that has accompanied introduction of the new tech-
nologies; while only a couple of decades ago childbirth was sought al-
most exclusively by married couples in their prime childbearing years,
many applicants for access to the new technologies are now single,
9
and some are post-menopausal.' 0 Nor do these new applicants neces-
sarily wish to establish traditional family forms. Some want their
children to have only one legal parent;11 some want their children to
have no father but two mothers; 12 some want to establish "traditional"
data collection and practitioner/facility certification. See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive
Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 650 (1997).
8 For example, intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), a technique used to overcome male
infertility in the context of an IVF procedure, was first reported as an experimental procedure in
1992, see infra note 39; during 1995, ICSI was employed in more than 5,ooo U.S. IVF procedures.
See U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL, 1995 NAT'L ART FERTILITY REPORT § 1 (1997)
(visited Nov. 3, x998) <http://www.cdc.govlnccdphp/drh/arts> [hereinafter 1995 NATIONAL ART
FERTILITY REPORT] (stating that approximately xi % of 59,142 ART cycles involved ICSI).
9 During a 12-month period in 1986-87, there were approximately 4,000 requests from single
women for artificial insemination. See OTA ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note
4, at 23. While there are no current national data on the proportion of AID users who are single
women, anecdotal evidence suggests that the phenomenon is increasing in frequency. For exam-
ple, the director of one California sperm bank has estimated that 40% of its AID recipients are
single lesbian women. See E. Donald Shapiro & Lisa Schultz, Single Sex Families: The Impact of
Birth Innovations upon Traditional Family Notions, 24 J. FAM. L. 271, 278 (1986); see also Emma
Cook, So You Want a Baby But There's No Sign of Mr. Right, INDEP. (London), Nov. 16, 1997, at
S (quoting medical estimates that 300 single British women per year - io times the number five
years earlier - were becoming parents through AID); Janet Kinosian, And Baby Makes Tho:
These Days, More Thirty Something Women Are Opting For Single Motherhood, NEWSDAY, May
ii, 1999, at B 13 (providing anecdotal accounts of AID use by single women); Rahel Musleah,
Single Mothers, by Choice, Increasing, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1996, § 13 (Long Island Weekly), at
i (same). Births to unmarried mothers have also risen dramatically in recent years. In 1970,
10.7% of U.S. births were to unmarried women; by 1995, 32.2% were. Compare BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1996, at 79 tbl.98 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (197os data), with
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1998, at 8o tbl.ioo (1998) [hereinafter 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT].
10 According to one recent report, some loo women aged 5o or older have borne children in
the U.S. See Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution in Making Babies, TIME, Dec. i, 1997,
at 40, 45; see also Mark V. Sauer, Richard J. Paulson & Rogerio A. Lobo, Pregnancy in Women 50
or More Years of Age: Outcomes of 22 Consecutively Established Pregnancies from Oocyte Dona-
tion, 64 FERTILITY & STERILITY I 11, 113 (1995) (noting that "[o]ocyte and embryo donation has
made pregnancy possible in postmenopausal women").
11 See Kinosian, supra note 9, at B13 (reporting anecdotal accounts of single mothers who
chose to have children without legal fathers); Musleah, supra note 9 (same); Gary Wisby, Single
Women Opt for Kids, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Jan. 5, 1997, at i (same).
12 See Judy Peres, Times Changed, Laws Didn't on Rights of Sperm Donors: Gay Relationships
Not Mentioned in 197o-8os Statutes, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 24, 1997, at Axo (describing cases
involving lesbian couples who wish to exclude the sperm donors from parental relationship). For
a broader justification of two-mother parental relationships, see Nancy D. Polikoff, This Child
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parental relationships by conceiving with sperm from a deceased part-
ner.13 The novelty and diversity of cases has inhibited the develop-
ment of consensus on the best regulatory approach.14
Novelty has not, of course, inhibited debate. There is a wealth of
popular and scholarly literature dealing with the ethical, legal, medi-
cal, and human issues arising from the new technologies."5 There is
also some case law, as courts have been unable to duck the disputes
arising from legislative inaction. 16 And, in contrast to the United
States, many other industrialized nations have made concerted efforts
to develop a consistent legal framework to govern technological con-
ception; 17 indeed, the influential Warnock Commission, appointed by
Does Have Tvo Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of Children in Lesbian-
Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J. 459 (1990).
13 See, e.g., ARTHUR CAPLAN, DUE CONSIDERATION: CONTROVERSY IN THE AGE OF
MEDICAL MIRACLES 73-74 (1998) (reporting that postmortem sperm retrieval has been per-
formed more than two dozen times in the U.S., "sometimes for a wife, sometimes for a fiancee,
and on one occasion for a woman who had been dating a man for a long time prior to his death");
see also Gina Kolata, Uncertain Area for Doctors: Saving Sperm of Dead Men, N.Y. TIMES, May
30, 1997, at Ai.
14 Congress has held many hearings on issues arising from technological conception, but they
have produced little legislation. For example, in 1987 and 1988, three separate House subcommit-
tees held preliminary hearings on the implications of these technologies for families and children.
See Consumer Protection Issues Involving In Vitro Fertilization Clinics: Hearings Before the
House Subcomm. on Regulation, Business Opportunities, and Energy, iooth Cong. 1-35 (1988)
(surveying related consumer protection issues); Alternative Reproductive Technologies: Implica-
tions for Children and Families: Hearings Before the House Select Comm. on Children, Youth,
and Families, iooth Cong. I-65 (1987) (considering the implications of new reproductive tech-
nologies); Federal Employee Family-building Act of 1987: Hearings Before the House Subcomm.
on Civil Service, iooth Cong. 1-18 (1987) (examining access to reproductive technologies). Con-
gress did enact the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-
493, io6 Stat. 3146 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 263a-i (1996)), which is designed to provide better and
more standardized information to those choosing between IVF programs; however, the Act's re-
quirements have never been funded. See WILLIAM J. CURRAN, MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE
BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER, HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETHICS 871-72 (5th ed. 1998).
15 See, e.g., ROBERT BLANK & JANNA C. MERRICK, HUMAN REPRODUCTION, EMER-
GING TECHNOLOGIES, AND CONFLICTING RIGHTS (i995); GENA COREA, THE MOTHER
MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES FROM ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTI-
FICIAL WOMBS (1985); LAWRENCE J. KAPLAN & ROSEMARIE TONG, CONTROLLING OUR
REPRODUCTIVE DESTINY: A TECHNOLOGICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVE (1994).
16 See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 777-78 (Cal. i993) (determining the legal parent-
age of a child born through gestational surrogacy); Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530 (Ct.
App. 1986) (determining the legal parentage of a child born through AID to a single woman when
the AID statute was not followed); In re Baby M, 537 A.2d r227 (N.J. 1988) (analyzing the legal-
ity of surrogate mothering agreements and the parentage of a child born as a result of such an
agreement); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992) (determining a divorcing couple's rights
to frozen preembryos created for use in IVF).
17 By 1989, commissions had issued reports that proposed public policy on technological con-
ception in France, Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. See
JONATHAN GLOVER, ETHICS OF NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: THE GLOVER
REPORT TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 15 (1989); see also WHAT PRICE PARENTHOOD?
ETHICS AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION 104-23 (Courtney S. Campbell ed., 1992) (surveying
840 [Voi. I113:835
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the British government to make legislative recommendations on the
new technologies, issued its report more than fifteen years ago.18 More
recently, the Canadian Royal Commission on New Reproductive
Technologies has issued two volumes of commentary and recommen-
dations. 19
Given the wealth of literature on technological conception, why do
we need yet another analysis? Existing policy analyses suffer from
two large - in my view, fatal - deficiencies. First, in developing a
regulatory framework, analysts have typically employed a "top-down"
approach, deriving rules to govern the various issues posed by tech-
nological conception from one or another global principle: contract en-
forcement, reproductive autonomy, and an "anticommodification" ethic
have all found proponents. 20  But as the range of principles urged by
various commentators suggests, the possibilities are many and there is
no obvious reason for the unconverted to choose one over another.
Public debate on the issues posed by technological conception has thus
all too often involved little more than an exchange of slogans, pre-
senting few possibilities for meaningful dialogue and hampering devel-
opment of legislative standards that can garner broad public alle-
giance. 21 Second, existing analyses have focused largely on the novel
aspects of technological conception. As a result of this bias, they typi-
cally fail to make use of - or justify their departure from - existing
legal principles. The result, all too often, is proposals that would cre-
policy development in a number of nations); Jean Martin, Prioritising Assisted Conception Serv-
ices: A Public Health Perspective, in CREATING THE CHILD: THE ETHICS, LAW AND
PRACTICE OF, ASSISTED PROCREATION 241, 243-46, 248-50 (Donald Evans ed., 1996) [herein-
after CREATING THE CHILD] (briefly describing the work of commissions in the Netherlands
and Switzerland).
18 See DEP'T OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SEC., UNITED KINGDOM, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (1984), re-
printed in MARY WARNOCK, A QUESTION OF LIFE: THE WARNOCK REPORT ON HUMAN
FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY (x985) (hereinafter WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT].
The Report led to the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of x9go, which established a
statutory authority to license and set standards for entities offering reproductive technology ser-
vices. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, x9go, ch. 37 (Eng.). For a description of
legislative developments leading to the Act, see Sarah Franklin, Making Representations: The
Parliamentary Debate on the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, in JEANETTE
EDWARDS, SARAH FRANKLIN, ERIC HIRSCH, FRANCES PRICE & MARILYN STRATHERN,
TECHNOLOGIES OF PROCREATION: KINSHIP IN THE AGE OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION 96
(1993).
19 See i ROYAL COMM'N ON NEW REPROD. TECHS., PROCEED WITH CARE: FINAL
REPORT OF THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES (1993)
[hereinafter PROCEED WITH CARE].
20 For discussion of these perspectives, see infra Part II.
21 See generally AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREE-
MENT 52-164 (1996) (describing conditions that produce fruitful democratic debate); Bruce A.
Ackerman, Why Dialogue?, 86 J. PHIL. 5, 16 (1989) (arguing that particularly divisive moral is-
sues should be removed from the "conversational agenda of the liberal state").
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ate two inconsistent legal regimes, one for technological conception
and another for sexual conception. Because inconsistent legal stan-
dards can easily produce inconsistent results, such an approach should,
at the very least, be justified. But advocates of the various top-down
approaches have generally failed to do so; indeed, they have often ig-
nored the current legal regime altogether.
In this Article I advocate an "interpretive" approach to the law of
technological conception. In contrast to the top-down methodology,
this approach seeks norms in society's actual practices and beliefs. 22
The rule-making strategy I develop thus relies heavily on the law gov-
erning sexual conception and the implicit assumptions about parentage
and family on which that law is based.
An interpretive approach to the regulation of technological concep-
tion holds a number of advantages over the alternative top-down
strategy. The first is grounded in necessity: without an interpretive
methodology, there is no obvious basis for choosing among competing
global principles and determining what, if any, role each should play in
designing regulatory standards. The interpretive approach is also con-
sistent with the widely held view that the expression of contemporary
beliefs and values is one of family law's most important functions.23
Moreover, its use promotes coherent rules reliant on consistent, rather
than discordant, values. The approach has the additional advantage
of comprehensiveness: it can be applied to the full range of legal issues
associated with technological conception while none of the global theo-
ries that commentators have offered can be applied in more than a
small number of cases. Finally, by avoiding the tendency toward slo-
ganeering inherent in the top-down methodology, the interpretive ap-
proach enhances the possibility of meaningful public debate and the
development of legislative consensus; it has the "large advantage of
allowing a convergence on particular outcomes by people unable to
reach an accord on general principles."24
22 For descriptions of the interpretive method and comparisons of this method with the "top-
down" approach, see JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 8-9, 441 n.2 (1992); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 45-86 (1986); and CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND
POLITICAL CONFLICT 96-ioo (1996), see also Edward J. McCaffery, The Uneasy Case for
Wealth 71ansfer Taxation, 104 YALE L.J. 283, 286-87 (1994) (defining the interpretive approach
and noting the important role of interpretive theories in constitutional law and common law fields
such as torts and contracts).
23 See MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 176-84
(i993); Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 2o HOFSTRA L. REV. 495
(1992); Carol Weisbrod, On the Expressive Functions of Family Law, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 99!
(x989). This "expressive" function of family law strongly suggests that most questions of family
law and policy are best analyzed using an interpretive approach. See Marsha Garrison, Auton-
omy or Community? An Evaluation of Roo Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CAL. L. REV. 4!,
46-47 (1998) (arguing in favor of an interpretive approach to child support policy).
24 SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 39-40.
[Vol. 113:835
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The interpretive approach I advocate is not novel. It is consistent
with the ideal of public reason on which democratic society is based.2"
It reflects the widely accepted principle that like cases should receive
like treatment.2 6 It embodies the notion, pervasive within our legal
system, that "the very concept of the rule of law" demands "continuity
over time" and "respect for precedent."2 7 The common law method
employed by Anglo-American courts for generations is, of course, an-
other application of the interpretive perspective. 28
In this Article I develop an interpretive approach to technological
conception and use it to resolve some of the legal issues arising from
the new methods of baby making. Part I describes the technologies in
question and the limited law to which they are now subject. Part II
describes and evaluates the various regulatory approaches suggested
by other commentators, contrasts them with the interpretive approach
I advocate, and explains why the interpretive approach is preferable.
Part III utilizes the interpretive approach to develop rules governing
the legal parentage of technologically conceived children.
Of course, technological conception raises a wide range of legal is-
sues in addition to parentage, issues to which the interpretive method-
ology might also be applied.29 I have chosen to focus on parentage
here for several reasons. First, the number and complexity of issues
arising from technological conception preclude the analysis of more
than one area of law within a single article; indeed, many issues are
worthy of, and have already received, book-length treatment.30 Sec-
25 For a defense of the public reason ideal, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 212-
54 (1993); and Joshua Cohen, Moral Pluralism and Political Consensus, in THE IDEA OF DE-
MOCRACY 270-271 (David Copp, Jean Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993).
26 See DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 165 (explaining that the provision of like treatment of like
cases "requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a principled and coherent manner
toward all its citizens, [and] to extend to everyone the substantive standards of justice or fairness
it uses for some"); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 2oi-o6 (1979) (explaining that rea-
soning by analogy serves the purpose of ensuring that a "new rule is a conservative one, that it
does not introduce new discordant and conflicting purposes or value into the law, [and] that its
purpose and the values it promotes are already served by existing rules").
27 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
28 See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX. L. REv. 527, 541-43 (1982) (describ-
ing the judge as a contributor to a "chain novel" and noting that "[elach judge must regard him-
self, in deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a complex chain enterprise of which
these innumerable [prior) decisions, structures, conventions, and practices are the history; it is his
job to continue that history into the future"). For extended analysis of analogical reasoning by
judges, see RAZ, supra note 26, at 180-2 io; and SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, passim.
29 Examples include commercialism, user/donor qualifications, and requirements for or bans
on particular practices such as postmortem conception, sex selection, genetic manipulation, clon-
ing, surrogacy, etc.
30 Surrogacy, for example, is already the subject of an enormous literature. Book-length
treatments of the subject include MARTHA A. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (2988);
DEREK MORGAN, SURROGACY AND THE MORAL ECONOMY (iggo); NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, SURROGATE PARENTING: ANALYSIS AND RECOM-
2000]
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ond, parental status offers a number of advantages as an analytical
starting point. Parentage issues are not only common to all forms of
technological conception, they are also inescapable; although lack of
legal regulation has precluded litigation of many issues raised by the
new technologies, it ensures that questions of parental status will often
be resolved in the courtroom. And because parentage issues involve
similar policy concerns, 31 the topic presents the opportunity to apply
the interpretive methodology to a number of different, but linked, legal
issues.
In applying the interpretive method to parentage issues arising
from technological conception, I review both constitutional require-
ments and contemporary laws applicable to marital, nonmarital, and
adoptive parenting. My review reveals that, although the structure
and content of legal standards have changed along with social mores
and perceptions of children's interests, family law has consistently pre-
ferred the interests of children and the public to those of parents and
parent-claimants. Thus, while biological relationship typically deter-
mines legal relationship, courts and legislatures have at times ignored
biology in order to provide the child with care and support from two
parents, foster marital child rearing, or protect a child's established
relationships. I find that, although some aspects of the emerging law
of technological conception conform to this pattern, others appear to
be inconsistent with it. I examine these apparent inconsistencies in
greater detail, along with issues such as gestational surrogacy that re-
quire more sustained analysis simply because of their novelty., Finally,
I propose rules to govern a number of parentage issues posed by cur-
rent technological conception techniques3 2 - rules that conform with
MENDATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY (1988); ON THE PROBLEM OF SURROGATE PARENT-
HOOD: ANALYZING THE BABY M CASE (Herbert Richardson ed., 1987); SCOTT B. RAE, THE
ETHICS OF COMMERCIAL SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD ('994); CARMEL SHALEV, BIRTH
POWER: THE CASE FOR SURROGACY (1989); THOMAS A. SHANNON, SURROGATE MOTHER-
HOOD: THE ETHICS OF USING HUMAN BEINGS (1988); and SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD:
POLITICS AND PRIVACY (Larry Gostin ed., i99o).
31 In analyzing the parentage issues arising from technological conception, I do not make rec-
ommendations on whether the practices that give rise to these issues should be restricted or
banned. For example, the legal parentage of children born to a surrogate mother is addressed, but
not the legality of surrogate parenting. I have taken this approach for two reasons. First, some
methods of technological conception - surrogate parenting is a good example - do not require
sophisticated medical assistance and therefore would be difficult to stamp out; parentage issues
will arise no matter what approach the law ultimately takes on the legality issue. Second, the de-
sirability of banning practices like surrogate parenting raises complex questions of both policy and
practicality, to which it would be impossible to do justice here.
32 I do not address techniques, such as cloning, that are not currently available. I have also
ignored practices, such as posthumous and post-menopausal conception, that, while controversial,
pose few questions related to parentage.
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current law, the policies underlying that law, and public values relating
to parentage and family relationships.
I. THE REVOLUTION IN REPRODUCTION:
PROCESSES, PROBLEMS, AND LEGAL PRINCIPLES
A. Artificial Insemination
Artificial insemination (AI) is the oldest and most popular means of
technological conception. An estimated 20,000 to 30,000 children are
born in the United States each year following AI with sperm provided
by donors (AID), and tens of thousands more following AI with sperm
donated by husbands (AIH).33 AI first came into widespread use dur-
ing the I950S.34 Until the I98os, it was almost invariably sought by
married couples, either to enhance the probability of conception by
bypassing the cervical barrier (AH) or to "remedy" the husband's in-
fertility (AID).
Although AIH and AID both offer an infertile couple increased
odds of conceiving a child, they produce different results and different
legal issues. The husband and wife who conceive using AIH are both
genetic parents of the child, and thus, under traditional family law
principles, they are also his legal parents. With AID, however, only the
wife is genetically related to the child. Thus, under prevailing law at
the time AID came into widespread use, her husband's parental status
was unclear.35
During the 1970s, the states began to enact legislation that clarified
the AID child's legal parentage. The 1973 Uniform Parentage Act
(UPA), for example, provided that "[i]f, under the supervision of a li-
censed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is in-
seminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her husband,
the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father of a child
thereby conceived. '3 6 As of 1998, fifteen states had adopted the UPA
33 See OTA ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION REPORT, supra note 4, at 3 (estimating that in
1986-87, 172,000 women underwent artificial insemination in the United States, resulting in
35,000 births from AIH and 30,000 from AID); Shapiro, Saphire & Stone, supra note 4, at 290 (re-
porting from survey data that AID conceptions during a one-year period between 1986 and 1987
produced as many as 23,400 infants).
34 The first recorded successful human artificial insemination apparently occurred in 1770.
See E. Donald Shapiro & Benedene Sonnenblick, The Widow and the Sperm: The Law of Post-
Mortem Insemination, i J.L. & HEALTH 229, 234 (1986-87).
35 Compare People v. Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495, 501-02 (Cal. 1968) (en banc) (holding a mother's
husband to be. her child's legal father on the theory that he had voluntarily assumed that respon-
sibility by consenting to AID), and Strnad v. Strnad, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390, 391-92 (Sup. Ct. 1948)
(same), with Gursky v. Gursky, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406, 411-12 (Sup. Ct. 1963) (holding the child ille-
gitimate but the husband liable for the child's support based on his consent to AID).
36 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5(a), 9B U.L.A. 301 (,973).
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or a virtually identical standard, and fifteen others had enacted similar
statutes that varied by eliminating the licensed physician require-
ment.37
Although the AID statutes resolved the status issue that courts ini-
tially confronted, they failed to resolve a host of other legal questions
that might arise from the use of AID - and which increasingly do.38
The status issues posed by AID today reflect a shift in its usage. Ad-
vances in the treatment of male infertility have markedly reduced the
number of married couples who seek AID,39 while a remarkable
change in parenting norms has greatly expanded the number of would-
be parents who seek AID for reasons unrelated to infertility: many of
these new AID applicants are single women who wish to achieve preg-
nancy but have no male partner;40 others are parties to a surrogate
parenting agreement;41 and an occasional applicant wishes to become
pregnant using sperm from a deceased partner.42 Many of these new
users continue to employ sperm banks and physician assistance in or-
der to ensure donor screening and anonymity, but others rely on
known donors and perform AID at home without physician involve-
ment.
43
The larger legal context has also shifted. As AID developed during
the 195os and 6os, its practitioners followed the model pioneered by
adoption agencies. In both contexts, the goal was to provide would-be
parents with the closest possible substitute for their own biological
child; secrecy, participant anonymity, and physical-trait "matching"
were employed to achieve these ends. But while AID practitioners still
37 See UNIF. STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT § 4 cmt., 9B U.L.A.
x96-97 (Supp. 1998).
38 For a review of the case law, see Michael J. Yaworsky, Annotation, Rights and Obligations
Resulting from Human Artificial Insemination, 83 A.L.R.4TH 295 (1990.
39 Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), involving the injection of a single sperm into an
ovum, was introduced in 1992. Although the technique was first used with ejaculated sperm,
surgically obtained immature sperm and spermatids from the epididymis or testis are now used as
well. See A. Van Steirteghem et al., The Development of Intracytoplasmic Sperm Injection, ii
HUMAN REPRODUCTION 59, 59, 62-64 (Supp. 1 996); E.R. te Velde, A.L. van Baar & R.J. van
Kooij, Concerns About Assisted Reproduction, 351 LANCET 1524, 1524 (1998). Because ICSI
avoids the problem of low sperm counts, it markedly increased the success rate of IVF with hus-
band sperm. In 1995, almost 5o,ooo ICSI cycles had been undertaken globally. See id.
40 See supra note 9.
41 See infra pp. 850-52.
42 See sources cited supra note 13.
43 See Judith Stacey, Gay and Lesbian Families: Queer Like Us, in ALL OUR FAMILIES: NEW
POLICIES FOR A NEW CENTURY I17, 120-21 (Mary Ann Mason, Arlene Skolnick & Stephen D.
Sugarman eds., 1998) (reporting that many lesbian AID users rely on donors located through per-
sonal networks because of exclusionary policies of physicians and sperm banks or because of the
desire to "solicit sperm from a ... male relative of one woman to impregnate her partner ... to
buttress their tenuous legal, symbolic, and social claims for shared parental status .. .'); Lisa Bel-
kin, Pregnant with Complications, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, (Magazine) at 34 (providing anec-
dotal accounts); Peres, supra note 12 (same).
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follow the old model, adoption practice has turned away from it. The
federal government has severely restricted racial matching in adop-
tion,44  and disclosure increasingly replaces secrecy; agencies and ex-
perts now counsel openness about the adopted child's origins, and
adoption statutes have accordingly moved toward open records 4 and
even "open adoption," in which the biological parent retains some form
of contact with the child after her adoptive placement.46
The legal status of unmarried biological fathers has shifted even
more dramatically. Although both AID users and adoptive parents
could afford to ignore biological fathers during the 195os and 6os - in
most states unmarried fathers had no legal rights whatsoever 47 - the
Supreme Court has since held that an unmarried father who has
"grasp[ed] th[e] opportunity [to develop a relationship with his child]
and accept[ed] some measure of responsibility for the child's future" is
entitled to constitutional protection. 4  A number of state courts have
accordingly voided adoptions when the unmarried father had no notice
of the proceeding and promptly came forward to obtain custody.49
Courts have also permitted challenges to the marital presumption of
legitimacy, 0 and even sperm donors who have asserted claims to visi-
tation or custody have sometimes been recognized as legal parents. 51
Current. AID statutes were not drafted with an eye to either the
new users or the new legal context in which AID occurs. Most do not
address the paternity of an AID child born to an unmarried woman.5 2
44 See Small Business Job Protection Act of x996, Pub. L. No. 104-188, 1io Stat. 19o3 (forbid-
ding delay or denial of adoption based on race). For a discussion of this statute, see Recent Leg-
islation, iio HARV. L. REV. 1352 (1997).
45 See infra pp. 890-9i.
46 See infra note 259 and accompanying text.
47 See infra pp. 885-89.
48 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
49 See, e.g., Steven A. v. Rickie M. (In re Adoption of Kelsey S.), 823 P.2d 126, 1236 (Cal.
1992); In re Petition of Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181, 182-83 (Ill. 1994); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 246
(Iowa 1992); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 428 (N.Y. 199o). For a critical review of the
case law, see Deborah L. Forman, Unwed Fathers and Adoption: A Theoretical Analysis in Con-
text, 72 TEX. L. REV. 967 (i994).
50 See, e.g., K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399, 400-01 (Ind. 1996); C.C. v. A.B., 550 N.E.2d 365, 370
(Mass. i9go); In re J.W.T., 872 S.W.2d i89, x98 (Tex. 1994). In a plurality opinion, the Supreme
Court has held that the Constitution does not require states to permit such challenges. See Mi-
chael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-29 (1989) (plurality opinion).
51 See, e.g., Jhordan C. v. Mary K., 224 Cal. Rptr. 530, 535-36 (Ct. App. 1986); In re R.C., 775
P.2d 27, 27 (Colo. 1989); Thomas S. v. Robin Y., 618 N.Y.S.2d 356, 356 (N.Y. App. Div. i994);
McIntyre v. Crouch, 780 P.2d 239, 241 (Or. Ct. App. 1989). See generally Vickie L. Henry, A Tate
of Three Women: A Survey of the Rights and Responsibilities of Unmarried Women Who Conceive
by Alternative Insemination and a Model for Legislative Reform, x9 AM. J.L. & MED. 285, 290-
300 (1993) (describing cases and contrasting the rules governing AID births to married and unmar-
ried women).
S2 As of 1996, 15 states had statutes that explicitly severed the parental rights of a sperm donor
who had provided sperm to a licensed physician, whether or not the sperm user was married. See
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Nor do current statutes typically provide guidance either on the AI
donor's rights to a relationship with his biological child or the child's
rights to information about her origins. In sum, current law on artifi-
cial insemination provides an extremely limited response to an isolated
legal issue; it fails to assimilate AID into the broader set of legal prin-
ciples governing parental rights and relationships.
B. In Vitro Fertilization
While AI avoids sex, in vitro fertilization (IVF) moves the entire
process of conception outside the body.53 In IVF, ovarian stimulation
is followed by the collection of eggs ready for fertilization.54 The pro-
cess of fertilization takes place in vitro in a laboratory; some or all of
the resulting preembryos are then implanted into the uterus or fallo-
pian tubes. 55 The first IVF birth occurred in 1978 in Great Britain.5 6
Since then, tens of thousands of children conceived through IVF have
been born in the United States alone.5 7
Like AI, IVF was originally employed by married couples with fer-
tility problems; thus the first IVF baby, Louise Brown, was conceived
using Mrs. Brown's ova in combination with her husband's sperm.
But as with AI, the uses of IVF have expanded.58 Because IVF takes
Kristin E. Koehler, Comment, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest?, 5 ALB. L.J.
ScI. & TECH. 32 1, 332 nn.79-8o (1996) (listing state statutes). The Uniform Status of Children of
Assisted Conception Act (USCACA), USCACA § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. 191, 196 (Supp. 1994), adopted in
two of those fifteen states, provides that a sperm donor is "not a parent of a child conceived
through assisted conception," whether or not the mother is married. Id.
53 For a basic description of IVF methodology, see KAPLAN & TONG, supra note 15, at 255-
68.
54 Egg retrieval originally involved laparoscopic surgery under general anesthesia. Increas-
ingly, however, ultrasound-guided transvaginal aspiration is used, eliminating the need for both
anesthesia and laparoscopy. See JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM
AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 99 (I994) [hereinafter ROBERTSON,
CHILDREN OF CHOICE].
55 Variations on "traditional" IVF include zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), in which the
fertilized egg is implanted into the fallopian tubes. ZIFT is usually performed before the fertil-
ized egg has begun cell division. Gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), a variation on ZIFT, in-
volves the placement of both sperm and unfertilized egg into the fallopian tube, where fertiliza-
tion and implantation occur as they would with coital reproduction. Pregnancy rates with ZIFT
and GIFT are higher than with traditional IVF. See generally BLANK & MERRICK, supra note
i5, at 87-89 tbl.4 -I (comparing GIFT, ZIFT, and IVF processes). But GIFT and ZIFT are none-
theless employed much less frequently than traditional IVE See 1996 ART REPORT, supra note
4, § I (reporting that, in i996, ZIFT and GIFT represented only 7% of total cycles).
56 See ROBERT EDWARDS & PATRICK STEPTOE, A MATTER OF LIFE: THE STORY OF A
MEDICAL BREAKTHROUGH (ig8o) (providing a description of the development of IVF and the
first birth, written by the physicians who developed the process).
57 See 1996 ART REPORT, supra note 4; Michael D. Lemonick, The New Revolution in Mak-
ing Babies, TIME, Dec. i, 1997, at 40, 42.
58 Developments in AI have themselves contributed to the growth in IVF use. ICSI, for ex-
ample, which greatly increases the chances that a man with low sperm counts will be able to fa-
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the process of conception outside the body, it permits the use of do-
nated eggs (the analog to AID);59 this practice has expanded dramati-
cally because IVF success rates for older women substantially increase
when the eggs of younger women are employed. 60  IVF also permits
the use of another woman to gestate the fetus; although less common
than IVF with donated ova, this practice, too, has increased. The net
result is a confusing array of "parents"; for example, would-be parents
A and B might obtain sperm from Man C and eggs from Woman D,
then have a doctor implant the resulting preembryos in Woman E to
be carried to term. And, as with AI, today's IVF users are not neces-
sarily married couples with fertility problems. A and B might be a gay
couple, or A and B might be simply A, a single man or woman.
The parenting possibilities created by IVF present a host of legal
issues. One set of questions relates to the legal parentage of children
born through IVF. While arguably more complex, these questions are
similar to those raised by AID. But IVF also poses altogether new le-
gal problems relating to the status of preembryos created in vitro. 61
Were these preembryos within her body, the pregnant woman could
choose to abort them or carry them to term. When they are outside
the womb, the woman's rights are less clear.
Courts have begun to address the legal issues raised by IVF, but
legislatures have thus far been almost entirely inactive. 62 The Tennes-
see Supreme Court has ruled that preembryos created through IVF
and frozen for future use are neither persons nor property; when a
married couple that had donated genetic material for the creation of
ther a child, has significantly expanded the number of fertile women who seek access to IVF. See
supra note 39.
59 Ova are rarely "donated" without compensation; instead, would-be mothers seek donors
through advertising and offer fees of $3000 or more. See Jan Hoffman, Egg Donations Meet a
Need and Raise Ethical Questions, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1996, at x; Adrienne Knox, What's a Hu-
man Egg Worth? Debate Intensifies, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Apr. 5, 1998, at Ei.
60 See Mark V. Sauer, The Impact of Age on Reproductive Potential: Lessons Learned from Oo-
cyte Donation, 30 MATURITAS 221, 223-24 (1998). Without donated eggs, older women have
poor prospects of achieving a live birth through IVF. See xg9 NATIONAL ART FERTILITY
REPORT, supra note 8, at figs.9, 1o (reporting that women with no previous live birth who used
their own eggs had a 24.6% live birth rate if they were under 35, a 17.1% rate if they were 35-39,
a 7.6% rate if they were over 39, and o% if they were 47 or older).
61 For a brief overview of different perspectives on the preembryo's moral status, see KAPLAN
& TONG, supra note i5, at 268-76.
62 See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note i5, at 96-98 (noting that some states have record-
keeping and reporting provisions and that few states regulate IVF directly). A handful of states
have begun to regulate donations of ova and embryos. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11(2)
(West 1997) (providing that a child born to a married woman conceived by donated gametes or
preembryos is "irrebuttably presumed to be the child of the recipient gestating woman and her
husband, provided that both parties have consented in writing"); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 151.102-151.103 (West i996) (providing that a child born to a married woman using her hus-
band's sperm and a donated oocyte or preimplantation embryo is the child of the marriage if both
spouses have consented in writing to the procedure).
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such preembryos later divorced, the court held that, based on the facts
and lack of an agreement regarding disposition of the preembryos, the
spouse who wished to destroy the preembryos was entitled to do so
over the objection of the other spouse.63 The California Supreme
Court has held that a baby born using IVF and a gestational surrogate
was the legal child of the genetic parents, 64 and a lower court in New
York has ruled that a woman who bore a child through IVF using do-
nated ova was the child's legal mother.65 A case involving the parent-
age and custody of twins born to a woman who underwent IVF with
"donated" preembryos that had allegedly been cryopreserved only for
the future use of the genetic parents is currently before the California
courts, but has not yet been resolved. 66
C. Pregnancy for Another: The Various Forms of Surrogacy
Surrogacy - bearing a child for someone else - stands in contrast
to AI and IVF in that it requires no technology at all. The Biblical
Sarah, Rachel, and Leah all made use of surrogates - their hand-
maids - in order to produce children for their husbands; 67 conception
was achieved sexually rather than technologically. Modern surrogacy,
however, invariably involves conception through AI. In the case of
gestational surrogacy, in which the woman who gives birth is not ge-
netically related to the child she bears, IVF is employed as well.
Modern surrogacy also differs from that of Biblical times in its reli-
ance on contract. Biblical surrogacy involved an informal under-
standing between the infertile woman, her husband, and her hand-
maid, but surrogacy today is almost invariably conducted on the basis
of a formal, written document specifying rights and obligations. Sur-
rogacy today is also commercial: contracts almost always require pay-
63 See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597, 604 (Tenn. 1992); cf Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174,
182 (N.Y. x998) (upholding a preembryo disposition contract and noting the importance of effect-
ing the parties' intentions). The Supreme Court of Israel has reached the opposite conclusion.
See Joel Greenberg, Israeli Court Gives Wife the Right to Her Embryos, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23,
x996, at Aio. For background and commentary on the frozen embryo problem, see Bill E. Davi-
doff, Comment, Frozen Embryos: A Need for Thawing in the Legislative Process, 47 SMU L. REv.
131 (r993); and Stephanie J. Owen, Note, Davis v. Davis: Establishing Guidelines for Resolving
Disputes over Frozen Embryos, io J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 493 (i994).
64 See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993).
65 See McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 478 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994).
66 See Valeria Godines, A Baby of Their Own; but Couple Says Legal Fight for 71vins Contin-
ues, PRESS-ENTERPRISE (Riverside, Cal.), Feb. 4, 1997, at Ai; Susan Kelleher & Dave Parrish,
Woman After 71ins' Custody Meets the Birth Mother, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Apr. 2, 1996, at
Bi.
67 See Genesis 16:1-4, I5; 30:1-10.
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ments both to the woman who will bear the child and to a service that
has brokered the arrangement.68
Commercial, contract surrogacy emerged in the United States in
the late 1970s. 6 9 Although its use has spread, the number of surrogate
births remains small in comparison to those obtained through AI and
IVF alone; in 1993 the Center for Surrogate Parenting estimated that
4000 surrogate births had occurred in the United States.70
Public attention became focused on surrogacy as a result of the
widely-publicized case of In re Baby M,71 involving the legality of an
agreement by a "surrogate" mother to relinquish the child she had con-
ceived through AI to the sperm donor and his wife in return for
$I0,000.72 Perhaps because of the media attention, state legislatures
reacted to surrogacy with greater speed than they have reacted to AI
and IVE By 1987, at least seventy-two bills pertaining to surrogacy
had been introduced in Congress, state legislatures and the District of
Columbia; today, nearly half of the states have statutes regulating sur-
rogacy.73 Almost all of these statutes declare commercial surrogacy
contracts void and unenforceable. 74 Some additionally criminalize
participation in and/or brokering of a surrogacy agreement. 75 A few
explicitly permit noncommercial surrogacy.76 And three states (New
Hampshire, Nevada, and Virginia) permit some forms of commercial
surrogacy, although all allow the birth mother to rescind the surrogacy
contract within a specified time period. 77
68 See LYNDA BECK FENWICK, PRIVATE CHOICES, PUBLIC CONSEQUENCES: REPRO-
DUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW ETHICS OF CONCEPTION, PREGNANCY, AND
FAMILY 230-33 (1998) (describing typical contract problems and terms and noting that surrogate
fees vary "from program to program, ranging from $xo,ooo to perhaps $20,000, or, in some pro-
grams, whatever the parties negotiate"); see also In re Baby M, 537 A.2d 1227, 1265-73 (N.J.
1988) (reproducing a surrogacy contract).
69 See FIELD, supra note 30, at 5.
70 See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note i5, at i io.
71 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. I988).
72 See id. at 1235.
73 See BLANK & MERRICK, supra note i5, at 123; FIELD, supra note 30, at 157-58.
74 See IRA MARK ELLMAN, PAUL M. KURTZ & ELIZABETH S. SCOTT, FAMILY LAW:
CASES, TEXT, PROBLEMS 1498 (3d ed. 7998); see also BLANK & MERRICK, supra note x5, at
125 tbl.5-I (categorizing state laws); Lori B. Andrews, Beyond Doctrinal Boundaries: A Legal
Framework for Surrogate Motherhood, 8i VA. L. REV. 2343, 2346-49 (i995) (same).
7S See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-204 (1995) (making entering into surrogacy agreements
a class B misdemeanor).
76 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63 .212(i) (West Supp. 1999) (allowing "preplanned adoption
agreement[s]" but restricting payments to surrogate to reimbursement for medical, legal, and "rea-
sonable living expenses," and permitting mother to rescind agreement up to seven days after giv-
ing birth); N.Y. DOM. REL. L. §§ 122-124 (McKinney 1999); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.26.210-
26.26.260 (1997).
77 See NEV. REV. STAT. § 127.287 (997) (excluding from state baby-selling prohibitions a
"lawful contract to act as a surrogate"); N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 168-B:i6, 168-B:25 (1994) (recogniz-
ing judicially approved surrogacy contracts, specifying allowable payments, and allowing surro-
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Most surrogacy laws assume that the "surrogate" birth mother is
genetically related to the child; they thus fail to address the increas-
ingly common phenomenon of gestational surrogacy.78 With gesta-
tional surrogacy, it is possible for a child to have three "mothers" -
one who is genetically related to the child, one who gave birth to the
child, and one who planned the pregnancy and intended the child to
be hers. It is also possible for a child to have three "fathers" - one
related to the child genetically, one married to the woman who gave
birth to it, and one who planned the pregnancy and intended it to be
his. Current law, even in states with statutes governing surrogacy,
typically fails to offer clear (or even murky) answers as to the rights
and obligations of these various parties.79
D. The Need for Legal Reform
Current American law is clearly inadequate to resolve legal issues
arising from the various forms of technological conception. That is
not, of course, necessarily a bad thing. It is not always possible for the
law to keep up with technological change. When the pace of change is
rapid and the impact of that change difficult to assess, it may be pref-
erable to deal with new legal issues on an ad hoc basis initially, defer-
ring a more comprehensive approach until consensus emerges on its
scope and substance.
But AI, IVF, and surrogacy are no longer novel technologies. In-
deed, AI and IVF are offered by hundreds of commercial providers to
tens of thousands of would-be parents each year.80 And while re-
searchers continue to develop technical refinements, the legal issues
posed by reproductive technology are now quite clear.
Most other industrialized nations have thus begun to move toward
comprehensive regulation of technological conception. In the United
gate to rescind agreement within 72 hours of child's birth); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156-2o-165
(Michie I995 & Supp. '999) (setting out requirements for enforceable surrogacy contract, permit-
ting payment of "reasonable medical and ancillary costs," and authorizing surrogate rescission of
contract within i8o days of conception). Both the New Hampshire and the Virginia laws ostensi-
bly forbid inducement of surrogates for a fee, but contain broad exceptions for the surrogate's
"expenses." See N.H. REV. STAT. §§ 168-B:6, 168-B:25; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-I56-2o-I65.
78 In 1995, only ten states had statutes dealing with gestational surrogacy. See Andrews, supra
note 74, at 2346 n.i6. The only state high court that has considered gestational surrogacy ruled
that the child's biological mother was entitled to custody. See Johnson v. Calvert, 85I P.2d 776
(Cal. 1993).
79 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (1998) (resolving the issue of
child support obligations toward a child conceived with donated eggs and sperm and gestated by
a surrogate after the divorce of a married couple who arranged for the child's birth).
80 While there are no national data on AID providers, there are at least 300 fertility clinics of-
fering IVF. See 1996 ART REPORT, supra note 4, at nat. summ. In 1996, those clinics performed
more than 55,000 IVF procedures. See id.
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Kingdom, the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act of 199 o81 set
standards to govern AID, IVF, and surrogacy; it also established a
governmental agency to regulate technological conception providers
and resolve new issues through administrative rulemaking.82 The
Royal Commission on New Reproductive Technologies has proposed a
similar regulatory structure for Canada.83 Industrialized countries
without regulatory agencies have typically enacted legislation to gov-
ern technological conception practices or have established national
commissions to formulate legislative standards.8 4
Our peers among the family of nations have not chosen to enact
statutory standards governing technological conception on the assump-
tion that such laws will put to rest all further legal and moral debate.
Instead, legislation has been premised on the view that the whole area
"will remain one of public interest and also of controversy."5  Contin-
ued controversy has not, however, been seen as a reason to forgo the
advantages of clear and consistent legal standards to guide the deci-
sionmaking of consumers and professionals and a regulatory frame-
work within which to debate and resolve new issues as they arise.
There is every reason to assume that such a course would be advanta-
geous in the United States as well.
II. LAW MAKING FOR BABY MAKING:
A COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
A. Top-Down Approaches
Much of the commentary on legal issues arising from technological
conception begins - and ends - with an appeal to one or another
global principle. Commentators have variously urged that procreative
rights, contract law, and an anticommodification ethic should guide
policymaking on technological conception. Admittedly, these ap-
81 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act, I9go, ch. 37 (Eng.).
82 See id. For a detailed account of the Act and the legislative debates leading up to it, see
DEREK MORGAN & ROBERT G. LEE, BLACKSTONE'S GUIDE TO THE HUMAN FERTIL-
ISATION & EMBRYOLOGY ACT 199o: ABORTION & EMBRYO RESEARCH, THE NEW LAW
(1991).
83 See PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note ig, at 107-25.
84 For a survey of the law relevant to technological conception in 13 European nations, see
Linda Nielsen, Legal Consensus and Divergence in Europe in the Area of Assisted Conception -
Room for Hamonisation?, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note 17, at 305. For a more de-
tailed description of the French statutory scheme enacted in 1994, see Christian Byk, French As-
sisted Reproduction Legislation, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note 17, at 347. Three Aus-
tralian provinces have legislation governing technological conception. See Infertility Treatment
Act, 1995, ch. 63 (Vict.); Human Reproductive Technology Act, i99i, ch. 22 (W. Austl.); Reproduc-
tive Technology Act, 1988, ch. io (S. Austl.).
85 MORGAN & LEE, supra note 82, at 3 (quoting U.K. Labour Party spokeswoman on health).
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proaches all offer something to the policymaker; procreative rights, for
example, should limit state regulation restricting technological procrea-
tive choices just as they curtail state regulation restricting sexual pro-
creative choices. But none of the principles proposed as a decision-
making lodestar is capable either of resolving the full range of
parentage issues posed by the new technologies or of capturing all of
the values that guide parentage determination in other contexts.
i. Rights-Based Analysis. - The best known proponent of a
rights-based approach is Professor John Robertson who, extrapolating
from Supreme Court cases recognizing a constitutionally protected in-
terest in decisionmaking about contraception and abortion,8 6 has ar-
gued that "if bearing, begetting, or parenting children is protected as
part of personal privacy or liberty, those experiences should be pro-
tected whether they are achieved coitally or noncoitally" and that
"[o]nly substantial harm to tangible interests of others should
... justify restriction [on use of reproductive technologies].", Based
on this analysis, Robertson has urged that:
[Legal] protection should extend to the use of gamete donation to over-
come gametic infertility in one member of the couple, as in sperm and egg
donation.... Use of a surrogate should also be presumptively protected,
since it enables an infertile couple to have and rear the genetic offspring of
both husband and wife in the case of gestational surrogacy, and of the
husband in the case of full surrogacy....s8
Robertson acknowledges that the only case in which his argument
has been tested produced a decision with the opposite conclusion but,
because the plaintiff was a prison inmate, argues that "it is not a
strong precedent for limiting procreative choice in nonprison set-
tings."8 9 He also acknowledges that the Supreme Court is unlikely to
strike down a range of existing restrictions on nonmarital procreational
choice - for example, laws against fornication, adultery, incest, and
bigamy - that "have a pedigree and tradition as long as the practice
of marital reproduction." 90
86 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, S05 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Carey v. Population Servs.
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 40 U.S. 113 (1973) (abortion); Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (same).
87 ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 39-41; see also John A. Robert-
son, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Family, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 911 (1996); John A.
Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Repro-
duction, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939 (1986) [hereinafter Robertson, Embryos & Families]; John A.
Robertson, Noncoital Reproduction and Procreative Liberty, in THE ETHICS OF
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 249 (Kenneth D. Alpern ed., 1992); John A. Robertson, Pro-
creative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405
(983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty].
88 ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 39-40.
89 Id. at 37-38 & 420 nn.so-5 x (discussing Goodwin v. Turner, 9o8 F.2d 1395 (8th Cir. 199o)).
90 Id. at 38.
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However, Robertson fails to note that the Supreme Court has never
employed his proposed test either when reviewing state laws limiting
access to abortion and contraception, the context in which the procrea-
tive liberties doctrine developed, or when addressing parental rights
more generally.91 Although the Court has held that state abortion and
contraception regulations implicate a "zone of privacy created by sev-
eral fundamental constitutional guarantees" 2 and thus must be "nar-
rowly drawn" to express only "compelling state interests, '93 it has
never mandated Robertson's "substantial harm to tangible interests"
test as a basis for state regulation in this area. Indeed, in recent years,
the Court has retreated from the position that "compelling" interests
are required to justify government restrictions on procreational choice,
holding that state abortion limitations are valid unless they impose an
"undue burden" on a woman's right to terminate an unwanted preg-
nancy.94 The Court has also consistently held that government may
prefer one form of procreational choice over another in funding medi-
cal services.95
Although the evidence is sparse, it seems probable that the procrea-
tive liberties doctrine would preclude explicit state restrictions on fam-
91 See, e.g., Ann MacLean Massie, Regulating Choice: A Constitutional Law Response to Pro-
fessor John A. Robertson's Children of Choice, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135 (1995) (arguing that
the Constitution does not support Robertson's analysis); Maura A. Ryan, The Argument for Un-
limited Procreative Liberty: A Feminist Critique, in WHAT PRICE PARENTHOOD? ETHICS
AND ASSISTED REPRODUCTION, supra note 17, at 84, 89 (noting that "Robertson's concern to
promote the procreative initiator's interests is not adequately balanced ... by a concern for the
persons who will participate as the means to the stated reproductive goals" and urging that the
"value of collaborative reproduction ... needs to be weighed against the costs these practices may
exact").
92 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a statute criminalizing use
of contraceptives by married couples was unconstititutional); see also Roe v. Wade, 41O U.S. 113,
153 (1973) (holding that the privacy right relied on in Griswold and Eisenstadt was "broad enough
to encompass a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy through abortion'); Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (extending the Griswold holding to unmarried couples and holding
that "[i]f the right of privacy means anything it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a per-
son as the decision whether to bear or beget a child').
93 Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S 678, 686 (1977) (striking down state regulations
that proscribed contraceptive advertising and limited the manner in which nonprescription con-
traceptives could be sold).
94 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992). The "undue burden" test adopted in
Casey had been proposed by Justice O'Connor in earlier abortion cases. See Thornburgh v.
American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828 (1986) (O'Connor, J., dis-
senting); Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). For criticism of the undue burden approach, see, for example, Martha A. Field, Abor-
tion Law Today, 14 J. LEGAL MED. 3, 15 (1993); and Gillian E. Metzger, Note, Unburdening the
Undue Burden Standard: Orienting Casey in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
2025 (1994).
95 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326-27 (1980); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 447 (1977);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 475-80 (i977).
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ily size. 96  The Court has already noted that a birth control require-
ment and a birth control ban are logically equivalent;97 a complete
state ban on access to reproductive technology thus would also be con-
stitutionally suspect, as it would deprive the infertile of their only
chance at genetic parenthood.98 Gender-based access restrictions, such
as rules denying access to reproductive technology if a wife is post-
menopausal but granting it if a husband is of post-menopausal age,
might also constitute impermissible gender discrimination.99
Nonetheless, given that traditional restrictions on choice of a sexual
partner - prohibitions on prostitution, incest, fornication, statutory
rape, adultery - all appear to be valid,'0 ° there is no obvious reason
why restrictions on choice of a technological "partner" would not also
be valid, including restrictions disallowing the sale of genetic mate-
96 The Court's decisions focus almost exclusively on the negative claim. In the affirmative
context, the leading decision is Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942), in
which the Court struck down a criminal statute requiring sterilization of those convicted of three
or more felonies involving "moral turpitude." Id. at 536. Although the Skinner Court described
procreation as one of the "basic civil rights of man," id. at 541, it ultimately decided the case on
fairly narrow equal protection grounds, see id. at 541; see also ELLMAN, KURTz & SCOTT, su-
pra note 74, at x 191 ("The Supreme Court cases ... do not themselves explicitly find a constitu-
tionally-protected right to procreate .... ") (internal citation omitted); CHRISTINE OVERALL,
ETHICS AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION: A FEMINIST ANALYSIS 166-72 (1987) (arguing that
the right not to reproduce does not necessarily imply a right to reproduce); Note, Human Cloning
and Substantive Due Process, iii HARV. L. REV. 2348, 2354 (i998) ("Despite the Court's occa-
sional references to a broader principle of reproductive freedom, the Court has not truly tested a
right to procreate.").
97 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[]f upon a showing of a slender
basis of rationality, a law outlawing voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then, by
the same reasoning, a law requiring compulsory birth control also would seem to be valid. In my
view, however, both types of law would unjustifiably intrude upon rights of marital privacy which
are constitutionally protected.").
98 One federal district court has held that the right to make reproductive decisions encom-
passes the right to "submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather than prevent,
pregnancy." Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. Ill. 199o), ff'd without opinion,
914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. I9go).
99 The Supreme Court has held that the preservation of traditional, gender-based family roles
is insufficient to justify a gender-based classification. See United States v. Virginia, 5 18 U.S. 515,
54o-46 (1996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 10 (1975).
100 See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) ("[Tihe Court's holding today
... in no way interferes with a State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or misconduct.").
The Supreme Court has not directly confronted the legality of partner restrictions. However, in
Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981), it rejected an equal protection challenge to a
California statutory rape law that imposed criminal liability only on males who engaged in sexual
intercourse with a female under the age of i8, see id. at 466-67.
Prostitution is illegal in all the states except Nevada, which delegates the regulation of pros-
titution to county officials. See RICHARD A. POSNER & KATHARINE B. SILBAUGH, A GUIDE
TO AMERICA'S SEX LAWS 155 (1996). In 1996, fornication was still a misdemeanor in 16 juris-
dictions; in several others fornication was a crime if "open and notorious." See id. at 99-102.
Adultery remained a crime in 25 states. See id. at 103-10.
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rial' 0 ' and imposing "time and manner" requirements. 102 Nor does the
Court's procreative liberties doctrine pose any apparent bar to state
rules defining parental status. While Robertson and other advocates
of a rights-based approach to technological conception have sometimes
assumed that freedom to engage in a particular reproductive practice
automatically implies recognition of parental status, 10 3 the procrea-
tional liberties doctrine in fact mandates no such thing. The Supreme
Court has simply never held that the right to bear a child ensures the
right to have one's parental status recognized. Instead, in another line
of cases involving claims by unmarried fathers, the Court has made it
clear that "the mere existence of a biological link" is inadequate to en-
sure parental rights. 104
Although the case law does not support Robertson's claim that cur-
rent constitutional doctrine does mandate a showing of substantial
harm to tangible interests of others as a precondition to state restric-
tions on use of reproductive technologies, one might still attempt to
show that the Constitution should be interpreted to provide would-be
parents with such protection. 05 Robertson himself does not offer to
101 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the constitutionality of restraints on com-
mercialism in the context of reproduction, it has upheld commercial restraints against a First
Amendment challenge. Compare Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding that the First
Amendment precludes state prohibition of possession of obscene material in the home), with
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (197) (ruling that the First Amendment does not preclude
states from prohibiting the sale of obscene material).
102 Noting that "the right of privacy has never been interpreted... to protect a woman's choice
of the manner and circumstances in which her baby is born," Bowland v. Municipal Ct., 556 P.2d
io81, 5o89 (Cal. 1976), a number of lower courts have already refused to extend procreational lib-
erty to control of the birthing process. See, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Porter Mem'l Hosp., 523 F.2d 716
(7th Cir. 1975) (rejecting a constitutional attack on a hospital policy that prohibited fathers from
participating in the delivery process); Bowland, 556 P.2d at 1o89, (rejecting a challenge to state
midwife regulation). The same approach would permit state restrictions on particular reproduc-
tive technology practices, such as the number of preembryos that may be implanted in an IVF
cycle.
103 See, e.g., ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 40 (urging that the pro-
creative liberty doctrine protects "use of a surrogate ... since it enables an infertile couple to have
and rear the genetic offspring of both husband and wife in the case of gestational surrogacy and
of the husband in the case of full surrogacy") (emphasis added); John Lawrence Hill, What Does
It Mean To Be a "Parent"? The Claims of Biology as the Basis for Parental Rights, 66 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 353, 383 (1991) (concluding that "[a]s the law currently exists, the legitimate exercise of the
right of procreation includes the right to parent a child").
104 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983).
105 Robertson suggests that "[t]he precise procreative interest at stake must be identified and
weighed against the core values of reproduction.... if an important reproductive interest exists,
then use of the technology should be presumptively permitted. Only substantial harm to tangible
interest of others should then justify restriction." ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra
note 54, at 41. However, he is unclear about what triggers the level of constitutional protection he
proposes. In urging protection for surrogacy, Robertson seems to assume that genetic relationship
triggers a procreational right, while in urging protection for gamete donation, he seems to assume
that the desire to have a child, whether genetically related or not, triggers that right. See id. at
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make such a showing. Instead, his claims on behalf of reproductive
technologies are based on their status as equivalents of coital reproduc-
tion; procreation should be protected, he argues, "whether ... achieved
coitally or noncoitally."10 6
Our tradition of deference to individual decisions about coital pro-
creation and parenting undeniably supports equivalent deference to
individual choice in the use of technological conception. But deference
does not imply abdication of any regulatory role. Indeed, parents who
want to adopt, the "traditional" method of achieving parenthood non-
coitally, face a maze of state regulations, including rules imposing
waiting periods before an adoption is finalized, voiding parental con-
sents obtained prenatally, permitting rescission of parental consent
within stated time limits, and requiring adoption through an interme-
diary agency.107 Under Robertson's view of the procreative liberties
doctrine, all of these rules should fail. 08 Baby selling prohibitions
would also be unconstitutional under Robertson's proposed standard,
as children whose parents want to sell them are not likely to be better
off remaining in parental custody.
Given the range of public values evident in this small sample of
parentage restrictions - values that simply cannot be accommodated
within Robertson's narrow, libertarian view of procreational rights -
it is not obvious that his perspective is preferable to the more moder-
ate approach our legal tradition has thus far followed, which allows
states considerable latitude both in regulating technological conception
and in defining the status of participants.
The important issue for a rights analyst thus is not whether the
state may regulate technological conception, but how a regulatory re-
gime should express the values that underlie the procreative liberties
doctrine. Some of the regulatory questions posed by reproductive
technology - use of a gestational surrogate, for example - simply do
not arise with coital conception. Nor has the enforcement of rights
waivers, which Robertson seems to assume that the Constitution man-
dates in the context of technological conception, ever been tested in the
38-40. More recently, Robertson has stressed the importance of genetic tie as a basis for procrea-
tional rights. See John A. Robertson, Two Models of Human Cloning, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 60g,
618 (1999) (arguing that a strong case can be made that procreational liberties protect the use of
cloning for the purpose of having a genetically related child in the event of a reproductive failure,
but that the case for cloning to obtain a child with specific traits is "much weaker'.
106 ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 39.
107 For a more detailed account of typical adoption rules and practices, see infra pp. 889-92.
108 Robertson himself notes that the expanded view of "collaborative reproduction" he advo-
cates would "undermine the foundations of adoption law." ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF
CHOICE, supra note 54, at 143.
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context of coital reproduction.10 9 Because the boundaries of procrea-
tive liberty are often murky even in the classic case of coital concep-
tion, "rights talk" like that which Robertson offers is of little use in
fashioning a workable legal regime that is sensitive to the range of
public and private interests at stake, and neither he nor other rights
theorists have as yet offered more. In sum, "it is not yet clear that be-
lievers in rights can provide a satisfactory justification for drawing the
distinction between rights and other interests in one place rather than
another."110
2. Contract-Based Analysis. - A number of commentators have
proposed that the parental rights of those who conceive technologically
should be governed by contract principles.11 There are a number of
variations on this basic claim, but Professor Marjorie Schultz has of-
fered what is probably the most sophisticated and detailed argument.
Relying on the claim that technological conception "dramatically ex-
tend[s] affirmative intentionality" by "eliminat[ing] uncertainty re-
garding procreative intention,"'" 2 Schultz urges that "[w]ithin the con-
text of artificial reproductive techniques, intentions that are
voluntarily chosen, deliberate, express and bargained-for ought pre-
sumptively to determine legal parenthood."'1 13 Recognizing that inten-
tion-based parenthood has not been the norm outside the context of
technological conception, Schultz asserts that "assisted reproduction
differs from ordinary reproduction" in that ordinary reproduction
poses greater difficulties in "severing intention about procreation
109 The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the state may not condition a woman's right
to an abortion on the consent of her husband, see Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52,
67-72 (1976); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 5o5 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992) (striking husband
notification requirement), but it has never addressed the question whether she might waive such a
right in a preconception contract. It is not obvious that enforcement of the waiver is required in
order to protect the husband's procreative liberties; it is also arguable that enforcement would
infringe the woman's procreative liberties.
110 GLOVER, supra note 17, at 29. Moreover, "it would be difficult to find any claim confi-
dently asserted to a right which could not be as confidently countered by a claim to another
right." Id.; see also NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 30,
at 61 (concluding that "[n]either existing caselaw nor the underlying principles of the cases in-
volving the right to privacy can logically be extended to provide constitutional protection to sur-
rogate parenting"); R.M. Hare, Abortion and the Golden Rule, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 201, 203
(1975). See generally Mark "Ibshnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363 (1984) (describ-
ing the limitations of rights-based analysis).
III See, e.g., SHALEV, supra note 30, at i2o-45; Hill, supra note 103, at 45-16; Anne Reich-
man Schiff, Frustrated Intentions and Binding Biology: Seeking AID in the Law, 44 DUKE L.J.
524, 549-70 (1994); Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Par-
enthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 199o WIS. L. REV. 297, 323.
112 Schultz, supra note i I i, at 309.
113 Id. at 323. Schultz argues that intention should be a "default rule ... that allows intention
to govern unless and until policy restrictions on particular types of private arrangements are ar-
ticulated, justified and adopted." Id.
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... from other motivations."'" 4  She also argues that "the newness of
the issues presented by scientific changes virtually demands considera-
tion of new legal approaches and rules," and that coital and techno-
logical conception present "differences in moral and factual legiti-
macy":115
The fairness of imposing a status-based parental regime is far weaker in
instances of artificial or assisted reproductive techniques. The justification
for such outcomes in ongoing relationships between coital partners derives,
at least in part, from presumed intention. In ... assisted reproduction the
factual base for such presumptions about intention is often lacking." 1
6
Because "the newness of the issues" offers no basis for choosing one
particular parentage-determination rule over another, Schultz ac-
knowledges that the case for a contractual approach ultimately hinges
on its desirability and feasibility." 7 On the desirability issue, she urges
that "[o]ur society generally favors the fulfillment of individual pur-
poses and the amplification of individual choice" and that private or-
dering plays a more important role in family law today than it did tra-
ditionally."1 On the feasibility issue, Schultz analyzes a broad array of
enforcement issues and ultimately concludes that it would be feasible
to enforce procreation agreements within limits.1 9
Schultz is undeniably right that parentage law has traditionally re-
lied on presumed, rather than actual, intent. Procreation has been
thought part of the state-imposed marriage contract, and even unmar-
ried persons who engage in sexual intercourse have been presumed to
consent to the risk of procreation. Indeed, courts have uniformly im-
posed parental responsibilities on men who were legally incapable of
consenting to sexual intercourse 20 and those who had been tricked
into fathering a child;' 2' they have refused to honor nonpaternity
agreements whether made before or after the child's conception.
22
114 Id. at 324.
11 Id.
116 Id.
117 Id. at 324-26.
118 Id. at 327.
119 See id. at 355-69 (analyzing the propriety of contract remedies).
120 A number of courts have rejected claims that the putative father was a victim of statutory
rape and thus could not legally consent to sexual intercourse. See, e.g., County of San Luis
Obispo v. Nathaniel J., 50 Cal. App. 4 th 842 (1996); Kansas ex rel. Hermesmann v. Seyer, 847 P.2d
1273 (Kan. 1993); Jevning v. Cichos, 499 N.W.2d 515 (Minn. App. 1993); In re R.A.S., 826 S.W.2d
397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
121 The most frequently cited cases are Stephen K. v. Roni L., 164 Cal. Rptr. 618 (ig8o), and L.
Pamela P v. Frank S., 559 N.Y.2d 1 (1983). See generally Annotation, Misrepresentation Regard-
ing Sterility or Use of Birth Control, 31 A.L.R.4TH 389 (1984); Diane M. Carlton, Note, Fraud
Between Sexual Partners Regarding the Use of Contraceptives, 71 KY. L.J. 593 (1982-83).
122 See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 6(d), 9 B U.L.A. 303 (1973) (declaring invalidity of
agreements regarding paternity); Straub v. B.M.T., 645 N.E.2d 597, 598-6oi (Ind. 1994) (holding
that an agreement providing that a father would "not be held responsible financially or emotion-
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Even in cases of adoption, in which legislatures have required actual
consent both to relinquish and accept parental rights, the parties' in-
tentions are insufficient to effect a rights transfer; a showing of com-
pliance with other state requirements designed to protect the child's
and parties' interests must also be made. 123
Schultz's claim that technological conception presents "differences
in moral and factual legitimacy" that require a more important - in-
deed, determinative - role for contract rests on much weaker ground,
however. Undeniably, it is easier to assess intention when conception
occurs technologically than when it occurs sexually.1 24  But it is not
easier to assess intention in a case of technological conception than it is
in a case of adoption. Nor does the pool of would-be parents who
adopt differ markedly from those who conceive technologically: both
groups include single individuals who want to parent without a part-
ner and couples who already have genetically related children, but
both are also dominated by couples who have tried and failed to con-
ceive sexually.125
Schultz's claim for contract thus comes down to the argument that
reliance on intention is desirable. But she does not explain why reli-
ance on intention is uniquely desirable for determining the parentage
of technologically conceived children; although some areas of family
law do increasingly rely on private ordering, parentage and parental
obligation are not among them. Here, family law simply has not "fa-
vor[ed] the fulfillment of individual purposes and the amplification of
individual choice."'1 26 Indeed, under current law, no contract regarding
ally" for any child born as a result of a relationship with the mother was contrary to public policy
and void); G.E.B. v. S.R.W., 661 N.E.2d 646, 650-51 (Mass. 1996) (holding that a child was not
estopped from maintaining a paternity action even though her mother "acting on her own behalf
and on behalf of a daughter born to her" and the defendant had eight years earlier signed a set-
tlement agreement under which the defendant was to pay the mother $25,000 in exchange for the
mother's assent to a stipulation stating that the defendant was not the child's father); see also
Peregood v. Cosmides, 663 So.2d 665 (Fla. App. 1995); Estes v. Albers, 504 N.W.2d 607 (S.D.
1993); Wyoming ex rel. TRL v. RLP, 772 P.2d 1054 (Wyo. 1989).
123 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 876--87 (2d ed. 1988) (describing legal issues arising out of adoption consent require-
ments). The same is true of AID, for which both onsent of the mother's husband and compli-
ance with statutory standards is invariably required before the husband will be recognized as the
child's legal father. See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 5, 9B U.L.A. 301 (i973) (mandating
physician participation in AID).
124 Despite advances in contraception, almost 6o% of U.S. pregnancies are unintentional, a rate
higher than that of any other developed country except France. See Sylvia A. Law, Sex Dis-
crimination and Insurance for Contraception, 73 WASH. L. REV. 363, 364 (1998).
125 See ALFRED KADUSHIN & JUDITH A. MARTIN, CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 542-46
(4 th ed. 1988) (describing characteristics of adoptive parents).
126 Schultz, supra note iii, at 327. Several commentators have analyzed contrasting trends
toward privatization and increased state intervention within the family. See JUNE CARBONE,
FROM PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAv (forthcoming
2000) (manuscript at 197) (on file with the Harvard Law School Library) (explaining that "courts
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a child's custody, support, or legal status is per se enforceable; unen-
forceability applies whether the contract was negotiated prenatally or
postnatally, and whether or not there is clear evidence of pre-contract
parental intentions. 12 7 Nor does Schultz address children's rights and
interests, the basis for restrictions on parental contract rights.
Other contract proponents have also tended to ignore these basic
questions. Professor John Hill, for example, argues in favor of an "in-
tentional" definition of parenthood that would grant parental status to
those who are the "first cause" of the procreative relationship. 128 His
conclusion is based on the "moral significance of the intended parents'
role as prime movers in the procreative relationship, [their reliance on
the] preconception promise of the biological progenitors not to claim
rights in the child, and the relative importance of having the identity
of the parents determined from conception onward."'1 9 Because the
last factor would support any clear status determination rule, Hill's
argument comes down to the intended parents' reliance interest and
"prime mover" role. But Hill again fails to offer a clear explanation of
why intention and reliance should count for so much more here than
and legislatures are busy... reweaving ... the public and private dimensions of family law. Sex-
ual relationships are becoming more distinctly private, more a matter of personal preference and
private bargaining .... Parent-child relationships in contrast are becoming more public, both in
the sense that they are attaining greater visibility in their own right.., and in the sense that the
state has become more willing to enforce public expectations of parents"); Jane C. Murphy, Rules,
Responsibility, and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law, 6o
U. PITT. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (explaining that public regulation increasingly focuses on
children and issues of physical protection, such as spousal violence).
127 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENTS ACT § 3(b), 9B U.L.A 373 (1983) ("The right of a
child to support may not be adversely affected by a premarital agreement.'; ELLMAN, KURTZ &
SCOTT, supra note 74, at 839 ("Long tradition in the domestic relations area would seem to en-
sure ... that courts would not consider themselves bound by custody provisions they believed
injurious to the child's interest. The law of separation agreements in every state is explicit on that
point, and there is no reason why premarital agreements would be treated differently."); see also
Osborne v. Osborne, 428 N.E.2d 81o (Mass. 1981) (custody); Combs v. Sherry-Combs, 865 P.2d 50
(Wyo. 1993) (child support).
128 Hill, supra note 103, at 414. Although Hill offers a contract argument in favor of his inten-
tionality approach, see id. at 415-6, he invariably describes his approach as based on intention,
not contract. It is unclear whether Hill would extend his intention-based analysis to cases with-
out a formal contract, for example those involving a gratuitous promise on which the intended
parent relied.
129 Id. at 49. Hill does not describe how his approach works if the commissioning parents
want to avoid reliance because the child that is born is somehow different (for example, born with
a birth defect, or genetically related to the surrogate's husband instead of the intended mother's
husband) from the one they wanted; cf. Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261, 263 (6th Cir. 1992) (declar-
ing surrogate and husband legal parents despite a contract and the intention of the sperm donor
and his wife to become legal parents, based on blood tests revealing that the "ordinary" surro-
gate's husband was the genetic father of the child born with severe handicaps).
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they do elsewhere in the law of parentage, 130 or how an approach fo-
cused on adult intentions can be reconciled with children's interests. 131
Only a few contract advocates, notably Professors Epstein and
Posner, have gone so far as to argue that all current restraints on pa-
rental contract rights, including babyselling prohibitions, should be
abolished.1 32 Professor Epstein, for example, urges that:
[t]he most that can be said is that money may create some kind of conflict
of interest between parent and child, so that the sale will be made to a
higher bidder when the child would be better off in the care of a lower
bidder. Yet ... the decisions made in the gray [adoption] market suggest
that this concern is overblown .... One can find cases in which ostensible
sales seem abusive per se .... But the use of these extreme examples
should not discredit the general practice in its far more benign form. 133
Epstein ignores the historical evidence, which shows that adoption
regulation arose precisely because market transactions did not ade-
quately protect children's interests.134  The fact that today's highly
regulated adoptions generally produce good results, even if some
money surreptitiously changes hands, hardly provides a testimonial to
the merits of an unregulated contract regime. There is no reason to
suppose that would-be parents utilizing technological conception to ob-
tain a child more frequently possess inadequate parenting skills than
would-be adoptive parents. But neither is there reason to suppose the
130 Recognizing that uniform application of his intentionality principle would deny parental
status to a significant minority (if not the majority) of persons who have traditionally been consid-
ered parents, Hill suggests that "[i]ntentionality [should] act[] as a trump ... when conflicting
claims are made by parties who have contributed biologically to the creation of the child." Hill,
supra note r03, at 387.
131 Most other contract proponents have offered even more cursory justifications. For example,
one author simply asserts that "the legislative regulation of artificial insemination relations im-
plicitly acknowledges the intention of the sperm donor to dissociate biological from social father-
hood," SHALEV, supra note 30, at 120, concludes that prohibitions on surrogacy are inconsistent
and paternalistic, see id. at 121-27, and accordingly rejects "[a]ny state-imposed restriction on ac-
cess to reproductive technology beyond that of general contractual capacity," id. at 129.
132 See Richard Epstein, Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2305, 2330-34 (1995) (discussing the baby selling analogy and concluding that the "analogy
to baby-selling ... only strengthens the conclusion that surrogacy transactions should be legal");
Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1978) (urging the enforcement of baby-selling agreements); Richard A. Posner, The
Ethics and Economics of Enforcing Contracts of Surrogate Motherhood, 5 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 21 (x989) (arguing in favor of surrogacy contract enforcement).
133 Epstein, supra note 132, at 2333-34.
134 For representative examples of reports on adoption abuses, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH
IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 140-42, 147-49 (Robert H. Bremner ed., 1971) (pro-
viding excerpts of early adoption abuses and responsive legislation that mandated investigatory
procedures).
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reverse; in each context, the vast majority of intended parents are able
and well-motivated, but a few are not. 131
Nor is it obvious how contract advocates could demonstrate that
their proposed approach adequately addresses the interests of children
who will be the subject of parental agreements. Our legal system
rarely tolerates a contract that binds a nonsignatory; only when a
guardian or conservator is appointed for an incompetent may an un-
consenting adult be contractually bound by someone else. In such a
case, the guardian or conservator is bound to act as a fiduciary, not a
self-interested actor.1 36
While the legal system of the feudal era accorded a family patriarch
the right to bind his children as he saw fit,137 that time has long since
passed. Today, parents' rights are thought to derive from - and to be
limited by - their children's interests.'38 Family law has thus moved
consistently in the direction of a child-centered view of parental enti-
tlements. 139 It is ironic that a feudal vision of the parent-child rela-
tionship would be linked with our most sophisticated means of pro-
creation, but that is exactly what contract enforcement as a deter-
minant of parental status would accomplish.
Contract advocates have also failed to define the role that contract
should play in regulating technological conception more generally: if
contracts between, say, a would-be and surrogate mother for the birth
and surrender of a child ought to be enforceable, should contracts be-
tween these parties and a surrogacy broker also be enforceable?
Should contracts between would-be parents and fertility centers de-
termine whether practices such as sex-selection and cloning are per-
missible? Enforcement of these contracts, too, would "fulfill[] individ-
135 See, e.g., Tamar Lewin, Man Accused of Killing Son Born to Surrogate Mother, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. i9, 1995, at AI6.
136 On the obligations of a fiduciary, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 170, 206
(1959); and GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §§ 54 3 -5 4 3(V) (2d ed. 1993).
137 See MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE
HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 6-7, 14-15 (994); Garrison, supra
note 23, at 49-50.
138 For examples of child-centered perspectives on parental rights, see Katharine T. Bartlett,
Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988); John Bigelow, John Campbell, Susan M.
Dodds, Robert Pargetter, Elizabeth W. Prior & Robert Young, Parental Autonomy, 5 J. APPLIED
PHIL. 183 (1988) [hereinafter Bigelow]; James G. Dwyer, Parents' Religion and Children's Wel-
fare: Debunking the Doctrine of Parents' Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott
& Robert E. Scott, Parents as Fiduciaries, 81 VA. L. REV. 2401 (1995); and Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, Hatching the Egg: A Child-Centered Perspective on Parents' Rights, 14 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1747 (1993).
139 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 138, at 2453-76 (discussing family law's evolution in the
direction of a more explicit linkage between parental rights and responsibilities).
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ual purposes and ... amplifi[y] individual choice. ' 140 But then, so
would the enforcement of any contract.
In fact, under modern contract law a wide array of contracts are
unenforceable. Contract bars apply to transactions ranging from vote
purchases to liability waivers on swimming pool admission tickets. 141
In each of these contexts, individual intention is inadequate to achieve
enforcement. 142 Indeed, "we have never had and never shall have un-
limited liberty of contract."143 When a privately negotiated agreement
violates public policy, it is void and unenforceable. 144
Given that our legal tradition precludes per se enforcement of all
contracts concerning children, a proposal to grant per se enforcement
to a single contract subset should be supported by a demonstration
that this group is sufficiently different from the remainder to justify
inconsistent treatment,145 or, in the event that the contract advocate is
willing to extend per se enforcement to all contracts governing chil-
dren's care and status, a showing that this approach is preferable to
the traditional one. Proponents of a contractual approach have not yet
made such a showing.146
140 Schultz, supra note iii, at 327.
141 See, e.g., i8 U.S.C.A. § 241 (1999) (outlawing vote tampering); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-
326 (McKinney 1989) (voiding "any contract, membership application, ticket of admission or
similar writing, entered into between owner or operator of any pool, gymnasium, place of amuse-
ment or recreation, or similar establishment ... which exempts ... owner or operator from liabil-
ity for damages" resulting from the negligence of owner, operator, or agent).
142 Under the Restatement of Contracts, a contract is defined as "a promise ... for the breach of
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a
duty." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1979) (emphasis added).
143 1 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1376 (1952).
144 See UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8), 9B U.L.A. 373 (1983) (allowing pre-
marital contracts about "any ... matter, including their personal rights and obligations, not in
violation of public policy"); JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § i-i I
(3d ed. 1987) (discussing "increasing legislative restrictions" on freedom to contract); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 1.7 (1982) (discussing public policy restrictions on freedom of
contract); see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM
AND EQUALITY 100-03 (1983) (describing categories of "blocked exchanges" in the United
States).
145 Cf. Gillian K. Hadfield, An Expressive Theory of Contract: From Feminist Dilemmas to a
Reconceptualization of Rational Choice in Contract Law, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1235, 128o (1998)
(arguing that the legal significance of surrogacy contracts "is a matter of ethical and social policy"
and that "[c]ontract here accomplishes little in taking the relationships among the parties involved
beyond the background of family law").
146 For additional criticism of the contractual approach, see WILLIAM JOSEPH WAGNER,
THE CONTRACTUAL REALLOCATION OF PROCREATIVE RESOURCES AND PARENTAL
RIGHTS: THE NATURAL ENDOWMENT CRITIQUE 166 (I995) (concluding that "[p]roposals to
apply contract to ordering human procreation fail to withstand normative evaluation because
they effectively remove the meaning of relationships grounded in lineage and nurturance");
Bartlett, supra note 138, at 335-37 (arguing against contract enforcement based on harm to chil-
dren); Margaret Friedlander Brinig, A Maternalistic Approach to Surrogacy: Comment on Richard
Epstein's Surrogacy: The Case for Full Contractual Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2377, 2377
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Even if contract advocates had demonstrated the superiority of
privately negotiated agreements to the traditional, regulated approach,
contract enforcement would still be inadequate as a general principle
to govern the parentage of technologically conceived children: in what
is probably the majority of cases, there is no contract between the
biological and intended parents to enforce, and it would be impractical
to require one. Although such contracts are fairly common in surro-
gacy cases, they are rare in the far more numerous cases of AID and
IVE Sperm, ova, and preembryo donors typically transfer their rights
to a sperm bank or fertility center, not to would-be parents. Although
one might describe would-be parents as third-party beneficiaries of
agreements between donors and intermediary agencies, the agreements
are not, in fact, intended to benefit particular individuals. Indeed, an
agreement may be concluded years before the ultimate user of donated
material becomes a client of the intermediary. In these cases, contract
analysis is strained at best.
Despite the limitations of contract analysis, contracts can and
should play a limited role in parentage determination. Most states
permit privately negotiated adoption contracts as long as the parties
comply with state rules designed to ensure deliberation, voluntariness,
and protection of children's interests.1 47 And courts will seldom sec-
ond-guess an agreement between parents dealing with custody or sup-
port unless one of the parents later questions the contract's capacity to
meet the child's needs.148 The challenge for policymakers is to adapt
these traditional contract possibilities to the new context of technologi-
cal conception. For example, a contract transferring a preembryo from
its progenitors to its intended parents is like an adoption contract in
some, but not all, respects. In fashioning rules to govern such a trans-
fer, policymakers will almost certainly want to rely on adoption law in
part. But in order to ensure that the interests of the parties, the pub-
lic, and any children that may ultimately be born have been protected,
they should also take account of the differences between adoption and
preembryo transfer. A legal regime exclusively reliant on the terms of
privately negotiated agreements is incapable of addressing these vari-
ous concerns.
(1995) (same); and A.M. Capron & M.J. Radin, Choosing Family Law over Contract Law as a
Paradigm for Surrogate Motherhood, 6 J. L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 34, 40 (1988) (rejecting con-
tract enforcement in surrogacy cases).
147 In 1993, only six states required adoption through an authorized agency. See Mark T.
McDermott, Agency Versus Independent Adoption: The Case for Independent Adoption, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 146, 146.
148 See CLARK, supra note 123, at 756-57 (noting a trend in favor of allowing separated cou-
ples to settle custody and financial issues by agreement and reporting that "within very broad
limits any agreement reached is likely to be approved by the court to which it is presented').
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3. The Anticommodification Approach. - A number of commenta-
tors on technological conception have relied, either wholly or partially,
on the claim that reproductive capacity constitutes an attribute, like
sexuality or a body part, that is so bound up with an individual's per-
sonhood that it should not be the subject of market transactions.1 49
Perhaps the best known and most eloquent spokesperson for this per-
spective is Professor Margaret Radin, who argues that:
[m]arket-inalienability [of surrogacy] might be grounded in a judgment
that commodification of women's reproductive capacity is harmful for the
identity aspect of their personhood and in a judgment that the closeness of
paid surrogacy to baby-selling harms our self-conception too deeply.
There is certainly the danger that women's attributes, such as height, eye
color, race, intelligence, and athletic ability will be monetized. Surrogates
with "better" qualities will command higher prices in virtue of those quali-
ties. 15o
As critics of the anticommodification claim have noted, however, it
is not so easy to articulate a clear definition of what is fundamental to
personhood and what is not.151 "[H]eight, eye color, race, intelligence,
and athletic ability" - which Radin fears might be monetized through
commercial surrogacy - are already monetized in the employment
market on a daily basis. 1 2 Nor can we point to historical continuity in
those aspects of personhood that are legally unmarketable. - 3  Blood
was marketable (although with price controls) until health concerns led
to bans on payment.'1 4  Slavery was not outlawed by most European
nations until the nineteenth century, and bride barter was widely prac-
149 See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS x68-9o (i993);
RAE, supra note 3o, at 59-66; Sara Ann Ketchum, Selling Babies and Selling Bodies, 4 HYPATIA
116, 120-23 (I989); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, ioo HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1921-
36 (1987); Barbara Katz Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the Commodification of Life, in
EMBRYOS, ETHICS, AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGIES 95 (Elaine Hoffman Baruch, Amadeo F. D'Adamo, Jr. & Joni Seager eds.,
1988). For general accounts of commodification, see, for example, MARGARET JANE RADIN,
CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); Scott Altman, (Com)modifying Experience, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 293 (1991); and Elizabeth S. Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity?, 19 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 71 (1990).
IS0 Radin, supra note 149, at 1932.
Isl See, e.g., Hill, supra note 103, at 412-13.
Is2 See ALAN HYDE, BODIES OF LAW 77 (1997) ('Most adults in our society survive, and are
expected to survive, by selling their labor power, renting, if you like, their brains and bodies for
specified times at specified rents.").
153 Aristotle, for example, condemned most market transactions. See ARISTOTLE, THE
POLITICS 49-50 (Carnes Lord ed. & trans., Univ. of Chicago Press 1984) (describing retail trade
in general and usury in particular as highly objectionable).
1S4 The classic work on blood donation and sale is RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT
RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (970).
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ticed in Europe until the modern era and continues in many parts of
the world today.155
In sum, although the anticommodification ethic appeals to widely
shared public values - most of us would agree that there are some
things which should not be bought and sold - it does not offer a clear
method of determining which transactions fall on the wrong side of the
proscriptive line. Commentators disagree about the desirability of
commercial surrogacy and the sale of genetic material.15 6 The anti-
commodification approach does not offer a clear methodology for de-
termining which view is right. Moreover, because it is solely con-
cerned with the commercial aspects of technological conception, the
anticommodification ethic fails to provide guidance on many legal is-
sues raised by the new reproductive technologies. Parental status
questions, for example, fit uneasily within an anticommodification
framework. Even if we take it as a given that surrogacy is wrong, the
parentage of children born through illegal transactions must still be
addressed; knowing that both parties are wrongdoers does little to re-
solve the issue.
The anticommodification ethic can be employed more successfully
when used descriptively instead of prescriptively. It offers a unifying
explanation for seemingly diverse legal prohibitions - against prosti-
tution, indentured servitude, organ sale, slavery, and baby selling -
that identifies their common aims and normative basis. Used as a uni-
fying explanation, it still fails to offer a bright-line test for state policy
on technological conception, but it does lend support to a policy that
takes account of existing prohibitions that reflect an anticommodifica-
tion bias. Thus, like the procreative rights doctrine and contract law,
the anticommodification ethic might play a useful, limited role in de-
veloping rules for technological conception. But, on its own, it is an
inadequate basis for policymaking.
B. Mixed Approaches to Regulation
In view of the deficiencies of top-down approaches - rights-based,
contract-based, and anticommodification based - it should come as
no surprise that real-world policymakers have rejected legislative
155 See MOHINDERJIT KAUR TEJA, DOWRY: A STUDY IN ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES
11-26 ('993); HUGH THOMAS, THE SLAVE TRADE: THE STORY OF THE ATLANTIC SLAVE
TRADE 1440-1870, at 65o (997).
156 Members of some state-commissioned policy groups have been open about the lack of con-
sensus on the issue of surrogacy and payment. See, e.g., WARNOCK COMMITTEE REPORT, su-
pra note 18, at 46 ("The question of surrogacy presented us with some of the most difficult prob-
lems we encountered.'); GLOVER, supra note 17, at 76-77 (describing the disagreement over
surrogacy among members of the European Union committee on reproductive technologies).
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strategies reliant on a global theory, opting instead for more flexible
methodologies.
i. The "Ethic of Care" Analysis. - The Canadian Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies recently rejected a global approach in
favor of what it termed an "ethic of care" analysis. 5 7 This approach
to ethical issues was popularized by feminist thinkers, who have em-
phasized norms based on reciprocity and caring, with care:
held to encompass a range of characteristic dispositions, such as concern
for the other not out of duty or obligation but out of feeling or sympathy;
attention or attentiveness, sensitivity to the needs of others, and more
strongly, taking the others' interests as equal to or more important than
one's own ... and an orientation to the common interest of the family or
of those who are close or related to one.
158
Although the ethic of care approach commendably seeks to accommo-
date and balance the interests of the various individuals who might be
affected by laws governing technological conception, it generally fails
to deliver clear legal rules; its aim is a particularist approach that de-
pends on facts about the individual case at hand.
1 59
Given its emphasis on particularity at the expense of universality,
the ethic of care methodology is an odd choice to guide legislative deci-
sionmaking. Recognizing that the ethic of care is "benign but ineffec-
tual" as a means of devising clear legal standards, the Commission
thus decided to flesh out the approach by adopting eight subsidiary
principles "of special relevance to ... [its] mandate."' 60 The Commis-
sion explains neither the development of the eight principles nor their
relationship to the ethic of care approach. The principles selected run
the gamut from "respect for human life and dignity" and "equality" to
"balancing individual and collective interests" and "appropriate use of
resources."'16 1 The principles are not weighted, and they frequently
point in different directions. Supporting "individual autonomy," for
example, will often preclude "protection of the vulnerable"; many
157 PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 1g, at 49-51.
158 Carol C. Gould, Feminism and Democratic Community Revisited, in DEMOCRATIC
COMMUNITY 396, 404 (John W. Chapman & Ian Shapiro eds., 1993). Feminist thinkers have
typically posited the maternal relationship as a normative model. See, e.g., NEL NODDINGS,
CARING: A FEMININE APPROACH TO ETHICS AND MORAL EDUCATION, 1-6 (1984); SARA
RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE, 127-39 (1989) (arguing
that maternal thinking should inform societal values); Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract,
in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 287, 288-90 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 199o).
159 See, e.g., NODDINGS, supra note 158, at 5 (rejecting "principles and rules as the major
guide to ethical behavior [along with] the notion of universalizability.... Since so much depends
on the subjective experience of those involved in ethical encounters, conditions are rarely 'suffi-
ciently similar' for me to declare that you must do what I must do.").
160 PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note 19, at 52.
161 Id. at 55.. The remaining principles are "individual autonomy," "protection of the vulner-
able," "non-commercialization of reproduction," and "accountability." Id.
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commentators, including Robertson, would argue that support for
autonomy is also inconsistent with "noncommercialization of reproduc-
tion., 162
Perhaps because the principles tug in so many directions, it is often
hard to see their relationship to the Commission's proposed rules.
Who would guess that a set of principles emphasizing equality and in-
dividual autonomy would require a ban on the donation of ova to a
named recipient? 163 Or that they would both support AID use by vir-
tually anyone seeking access to this technology and forbid IVF use ex-
cept in "cases of diagnosed bilateral fallopian tube blockage?" 164 In
sum, although many of the specific rules proposed by the Royal Com-
mission seem sensible, their basis is often unclear. It would not be
surprising if a different Commission, using the same principles,
reached quite different results.
The ethic of care approach thus avoids the rigidity of the rights-
based and contract-based approaches, but it does so at the expense of
predictability. The Commission's need to augment the approach is
understandable, but because the additional principles selected are
vague and contradictory, particular rules favored by the Commission
seem to be drawn from nowhere. Their justification is cursory; their
consistency is questionable.
2. The Reflective Equilibrium Model. - Like the Canadian Com-
mission, the Working Party formed to advise the European Commu-
nity (EU) on technological conception rejected "solutions at the theo-
retical level."165 But instead of the ethic of care methodology, it chose
an approach reliant on the Rawlsian notion of "reflective equilib-
rium. "166 This approach requires the decisionmaker to begin with his
or her "considered judgments," defined as those in which our moral
162 Id. at 53.
163 See id. at 455-56, 485 (AI); id. at 569 (IVF).
164 Id. at 485. The Commission leaves open the possibility of "[c]riteria for determining access
to assisted insemination services ... [that do] not discriminate on the basis of social factors such
as sexual orientation, marital status, or economic status" but suggests none itself. Id. The Com-
mission's criteria for access to IVF reflects its conclusion that "[fOallopian tube blockage is the
only indication for which IVF has been demonstrated effective." Id. at 556. The Commission
thus suggests that medical criteria exclusively determine IVF access but that AID access should
be permitted based on nonmedical criteria; the same lesbian couple who sought access to AID to
achieve parenthood would be precluded from employing IVF to share parenthood by severing
genetic and gestational motherhood.
165 GLOVER, supra note 17, at 30.
166 Id. The reflective equilibrium approach is described in JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 19-22, 46-53, 252-55 (x97x), see also HENRY S. RICHARDSON, PRACTICAL
REASONING ABOUT FINAL ENDS 178 (1994) (discussing "Rawls's notion of wide reflective
equilibrium").
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capacities are most likely to be displayed without distortion. 167 Con-
sidered judgments may occur at all levels of generality, "from those
about particular situations and institutions through broad standards
and first principles to formal and abstract conditions on moral concep-
tions." 168  Reflective equilibrium describes the process by which these
judgments are compared and refined. It entails:
formulating general principles which seem plausible, and then seeing to
what extent their application fits our intuitive responses to particular
cases. Where there is conflict between intuition and theory, we need to re-
consider both.... The hope is that, by a process of mutual adjustment,
we may reach a state of equilibrium, where we have a stable set of princi-
ples and of intuitions, which are in harmony with each other.
169
The reflective equilibrium ideal bears some resemblance to tradi-
tional methods of legal analysis. "In deciding hard cases, judges and
lawyers make an effort to bring their convictions, both general and
particular, into some coherent order, and this is one way that they
think through legal problems." 170 But it is a more demanding process
than that in which judges and legislators typically engage:
The search for reflective equilibrium places a high premium on, first, the
capacity to develop a complete understanding of the basis for particular
judgments and, second, the development of both abstract and general
principles to account for those judgments. If reflective equilibrium could
ever be obtained, we would have both horizontal and vertical consistency
in our judgments.1 7 1
Perhaps because reflective equilibrium is an ideal beyond the typi-
cal aspirations of policymakers, the Working Group's actual delibera-
tions appear to have been considerably less principled than the reflec-
tive equilibrium ideal would suggest. Indeed, it is not always easy to
discern any principles against which the Group contrasted its intui-
tions. For example, in describing its deliberations on surrogacy, the
Group's report notes that:
[s]ome members of the committee are opposed to surrogacy in principle,
because of what the practice does to the surrogate mother. The invasion
of her bodily integrity, the disappointment of any hopes for friendship
with the family who receive the child, the psychological trauma of giving
up the baby, and the possibility of regrets for the rest of her life, add up to
167 TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & JAMES F. CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
20 (4th ed. 1994) (quoting John Rawls, The Independence of Moral Theory, in 48 PROC. &
ADDRESSES OF THE AM. PHIL. ASS'N 5 (1974-75)).
168 Id. at 21 (quoting Rawls, supra note 167, at 8).
169 GLOVER, supra note 17, at 30.
170 SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 17-18; cf JOEL FEINBERG, SOCIAL PHILOSOPHY 34-35
('973).
171 SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 32.
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a very strong case against surrogacy. There is also the possibility of ill ef-
fects on the surrogate's own family, particularly on her own children.
Other members of the committee ... are sufficiently impressed by the
needs of infertile couples to think that some cases of surrogacy are benefi-
cial. 172
At first blush, the statement suggests that some members of the
Group focused on principles while other members focused simply on
needs. But a closer look at the statement reveals that those opposed to
surrogacy in principle in fact relied upon an intuitive cost-benefit ap-
praisal as the basis for their opposition rather than a principle of gen-
eral application, like the anticommodification ethic. Nor is there any
suggestion that costs and benefits were evaluated in any systematic
way: possibilities, traumas, and needs are all thrown into the decision-
making mix without any effort to prioritize or even to factually assess
the merits of the various claims.'7 3 Thus, while the reflective equilib-
rium ideal represents an extraordinarily structured, ambitious method-
ology, the approach actually utilized by the Working Group seems ex-
traordinarily ad hoc and unambitious.
This gap between the ideal and the real suggests that the reflective
equilibrium model may be too demanding for use in real-world deci-
sionmaking. It is not obvious that lawmakers - who will rarely bring
identical moral principles and factual assumptions to the bargaining
table - have either the time or the will to realize the Rawlsian ideal.
Nor does it seem necessary that lawmakers achieve complete consen-
sus at the level of high-order moral principles; certainly we do not de-
mand that they reflect this deeply in other contexts.
C. The Interpretive Approach
i. The Model and Its Advantages. - The multi-principle and re-
flective equilibrium models pioneered by the Canadian and EU groups
represent improvements over single-principle approaches. Both permit
172 GLOVER, supra note 17, at 76-77 (emphasis added).
173 The approach utilized by the Working Group thus resembles a rough form of utilitarian cal-
culus. Such an approach is doomed to fail because we generally lack the empirical data necessary
to assess welfare gain or loss and to make interpersonal welfare comparisons. In most instances,
it is thus impossible to precisely assess whether a rule that enhances the welfare of some while
reducing the welfare of others serves utilitarian goals. See, e.g., John Broome, Utilitarian Meta-
physics?, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING 70, 82-84 (Jon Elster & John
E. Roemer eds., i991); John A. Weymark, A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi-Sen Debate on
Utilitarianism, in INTERPERSONAL COMPARISONS OF WELL-BEING, supra, at 255, 296-97.
The Working Group's deliberations reflect this problem: members of the Committee could not
agree on whether the harms to the surrogate mother and her family were outweighed by the wel-
fare gains of the infertile couple because there is no way of measuring, aggregating, or comparing
these costs and benefits. Utilitarian analysis also has difficulty with rights claims. See GLOVER,
supra note 17, at 27; David Lyons, Utility and Rights, in ETHICS, ECONOMICS, AND THE LAW
107, 113-18 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1982).
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the decisionmaker to consider evidence on a range of issues and to bal-
ance competing concerns. The reflective equilibrium model, at least
when represented as an ideal, also incorporates a consistency require-
ment that is desirable in order to ensure fair treatment of similarly
situated individuals. But as actually practiced by the Canadian and
EU panels, both approaches seem overly reliant upon intuition. As a
result, neither can provide a strong justification for any particular
policy choice. The interpretive approach that I advocate in this sec-
tion offers a means of avoiding these various deficiencies.
Like the methods pioneered by the Canadian and EU policy
groups, the interpretive approach eschews reliance upon a single grand
theme in favor of a multi-principle dialectic. But rather than high-
level abstractions, it relies on specific legal principles and policies. The
methodology could perhaps be described as a form of legal casuistry;
certainly it bears a strong resemblance to the traditional process of
analogical reasoning utilized by judges.
The example of judicial decisionmaking helps to differentiate the
interpretive approach from both the top-down methodology and the
intuitive approaches used by the Canadian and EU groups. Consider
the well-known case of In re Baby M,'174 which triggered much of the
current statutory law on surrogacy. As the case wound its way
through the courts, there was an outpouring of commentary that relied
on a variety of approaches. Some commentators dealt with the issues
from the perspective of one or another top-down theory; more specifi-
cally, one group urged that enforcement was mandated by procrea-
tional liberties, 175 while another urged that enforcement was precluded
by the anticommodification principle. 176 Other commentators used an
intuitive, cost-benefit analysis; some, for example, asserted that the
agreement should not be enforced because surrogacy is exploitative
174 537 A.2d 1227 (N.J. 1988).
175 See Ethics Committee of the American Fertility Society, Ethical Considerations of the New
Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY i, 58-68 (Supp. 1 1986); Robertson,
Embryos & Families, supra note 87, at 954-67; Thomas S. Bradley, Note, Prohibiting Payments
to Surrogate Mothers: Love's Labor Lost and the Constitutional Right of Privacy, 20 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 715, 729-33 (987).
176 See, e.g., Radin, supra note 149, at 192 1-36; Barbara Katz Rothman, Surrogacy: A Question
of Values, CONSCIENCE, May/June 1987, at 1, 2-4.
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and demeaning to women, I77 while others urged that it is demeaning
to women not to enforce such agreements. 178
By contrast, the New Jersey Supreme Court approached the case
from the perspective of existing law, which forbids baby sales. 179 If a
contract to sell a baby is unenforceable, the court reasoned, why
should it matter that the baby was conceived through artificial insemi-
nation? Both baby selling in its "traditional" form and the contract at
issue in Baby M involve relinquishment of parental rights in return for
a fee. The biological relationships established using AI and IVF are
not different from those established when children are conceived coi-
tally; nor are the children themselves discernably different. Because
the court found no essential difference between the two types of trans-
actions, it concluded that the contract at issue in Baby M was inva-
lid.180
I do not mean to suggest by this example that issues arising from
technological conception can always be resolved by reference to cur-
rent law, or even that the application of current law will be obvious.','
Indeed, another state court, analyzing the legality of a surrogacy
agreement under its baby-selling laws, determined that surrogacy did
not offend the baby-selling ban, both because the practice was not
within the contemplation of the legislature at the time the statute was
enacted and because, in its view, the sole purpose of the ban was to
"keep baby brokers from overwhelming an expectant mother or the
177 See e.g., COREA, supra note x5, at 213-45; Capron & Radin, supra note 146, at 36; see also
Virginia Held, Non-Contractual Society: A Feminist View, in SCIENCE, MORALITY &
FEMINIST THEORY I II, 113 (Marsha Hanen & Kai Nielsen eds., 1987) ("To see contractual rela-
tions between self-interested ... individuals as constituting a paradigm of human relations is ....
to overlook or to discount in very fundamental ways the experience of women."); Cyril C. Means,
Jr., Surrogacy v. the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 N.Y.L. SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 445, 445-47 (1987)
(urging that surrogacy violates the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition on involuntary servitude).
178 See, e.g., SHALEV, supra note 3o, at io-04, 165-66 (arguing in favor of the contractual ap-
proach and concluding that "[ihf we are to transform our patriarchal reproductive consciousness,
we cannot evade the burden of our personal human agency"); Lori B. Andrews, Surrogate Moth-
erhood: The Challenge for Feminists, x6 L. MED. & HEALTH CARE 72, 76 (1988).
179 See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 124o-46; see also In re Adoption of McFadyen, 438 N.E.2d 1362,
1364, 1365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (addressing a claim by a party attempting to use the language of
surrogacy - or "surrogate insemination" - in the context of coital conception, described in one
pleading as "artificial insemination by means of a surrogate donor's penis").
1s0 See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1245-46. A few commentators have agreed with the reasoning of
the New Jersey Supreme Court, but concluded that both types of sales should be legalized. See
Epstein, supra note 132, at 2330-34 (agreeing that a commercial surrogacy contract represents
"the sale of a half-interest in a baby" and concluding that all types of baby sales should be legal).
181 Professor Martha Field, in a thorough, book-length treatment of surrogacy that represents a
notable exception to the intuitionist and single-principle approaches, explores in detail the possi-
ble applications of contract law, baby-selling prohibitions, adoption law, and AID statutes. See
FIELD, supra note 30, at 75-125 (1988); see also Marsha Garrison, Surrogate Parenting: What
Should Legislatures Do?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 249, 153-71 (x988) (applying baby-selling prohibitions,
adoption law, and AID statutes to surrogacy).
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parents of a child with financial inducements to part with the
child."" 2
While the Baby M court's analysis seems better reasoned, 183 my
primary point here is simply that the process engaged in by judges of-
fers an excellent model for a lawmaking heuristic in the area of tech-
nological conception. The disagreement between these courts comes
down to a dispute about whether a surrogacy contract is sufficiently
like "classic" instances of baby selling so as to fall under the baby-
selling ban. In comparison to a conflict between, say, the claims of
contract and noncommodification, this is a narrow disagreement that
turns on the central purpose of a specific legislative enactment and of-
fers the opportunity for close case comparisons instead of broad, theo-
retical disagreement. It is also subject to fact-based resolution; for ex-
ample, the Baby M court rejected the argument that the surrogacy
contract was simply for gestational services and thus did not offend
the baby-selling ban based on the fact that the "surrogate" mother re-
ceived no money unless and until she turned over her child.18 4 In the
end, reasonable people may still disagree, but their disagreement will
be cabined and focused.
The interpretive model holds these same advantages over an intui-
tion-based or cost-benefit assessment. The competing claims that sur-
rogacy contract enforcement is demeaning to women and that surro-
gacy contract nonenforcement is demeaning to women represent broad
value assertions rather than statements of fact. Such claims cannot be
subjected to empirical analysis, nor can disagreements about them be
resolved or even narrowed.
Because of these various advantages of the interpretive model, one
or another variant of the methodology has found favor with several
groups charged with developing policy in areas where feelings run
high, but consensus on general principles is lacking. For example, a
182 Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth ex tel. Armstrong, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky.
1986).
183 The Kentucky court's analysis is cursory and ignores the fact that surrogacy, like classic in-
stances of baby selling, conditions a child's adoption on payment to her parent(s). The Baby M
court entertained "no doubt whatsoever that the money [was] being paid to obtain an adoption,"
537 A.2d at I2,to, and rejected the argument that surrogacy did not produce harms of the sort the
legislature intended to avert:
It strains credulity to claim that ... surrogacy ... amount[s] to something other than a
private placement adoption for money.
... The evils inherent in baby-bartering are loathsome for a myriad of reasons....
Baby-selling potentially results in the exploitation of all parties involved.... The nega-
tive consequences of baby-buying are potentially present in the surrogacy context, espe-
cially the potential for placing and adopting a child without regard to the interest of the
child or the natural mother.
Id. at 1241-42 (citation omitted). For a similar analysis, see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 796-97
(Mass. 1998).
184 See Baby M, 537 A.2d at 1241.
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commission appointed by the federal government to develop guidelines
for criminal sentencing ultimately rejected reliance upon both high
theory and intuition in favor of an approach based heavily upon past
practice.' 85  The commission considered the possibility of devising
guidelines based on a deterrence model of punishment; it also consid-
ered guidelines based on a "just deserts" principle: "Why didn't the
Commission sit down and really go and rationalize this thing and not
just take history?" In the words of the Commission's chairperson, "we
couldn't. We couldn't because there are such good arguments
... pointing in opposite directions. '186
The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of
Biomedical and Behavioral Research similarly found that "the one
thing [on which its members] could not agree ... was why they
agreed.... Instead of securely established universal principles,
... [t]he locus of certitude in the commissioners' discussions ... lay in
a shared perception of what was specifically at stake in particular
kinds of human situations. " 187 In contrast to the Sentencing Commis-
sion, this group did not eschew reliance on principles altogether. In-
stead, "transcripts of the commission's deliberations show a constant
back-and-forth movement from principle to case, and from case to
principle. '188 The principles relied on by the group were not, however,
broad high-level theories, but the more specific principles employed by
bioethicists in resolving individual cases. The Commission's method-
ology thus strongly resembled the traditional process of judicial deci-
sionmaking.
2. Legislation or Litigation? - If the process I have in mind
strongly resembles that used by judges, would it be best simply to let
judges make law on a case-by-case basis? The pace with which re-
productive technology has advanced suggests caution before enacting a
comprehensive regulatory scheme. But as we have seen, reproductive
technology is now a "mature" area of medical practice and, certainly
with respect to parental status, the legal issues are clear.
Legislation also holds many advantages over a case-by-case ap-
proach to law making. A statutory standard can provide clearer and
more detailed notice of relevant legal requirements. Moreover, because
judges can only decide the cases before them, they are incapable of
185 See Stephen A. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon
Which They Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 28-31 (i988).
186 SUNSTEIN, supra note 22, at 9; see also Breyer, supra note 18s, at 31-32.
187 ALBERT R. JONSEN & STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE ABUSE OF CASUISTRY: A HISTORY
OF MORAL REASONING 18 (1988).
188 BEAUCHAMP & CHILDRESS, supra note 167, at 98.
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charting a consistent policy over a broad range of legal issues. 8 9 For
example, one court has recently ruled that sperm is heritable' 90 while
another tribunal, interpreting the federal Social Security statutes, has
ruled that a child conceived after the sperm donor's death is not a
"survivor" of the decedent.' 9 ' Both decisions represent plausible inter-
pretations of the statutes in question, but they fail to provide a coher-
ent policy on posthumous conception. Finally, legislators can and
should take account of a range of practical concerns that judges will
seldom be able to address: problems of feasibility, efficiency, noncom-
pliance, and political acceptability can be addressed far more explicitly
in shaping a legislative enactment than in crafting a judicial opinion.
Because of these various advantages of a legislative approach, statu-
tory standards to govern the legal parentage of technologically con-
ceived children seem preferable to continued case-by-case adjudica-
tion.
An analogous case is that of life-sustaining medical technology.
Techniques that sustain life even when the patient has no hope of re-
gaining consciousness emerged contemporaneously with reproductive
techniques aimed at creating life. The new end-of-life treatments
likewise raised a host of new legal questions. In most states, these is-
sues were dealt with on a case-by-case basis for a number of years be-
fore statutory enactments arose. But with end-of-life technology, statu-
tory regulation - setting standards for so-called "advance
directives," 192 requiring hospitals to promote such directives through
189 See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITU-
TIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 123-50 (994) (analyzing the limitations of
courts as policymaking entities); cf. Satz v. Perlmutter, 379 So. 2d 359, 36o (Fla. 198o) ("Because
the issue [of end-of-life decisionmaking for an incompetent] is fraught with complexity and en-
compasses the interests of the law, ... medical ethics and social morality, it is not one which is
well-suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of] issue which is
more suitably addressed in the legislative forum .... ).
'90 See Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).
'9' See Joseph Wharton, "Miracle" Baby Denied Benefits, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1996, at 38. The So-
cial Security Commissioner ultimately reversed the decision and awarded benefits. See Girl to
Get Benefits in Death of Father Before Conception, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1996, at A13.
192 States began to statutorily authorize "living wills" in the late 197os; today, all 5o states and
the District of Columbia have adopted living will statutes. See BARRY R. FURROW, THOMAS L.
GREANEY, SANDRA H. JOHNSON, TIMOTHY S. JOST & ROBERT L. SCHWARTZ, HEALTH
LAW xio6 (3d ed. x999). At least 33 states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation
permitting individuals to create "durable powers of attorney" applicable to the termination of life-
sustaining treatment (LST). See JUDITH AREEN, PATRICIA A. KING, STEVEN GOLDBERG,
LAWRENCE GOSTIN & ALEXANDER MORGAN CAPRON, LAW, SCIENCE AND MEDICINE
1188 (2d ed. 1996). Of the states without statutes specifically authorizing durable LST powers,
"all have general durable power of attorney statutes which could be interpreted to authorize a du-
rable power of attorney for health care"; in a number of these states, court decisions or attorney
general opinions specify that the general statute applies to LST. Id.
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patient education,193 authorizing family members to make medical
care decisions when advance directives are unavailable 94 - now oc-
cupies much of the field in which case-by-case decisionmaking was
formerly necessary. 95 There is every reason to believe that the field of
reproductive technology would profit from a similar approach. In-
deed, it is ironic that legislatures have devoted so much attention to
the regulation of dying, while conception is in most states subject to
virtually no statutory law.
3. The Value and Meaning of Consistency. - As we have seen,
technological conception raises a number of parental status questions;
a related issue, like that which arises in the case of adoption, concerns
the technologically conceived child's right to information about his or
her genetic progenitors. In developing new law applicable to these
various issues, the interpretive model requires consistency with current
law, public policy, and public values. Once these requirements have
been met, the model permits a more flexible approach to legislation
that takes account of the various parties' interests as well as practical
and political constraints.
Consistency may, at first blush, seem too narrow a virtue for
policymaking in an area that, like technological conception, is both novel
and controversial. After all, pursuit of consistency "can require us to
support legislation we believe would be inappropriate in the perfectly just
and fair society and to recognize rights we do not believe people would
have there. 11 96 A consistent result will not necessarily be an ideal result,
or one that we would choose if we were beginning life in a brave new
world without precedents or past practices.
Clearly, it is one or another vision of the ideal that has stimulated most
of the global theorists writing about technological conception. Professor
Schultz, for example, who has eloquently made the case for a contract-
based approach to parentage determination, has also eloquently urged
contract as a governing principle in other areas of family life such as
marriage;1 97 Schultz seems to prefer the world of private ordering and
193 The Patient Self-Determination Act was passed as part of the Omnibus Budget Reconcilia-
tion Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. ioi-5o8, 104 Stat. 1388. The key provisions are contained in 42
U.S.C. §§ 1395cc(a)(I)(Q), 1395mm(cX8), 1396a(aX57)-1396a(aXs8), x396a(w) (1994). For a sum-
mary of the Act's requirements, see FURROW, GREANY, JOHNSON, JOST & SCHWARTZ, supra
note 192, at 114-15.
194 See FURROW, GREANY, JOHNSON, JOST & SCHWARTZ, supra note 192, at I115-I7 (de-
scribing current family consent statutes).
195 See CURRAN, HALL, BOBINSKI & ORENTLICHER, supra note 14, at 626 (reporting that
"[a]bout half of the states" now have statutes governing termination of medical treatment for pa-
tients without advance directives).
196 DWORKIN, supra note 22, at 176-77 (discussing the "integrity of the law").
197 See Marjorie Maguire Schultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Pol-
icy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204 (1982).
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promise keeping offered by contract law to the world of responsibility and
status offered by family law. For commentators like Schultz, technological
conception offers the opportunity to achieve the ideal in at least one
category of cases.
But by adopting a new ideal in one restricted case category, the
policymaker risks what Professor Ronald Dworkin has aptly described as
"checkerboard" law:
Do the people of North Dakota disagree whether justice requires compen-
sation for product defects that manufacturers could not reasonably have
prevented? Then why should their legislature not impose this "strict" li-
ability on manufacturers of automobiles but not on manufacturers of
washing machines? Do the people of Alabama disagree about the moral-
ity of racial discrimination? Why should their legislature not forbid racial
discrimination on buses but permit it in restaurants? 198
Even those of us who strongly support one side in the debate over strict
liability or racial discrimination would typically reject compromises "that
treat similar accidents or occasions of racial discrimination ... differently
on arbitrary grounds."199 We say that "a state that adopts these internal
compromises is acting in an unprincipled way" and that "[t]he state lacks
integrity because it must endorse principles to justify part of what it has
done that it must reject to justify the rest."200
Policymakers may find the claims of contract - or reproductive
liberty or the anticommodification ethic - sufficiently appealing that they
will want to enhance its role in parentage law. But such a shift should be
made in all similarly situated cases and not restricted to an arbitrary
subset. Checkerboard rulemaking violates the ethical norm that like cases
receive like treatment; it denies "what is often called 'equality before the
law. '201
A consistency requirement does not demand that the law remain static.
It merely requires the policymaker to follow a coherent, uniform approach
to legal change. In recent years, many of family law's most fundamental
assumptions have been challenged; commentators have urged courts and
legislatures to rethink even such basic categories as marriage and the
family unit.10 2 These challenges to tradition reflect recent shifts in our
family life and the pluralistic nature of our society, which must
accommodate differing visions of the good if it is to thrive. Family law
198 DwORKIN, supra note 22, at 178.
199 Id. at 179.
200 Id. at 183-84.
201 Id. at 185.
202 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996) (arguing in
favor of legal recognition of same-sex unions); MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY
TRAGEDIES 101-25 (I995) (arguing that the law should recognize the mother-child dyad as the basic
family form).
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has repeatedly demonstrated the capacity to respond to such challenges; a
consistency requirement demands only that it do so in a principled way.
Proponents of novel parental status rules for technological conception
have typically assumed, of course, that the new methods of baby making
are sufficiently different from sexual conception to justify a new approach.
And technological conception does clearly differ from sexual conception in
terms of mechanics - sperm and ovum are combined in different ways.
But washing machines also differ from automobiles, and restaurants from
buses. We want to treat washing machines like automobiles for purposes
of a manufacturer liability law because the values and policy goals that
determine the choice of a liability rule apply equally to both washing
machines and automobiles; we want to treat restaurants like buses for
purposes of a racial discrimination law for the same reasons. "Even
though we recognize that there are, in a literal sense, differences of one
kind or another, we suppress these differences or inexactitudes, because
the points of convergence are far more important ... than the points of
divergence."203
For purposes of a parental status rule, the differences between sexual
and technological conception are like the differences between restaurants
and buses - they are irrelevant to the values and policy goals that
underlie the choice of a decision-making standard. Parentage law
regulates the formation of family relationships, not the mechanics of
conception. The law has never cared whether sperm and ovum met in a
fallopian tube or in the uterus; there is no obvious reason why it should
care if sperm and ovum meet in a petri dish. What matters are the
relational interests that ultimately result. And there is simply no evidence
that technological conception is creating genuinely new family forms.
Consider the case of Louise Brown, the first child conceived
through IVF. In an interview given at age nineteen, Louise noted that
she was "just an ordinary girl."20 4 Of course, Louise's birth was not
ordinary; given her conception in a petri dish, it was world-wide news.
Indeed, the very fact that Louise was interviewed nineteen years later
is testament to the extraordinariness of her birth. But while Louise
was conceived in vitro, she was conceived using the sperm and ova of
her married parents who had failed to conceive a child sexually, par-
ents who planned to raise Louise after her birth and who in fact did
so. Louise's parental relationships were thus extraordinarily ordinary.
203 Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1215, 1218 (998).
Professor Schauer explains that:
[Cilaims of identity, likeness, exactness, and sameness ... are not ordinarily claims of
literal equality in all respects, or even in all potentially relevant respects, but rather they
are claims that people should be treated the same in some number of respects because
they are the same in some, but clearly not in all, respects.
Id. at 1219.
204 Ruth Deech, Infertility and Ethics, 9 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 337, 338 (x997).
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Louise may have felt particularly wanted because her parents went to
such lengths to produce her, but there is no reason to suppose that the
relationship of Louise and her parents would in other respects differ
from those of other married couples and their sexually conceived chil-
dren. In cases like Louise Brown's, no commentator has suggested
that legal parentage should be determined any differently than it is in
cases of sexual conception. And because the end result - the parent-
child relationship - is the same as that of sexual conception, consis-
tency demands similar treatment.
Of course, many cases of technological conception involve donated
eggs, sperm, or both; women who employ AID and IVF may also be
single.2 05 It is in these cases that reproductive rights and contract ad-
vocates have argued for new legal approaches. But what distinguishes
these cases from that of Louise Brown is not the use of technology -
identical reproductive techniques are involved - but the use of ge-
netic material from an individual outside the family that plans to raise
the child. Biological "outsiders" are hardly a novelty, however; family
law regularly contends with marital infidelity,20 6 casual sex, and "par-
ents" whose relationships derive from nurture rather than nature. If
mechanics are irrelevant in determining the parentage of Louise
Brown, it is hard to see why they should be relevant in these outsider
situations.
Take the case of Erez, an African-American toddler recently pro-
filed in the New York Times Sunday Magazine. Erez's family includes
his gay, male, white parents (one of whom adopted the toddler when
"well past 4o" and before he met the other) plus "a company of extras,"
including "gay uncles, career-track women, stranded grannies, and
loving if hired hands" who baby-sit and serve as a larger, extended
"shadow family."20  Somewhere in the background, of course, are
Erez's biological parents, who relinquished him for adoption. Erez's
family - biological, adoptive, and functional parents with some racial
and gender anomalies thrown into the mix - represents a genuine de-
parture from our traditional family norms. But that departure is not
dependent on technology. Nor is there evidence that the families
which arise from technological conception involve more variable or
profoundly different relationships than those which arise from sexual
conception, adoption, and shared family life.
205 See supra note 9.
206 Experts variously estimate the rate of nonmarital paternity among births to married
women. See Serge Br~dart & Robert M. French, Do Babies Resemble Their Fathers More Than
Their Mothers? A Failure to Replicate Christenfeld and Hill (1995), 20 EVOLUTION & HUM.
BEHAV. 129, x3o--3i (1999) (summarizing research reports and noting estimates of extramarital
paternity of 6% to 30% in southern England and xo% in rural Michigan).
207 Jesse Green, Orbiting the Son, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1999, § 6 (Magazine), at 66.
2000]
HARVARD LAW REVIEW
Because the law of parental status regulates relationships and the
same relational possibilities are available in cases of technological and
sexual conception, the mechanical differences between these methods
of conception should not be determinative. To fashion novel parental
status rules for technological conception alone risks outcomes reliant
on discordant values that have been rejected for the rest of our fami-
lies. Indeed, disparate rules may raise serious equal protection prob-
lems. For example, in resolving the parentage of a child born through
a gestational surrogacy arrangement, one court recently held that it
was bound, under the Equal Protection Clause, to determine mother-
hood under standards consistent with those applied to fatherhood.20
Given that parenthood is a constitutionally protected status,20 9 differ-
ences in parental status rules should be justified by more than differ-
ences in conception mechanics.
Current law governing the status of those who conceive sexually
and those who adopt thus becomes crucially important: unless there is
a justifiable basis for distinguishing technological conception from
these other methods of achieving parentage, fairness demands that
status be determined by similar legal standards.
III. THE LAW OF PARENTAL STATUS: WHO IS A LEGAL PARENT?
How IS PARENTAGE DETERMINED?
Our legal tradition has long determined parentage based on both
biological and social factors.210 When assigning parental status to
someone other than a biological progenitor, courts and legislatures
have relied on several policy goals. The most important of these aims
- today as much as in earlier times - has been ensuring that children
have at least one, and preferably two, legal parents who are responsi-
ble for their care and support. This policy goal has been paramount
because it has been thought to serve the interests of both children and
the public. Thus, although concerned with parental rights as well as
obligations, the law of parentage ultimately reflects legislative and ju-
dicial judgments about children's physical and emotional needs. Par-
entage law also reflects public fiscal concerns, which have favored
rules ensuring, to the extent possible, that parents rather than the
208 See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994). For criticism of Soos, see
Alexander Morgan Capron, Horton Hatches the Egg, 25 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 30 (995).
209 See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 4o6 U.S. 205 (1972).
210 See WAGNER, supra note 146, at 201 (noting that "[iun both the recent and distant past, the
primary tension within the law of the family has been between rights and duties arising from ge-
netic and gestational relationships ... and a perceived need to ground rights and duties in the
external social form of the family"); Schiff, supra note iii, at 532 (noting that the "weight that the
law accords to biology is influenced heavily by favored social policies, such as the desirability of
the nuclear family and the importance to the child of having nurturing, committed parents").
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public bear the cost of childrearing. Finally, parentage law reflects
current family ideology, which may support rules promoting some
family forms over others.
A. The Marital Presumption of Legitimacy
The primary rule governing the parentage of children born to a
married woman is the marital presumption of legitimacy. While the
common law permitted rebuttal of the presumption only by proof that
a husband was incapable of procreation or had no access to his wife
during the relevant period, 211 the presumption is typically rebuttable
today in a wider range of circumstances. 212  Because sophisticated
blood and DNA tests now make it possible to prove or disprove pater-
nity 'with a very high degree of reliability,213 the rules governing when
and by whom the presumption may be rebutted will determine the
outcome of most cases.
In order to protect the marital family, many states severely restrict
a putative father's opportunity to assert his paternity. For example,
the Uniform Parentage Act, adopted in nearly half of the states, per-
mits rebuttal of the marital presumption by clear and convincing evi-
dence but grants standing to commence such an action only to the
211 See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *442-
*45 (1765) ("[Glenerally, during the coverture access of the husband shall be presumed, unless the
contrary can be shewn; which is such a negative as can only be proved by shewing him to be
elsewhere: for the general rule is, praesumitur pro legitimatione."). Under Lord Mansfield's Rule,
first enunciated in Goodright v. Moss, 98 Eng. Rep. 1257 (x777), neither spouse was permitted to
testify to nonaccess by the husband. The source of restrictions on rebutting the presumption was
the desire to protect children from the stigma and legal disadvantages of illegitimacy, coupled
with the hope of promoting marital harmony, "a goal that is obviously impaired by facilitating
suits against husband and wife asserting that their children are illegitimate." Michael H. v. Ger-
ald D., 491 U.S. 110, 125 (1989); see also MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH:
LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 202 (1985).
212 See LESLIE J. HARRIS, LEE E. TEITELBAUM & CAROL A. WEISBROD, FAMILY LAW
1077 (i996). In many states, the presumption has been codified. Section 4 of the Uniform Par-
entage Act restates the presumption; it, or a close variation, has been adopted in r7 states. See
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
§ 3 .02A cmt. d, reporter's note at 82 (Council Draft No. 5 1998) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES](listing states). The more recent Uniform Status of Children of Assisted Conception Act
(USCACA), USCACA § 3, 9B U.L.A. 195-96 (igg), also incorporates the presumption by speci-
fying that the husband of a woman (other than a surrogate mother) who bears a child through
assisted conception is deemed to be the father if he fails to challenge his paternity within two
years after discovering the child's birth. See id. Older state statutes incorporating the presump-
tion of legitimacy are collected in Jean E. Goldstein, Recent Case, "Children Born of the Mar-
riage" - Res Judicata Effect on Later Support Proceedings, 45 Mo. L. REV. 307, 308 n.5 (I98o).
213 See David H. Kaye, DNA Paternity Probabilities, 24 FAM. L.Q. 279, 292-304 (iggo); D.H.
Kaye, Presumptions, Probability and Paternity, 30 JURIMETRICS J. 323, 337-42 (iggo); Jeffrey
W. Morris & David W. Gjertson, The Scientific Status of Parentage Testing, in i MODERN SCI.
EVIDENCE § 19-2.0 (David L. Faigman, David H. Kaye, Michael J. Saks & Joseph Sanders, eds.
1997).
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child, the mother, and her husband unless, during the child's minority,
the putative father has "receive[d] the child into his home and openly
[held] out the child as his natural child";214 the presumption may be
rebutted only "if the action is brought within a reasonable time after
obtaining knowledge of relevant facts. '215 State courts have upheld
such restrictions against constitutional challenges,216 and, in Michael
H. v. Gerald D.,217 a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the
states may prefer the interests of the mother's husband to those of the
biological father, even if the biological father has lived with the mother
and their child in a family unit.218
Even when a paternity challenge is brought by a party with
standing, courts have typically avoided a finding of husband nonpa-
ternity when it would conflict with the child's interests. There are any
number of cases in which divorce courts, usually relying on estoppel or
laches principles, have refused to permit the mother's husband to liti-
gate the paternity issue 219 or denied the mother the opportunity to con-
test the presumption when she had acquiesced in her husband's estab-
lishment of a paternal relationship with her child;220 following divorce,
courts have relied on res judicata or collateral estoppel principles to
bar subsequent paternity contests.2 21 Judges have also struck down
spousal (non)paternity agreements that conflict with the child's inter-
214 UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 298-99, 302 (i973).
215 Id. § 6(a)(2), 9B U.L.A. 302.
216 See, e.g., In re Paternity of C.A.S., 468 N.W.2d 719, 727 (Wis. 1991) ("The best interests of
the children are the ultimate and paramount considerations in this case, and reflect a strong pub-
lic policy of this state."); A v. X, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982) ("[A] child has a right to legitimacy
and that right is one the State is bound to protect during minority.") (internal quotation marks
omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1021 (1982).
217 491 U.S. 11o (1989) (plurality opinion).
218 See id. at 129 ("Where ... the natural father's unique opportunity [to establish a parental
relationship] conflicts with the similarly unique opportunity of the husband of the marriage[,] it is
not unconstitutional for the State to give categorical preference to the latter.").
219 See generally ALI PRINCIPLES, supra note 212, § 3 .02A cmt. d, reporter's note at 83 (citing
cases and noting that "[m]ost states find husbands estopped from challenging paternity under cer-
tain facts").
220 See In re Marriage of Gallagher, 539 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Iowa 1995) (holding that a mother's
husband might be able to claim custody of a two-year-old child with whom he had developed a
parent-child relationship, in which he had learned that another man was the child's father during
the pendency of the divorce action); In re Marriage of Ross, 783 P.2d 331, 338-39 (Kan. 1989)
(holding that a court may not order blood tests to determine paternity in an action brought by a
mother when disruption of the child's established relationship with the mother's former husband
was not in the child's interests); Pettinato v. Pettinato, 582 A.2d 909, 912-13 (R.I. 199o) (holding a
mother estopped from challenging her husband's paternity, because she had told him that he was
the child's father); In re Marriage of D.L.J. & R.R.J., 469 N.W.2d 877, 879-81 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
221 See Goldstein, supra note 212.
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ests.222 The combined effect of the marital presumption and these
various bases for avoiding a nonpaternity finding is that children of
married couples will almost invariably have two parents with care and
support obligations.
B. Nonmarital Parenting
Under the common law, concern for children's interests was tem-
pered by the risk of erroneous paternity adjudications223 and the desire
to channel childbearing within the confines of marriage. The result
was rules that penalized nonmarital children and rigidly cabined the
paternity claim. As late as the ig6os, most states denied a nonmarital
child the right to inherit from his or her father, the right to bear the fa-
ther's name, and the right to public benefits based on the parental re-
lationship; paternity actions were also subject to very short statutes of
limitation and evidentiary restrictions.2 24  Unmarried fathers had no
more rights than did their children. Consent of the child's mother
alone was sufficient to permit the child's adoption, and paternity stat-
utes frequently provided the unwed father with no opportunity to es-
tablish his paternity.22 s
Beginning in the late I96Os, the Supreme Court initiated wholesale
revision of these laws. In a lengthy series of decisions, the Court
struck down "nearly all forms of legal discrimination against nonmari-
tal children. '226  During the same period, the Court established new
rights for unmarried fathers. In Stanley v. Illinois,227 it held that an
unmarried father was entitled to a hearing on his fitness as a parent
before his children could be placed in state custody.228 And, in a series
of later cases pitting unmarried fathers against mothers' husbands, the
Court ruled that a father may block an adoption by a stepparent if he
222 See, e.g., Casbar v. DiCanio, 666 So. 2d 1028, io3o (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. I996) ("[P]arents may
not contract away the rights of their children to support.").
223 See Richard 0. Arther & John E. Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector Technique to Determine
the Truth in Disputed Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 213, 215,
217 (1954) (reporting that in a six-year study of 312 disputed paternity cases in Chicago, 57% of
the witnesses who had testified to having intercourse with the complainant for the purpose of es-
tablishing that the mother had had multiple sexual partners during the period of conception ad-
mitted having lied, while 41% of mothers admitted having lied in denying intercourse with an-
other man).
224 See CLARK, supra note 123, at 149-72 (describing common law rules and Supreme Court
decisions on illegitimacy).
225 During this period, "the law hardly considered the possibility that an unmarried father
might seek to assert paternity rather than escape it, and procedures for such actions were often
not available." ELLMAN, KURTZ & SCOTT, supra note 74, at 1o63.
226 HARRY D. KRAUSE, LINDA D. ELROD, MARSHA GARRISON & J. THOMAS OLDHAM,
FAMILY LAW: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 293 (4 th ed. 1998).
227 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
228 See id. at. 658.
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"demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood
by com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child." 229
The Supreme Court's decisions on nonmarital parenting demon-
strated that paternity law could constitutionally focus on children's in-
terests and allow a minor child to assert a paternity claim at any time
under any circumstances but permit an unmarried father to block his
child's opportunity to experience two-parent care only after demon-
strating a willingness to offer the child a meaningful relationship him-
self. In recent years, paternity law has increasingly conformed to the
child-focused pattern laid out by the Supreme Court. In most states,
an unmarried father may establish his paternity without limitation if
the mother is unmarried and plans to raise the child alone,230 but if the
mother marries and her husband is prepared to adopt, the father must
demonstrate the ability to provide his child with a meaningful rela-
tionship to retain his parental rights. And, in many states, if the
mother consents to the child's adoption by others, only willingness to
assume custody and all related obligations will suffice to ensure an
unmarried father's retention of parental status.23'
At the same time, both the state and federal governments have en-
acted laws to facilitate paternity establishment by children and their
mothers. For example, federal legislation now mandates paternity
statutes of limitation extending to 18 years after the child's birth, ge-
netic testing in contested paternity cases, 232 and streamlined case pro-
cessing.233 State legislatures have been active in pursuit of similar
goals. 234
229 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 26i (1983) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380,
392 (x979) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (979)
(holding that a statute permitting an unwed mother, but not an unwed father, to prevent a child's
adoption simply by witholding her consent violated the Equal Protection Clause). For commen-
tary on the rights of unmarried fathers and the Supreme Court case law, see Elizabeth Buchanan,
The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 313 (1984); Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Drqftees: The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415 (ig9i); and Mary L. Shanley, Unwed Fathers' Rights, Adoption, and Sex
Equality: Gender-Neutrality and the Perpetuation of Patriarchy, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 6o (1995).
230 See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 6, 9B U.L.A. 298-99, 302-03 (1973).
231 See ELLMAN, KURTZ & SCOTT, supra note 74, at 1402 ("If the mother consents to adop-
tion and prospective adoptive parents are ready to undertake responsibility for the child, the fa-
ther generally must demonstrate that he is ready to step in to assume full parental responsibili-
ties.").
232 See Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, § 111, 102 Stat. 2343, 2349 (1988).
233 For a detailed description of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconcilia-
tion Act of 1996 paternity requirements, see Paul K. Legler, The Coming Revolution in Child
Support Policy: Implications of the 1996 Wegfare Act, 30 FAM. L.Q. 519, 532-35 (1996).
234 Some states have recognized "in-hospital" paternity establishment, which researchers have
found can significantly improve paternity establishment rates. See Freya L. Sonenstein, Pamela
A. Holcomb & Kristin S. Seefeldt, Promising Approaches to Improving Paternity Establishment
Rates at the Local Level, in CHILD SUPPORT AND CHILD WELL-BEING 31, 52 (Irwin Gar-
finkel, Sara S. McLanahan & Philip Robins eds., 1994). Other states have allowed paternity es-
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Legislative interest in paternity establishment has been driven by a
swift and substantial rise in nonmarital parenting; almost a third of
U.S. births now occur outside of wedlock, as compared to ii as re-
cently as 1970.235 This trend troubled policymakers for two reasons.
First, children in single-parent households have a higher rate of pov-
erty and welfare dependence than any other segment of the American
population. 236 Second, as compared to their peers in two-parent fami-
lies, children in single-parent households are more likely to experience
serious childhood and adult problems, including poor health, delin-
quency, behavioral problems, low educational attainment, and early
childbearing.237 Concern about the impact of single parenting on chil-
dren and its corollary public costs has prompted not only paternity law
reform, but also comprehensive revision of child support standards
and enforcement mechanisms. 238
Although the drive to provide nonmarital children with two-parent
families thus stems in part from public fiscal concerns, it is also con-
nected to a broader movement aimed at providing children of sepa-
rated parents with some of the less tangible benefits available to those
in intact families. This movement has been fueled by evidence sug-
gesting that, although the lower incomes of single parents appear to be
the most important factor in producing poor outcomes for their chil-
dren, 23 9 lower quality parent-child relationships that result from pa-
rental conflict, stress, and absence, also play a role.240 It also reflects a
tablishment by affidavit or moved the voluntary paternity establishment process out of the courts
altogether. See KRAUSE, ELROD, GARRISON & OLDHAM, supra note 226, at 1oog.
235 See supra note 9.
236 See 1998 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 9, at 478 tbls.758-59, 48o tbl.762; see also
FRANK LEVY, DOLLARS AND DREAMS: THE CHANGING AMERICAN INCOME DISTRI-
BUTION i85 (987).
237 For summaries of the research, see DONALD J. HERNANDEZ, AMERICA'S CHILDREN:
RESOURCES FROM FAMILY, GOVERNMENT, AND THE ECONOMY 58-64 (993); SARA
MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE PARENT: WHAT HURTS,
WHAT HELPS 19-38 (1994); S. Wayne Duncan, Economic Impact of Divorce on Children's Devel-
opment: Current Findings and Policy Implications, 23 J. CLINICAL CHILD PSYCHOL. 444, 451-
53 (1994); and Sara McLanahan, The Consequences of Single Motherhood, in SEX, PREFER-
ENCE, AND FAMILY 306, 307-II (David M. Estlund & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 1997).
238 See Legler, supra note 233, at 527-28 (explaining changes in paternity establishment law
and noting that "[p]erhaps the major catalyst for change in paternity law has been the change in
social perspective on the importance of paternity establishment. As policymakers began to pay
attention to the mushrooming number of out-of-wedlock births during the ig8os, [e]stablishing
paternity was seen as a way to alleviate some of the poverty [associated with single parenting]
because it opened the door to the possible receipt of child support").
239 See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 237, at 3 (reporting that "[1]ow income - and
the sudden drop in income that often is associated with divorce - is the most important factor in
children's lower achievement in single-parent homes, accounting for about half of the disadvan-
tage"); see also id. at 79-94; Duncan, supra note 237, at 444 (reviewing research).
240 See, e.g., MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 237, at 95-XiS (reviewing evidence);
Paul R. Amato, Life-Span Adjustment of Children to Their Parents' Divorce, THE FUTURE OF
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growing consensus that it is "the right of every child ... to have the
ties of nature maintained, wherever possible, with the parents who
gave it life."24 1 Both the popular press 24 2 and policymakers 243 cite fa-
therlessness as an important public concern, and family law has in-
creasingly "focus[ed] on [filling] children's 'need' for continuing close
relationships with both parents. '244
Many of the new laws focus on providing children whose parents
live apart with more active and less conflict-ridden relationships. All
states, for example, now permit joint custody following divorce,245 and
a few have established presumptions in favor of it.246 Some states
have mandated that some or all divorcing couples with children par-
ticipate in parent education programs. 247  Others have established me-
diation programs aimed at reducing custody litigation and fostering
amicable settlements. 24  Still others have enacted "friendly parent"
CHILDREN, Spring 1994, at 143, 143 (reviewing the evidence and concluding that children's ad-
justment to divorce depends on a number of factors, including "the amount and quality of contact
with noncustodial parents, the custodial parents' psychological adjustment and parenting skills,
the level of interparental conflict that precedes and follows divorce, the degree of economic hard-
ship to which children are exposed, and the number of stressful life events that accompany and
follow divorce"); Michael E. Lamb, Fathers and Child Development: An Introductory Overview
and Guide, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT i, 1i-13 (Michael E.
Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997) (reviewing evidence).
241 In re K., i W.L.R. 431, 437 (iggo) (interpreting speeches in the House of Lords).
242 See, e.g., DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: CONFRONTING OUR MOST
URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM (1995) (arguing that "[flatherlessness is the most harmful demo-
graphic trend of this generation").
243 See, e.g., YOUNG UNWED FATHERS: CHANGING ROLES AND EMERGING POLICIES 18
(Robert I. Lerman & Theodora J. Ooms eds., 1993) (quoting a former Secretary of the U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services as saying that "the greatest family challenge of our era is
fatherhood").
244 Scott Coltrane & Neal Hickman, The Rhetoric of Rights and Needs: Moral Discourse in the
Reform of Child Custody and Child Support Laws, 39 SOC. PROBS. 400, 402 (1992); see also
CARBONE, supra note 126 (describing the trend toward joint, egalitarian parenthood).
245 Although joint custody is permissible in all states, it is still disfavored in a few. See, e.g.,
Hildebrand v. Hildebrand, 477 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Neb. 1991) (holding that courts must conduct a
hearing to determine whether joint custody is in the best interests of the child even if parents have
agreed to it).
246 See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3o8o (West 1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56a(b)
(West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 6o-i6io(a)(4)(A) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (Michie
1999).
247 See Marcy L. Wachtel, Divorce Counseling: For the Sake of the Child, LEGAL TIMES, May
24, 1993, at 29 (listing California, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Minnesota, and Texas
as having mandatory parent education programs); Junda Woo, More Courts Are Forcing Couples
to Take Divorce-Education Class, WALL ST. J., Oct. i, 1993, at B8 (noting that some divorce
courts in Kentucky, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Georgia, and elsewhere mandate divorce-education
lessons).
248 Some states now mandate pretrial mediation for certain types of child-related disputes. See,
e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3178 (West 1999) (mandating mediation for disputes over parenting
plans, custody, and visitation); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 4 4 .102(2)(b) (West x998) (mandating mediation
under some circumstances for custody, visitation, or other parental responsibility disputes); NEV.
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provisions that require courts deciding custody cases to consider the
ability of each parent to encourage and support the child's relationship
with the other.249  Although these various measures are diverse, they
exhibit a common emphasis on ensuring that children have meaningful
care, as well as financial support, from both of their parents.2 °0
The net result of these various reforms is to extend the two-parent
model, once applied only to marital parenting, to the separated family
as well. This shift reflects the fact that, although marriage is increas-
ingly seen as a matter of "personal choice and private bargaining," the
parent-child relationship is now seen as a matter of public concern:
"[T]he state has become more willing to enforce public expectations of
parents [and to promote a] revitalized definition of parenthood [that]
turn[s] on the newly emerging norms of egalitarian parenting and pa-
rental obligation." ''
C. Adoption Law
While the purpose of ancient adoption laws was to meet the needs
of would-be adoptive parents,25 2 American adoption laws have peren-
nially been structured to meet the needs of adoptive children.25 3  Al-
REV. STAT. ANN. § 3.500 (Michie 1998) (mandating mediation under some circumstances for cus-
tody and visitation disputes). Some commentators have argued that mandatory mediation is inju-
rious to the interests of mothers and children. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse,
Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, ioi HARV. L. REV.
727, 766 (igs) (arguing that, in mediation, "allegations of mistreatment, abuse, or neglect on the
part of husbands toward either their wives or children are trivialized, masked, or lost amid the
psychological rhetoric that reduces mothers' desires to have custody and control of their children
to pathology").
249 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 750 para.
5/602(a)(7) (Smith-Hurd 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(3) (West 1996). For an argument in
favor of friendly parent provisions, see Andrea Charlow, Awarding Custody: The Best Interests of
the Child and Other Fictions, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 267, 283-84, 288 (1987).
250 See ELLMAN, KURTZ & SCOTT, supra note 74, at 673 (noting that "[tihe continued in-
volvement of both parents in their children's lives after divorce is expressed as a policy goal under
many custody laws"); June Carbone, The Missing Piece of the Custody Puzzle: Creating a New
Model of Parental Partnership, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1091, 1145 (1999) ("The overwhelming
thrust of American family law has been the effort to secure both parents' continuing involvement
with their children.").
251 CARBONE, supra note 126, at 197-98. Some commentators have argued that the current
policy emphasis on two-parent care is misguided. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 202, 101-25
(arguing that the mother-child dyad should be considered the basic family form and that current
family policy reinforces patriarchal values); Linda McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47
HASTINGS LJ. 339, 372-419 (1996) (critiquing recent legislative initiatives aimed at promoting
two-parent care and reducing single mothers' welfare dependence). In this article, I take no side
in this debate.
252 For example, in ancient Rome, adoptions were often arranged to provide an heir to per-
petuate the family line. See Stephen B. Presser, The Historical Background of the American Law
of Adoption, ii J. FAM. L. 443, 446 (1972).
253 Because the common law did not permit adoption, U.S. adoption laws are entirely statutory.
See id. at 443; Louis Quarles, The Law of Adoption - A Legal Anomaly, 32 MARQ. L. REV. 237,
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though early adoption laws typically contained no requirements for an
adoption other than the consent of the child's biological parents and a
judicial finding that the adoption was "fit and proper,"254 reports of
abuses produced detailed regulatory requirements, including prehear-
ing investigations of would-be adoptive parents by child welfare offi-
cials, sealed records and, in some states, trial placements with further
investigation before finalization of the adoption order.25 Adoption
agencies, which in many states were statutorily designated as the only
source of adoptive children, often imposed additional requirements: all
stressed a stable marital relationship, and many refused applications
from would-be parents over a designated age.216
Today, changed social mores coupled with shifts in the number and
characteristics of children available for adoption 2 7 have altered many
aspects of adoption practice. Independent (nonagency), international,
transracial, and older child adoptions have all increased markedly,258
while secrecy is increasingly replaced with open records and even open
237 ('949). The first American adoption statutes were enacted in Texas and Massachusetts in the
mid-nineteenth century; by 1929, every state had one. See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note
z25, at 535.
254 The "fit and proper" requirement was contained in the Massachusetts adoption law, which
became a model for many of the other state adoption laws passed during or shortly after the Civil
War. See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 535.
255 For representative examples of reports on adoption abuses, see 2 CHILDREN AND YOUTH
IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 140-42, 147-49 (Robert H. Bremner ed., z971) (pro-
viding excerpts from descriptions of early twentieth-century adoption abuses and legislation man-
dating investigatory procedures). In 189i, Michigan became the first state to require investiga-
tions of prospective adoptive parents. See id. at 147. By 1938, laws requiring a prehearing
investigation and report by a local child welfare agency had been enacted in twenty-four states.
See KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 536. A sealed record requirement was first intro-
duced in Minnesota in 1917 and soon became universal; the requirement was apparently urged by
social workers in child-placing agencies, who believed that assuring biological and adoptive par-
ents' anonymity would both foster the integration of the child into the adoptive family and pre-
vent the stigma of illegitimacy from tainting the child's future. See Burton Z. Sokoloff, Antece-
dents of American Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 17, 21-22.
256 See David B. Harrison, Annotation, Age of Prospective Adoptive Parent as Factor in Adop-
tion Proceedings, 84 A.L.R.3D 665 (1978).
257 Between 197o and 1986 the number of nonrelative adoptions in the United States declined
by approximately 40%. See Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, THE
FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 26, 28-29, fig.L.
258 Experts estimate that independent adoptions - in which the birth parents either make the
placement themselves or use an intermediary, such as a doctor or lawyer, to find adoptive parents
- now constitute approximately 30% of nonrelative adoptions. See McDermott, supra note 147,
at 151 n.3. International adoptions now comprise one-fifth to one-sixth of all nonrelative adop-
tions in the United States and a somewhat larger proportion of infant adoptions. See Elizabeth
Bartholet, International Adoption: Current Status and Future Prospects, THE FUTURE OF
CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 89, 90. The reduced supply of healthy white infants available for
adoption has also significantly increased the number of transracial and older-child adoptions. See
KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 539 (describing the increase in older child adoptions);
Arnold R. Silverman, Outcomes of TRansracial Adoption, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring
1993, at 104, io6-07 (describing the increase in transracial adoptions).
[Vol. 113:835
LAW MAKING FOR BABY MAKING
adoptions, in which the adoptive child retains some form of contact
with her biological family.259 Although some of these changes simply
reflect imbalance in the supply of and demand for healthy, same-race
adoptive infants,260 others - in particular the trend toward openness
- have also been prompted by concern for children's needs.
Most states now have registries that enable adoptees to obtain
nonidentifying information such as parental medical histories upon re-
quest and to obtain identifying information based either on good cause
or the biological parent's consent. 261 These statutes recognize the fact
that some adult adoptees, whether to ascertain a genetic health risk or
simply because they feel a need to know about their origins, want in-
formation relating to their biological parents.262 Indeed, based upon
studies showing harm to children who learn about their origins acci-
dentally263 and benefits to those who grow up in open families,264 ex-
perts now recommend openness instead of secrecy even during an
2S9 See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for Collabora-
tive Adoption Law and Practice, 75 B.U. L. REV. 997, 1028-39 (x995) (describing and comparing
various state statutes). Some state courts have also approved open adoption without statutory
authorization. See generally Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Postadoption Visitation by Natural
Parent, 78 A.L.R.4TH 218 (xggo) (describing case law).
260 Although estimates vary, some experts believe that more than a million couples seek to
adopt the approximately 30,000 white infants available each year. See Cynthia Crossen, Hard
Choices: In Today's Adoptions, the Biological Parents Are Calling the Shots, WALL ST. J., Sept.
14, 1989, at Ai; see also Stolley, supra note 257, at 37 (estimating that the number of women
seeking to adopt surpasses the annual number of unrelated-child adoptions by a ratio of 3.3 to i).
261 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 7, at 176-77 (classifying state laws and providing statu-
tory references); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption Law, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring
1993, at 43, 53 tbl.i (classifying state records laws and reporting that, in 1993, 19 states had laws
under which adoptees and birth parents could register their mutual consent to meet one another
as a basis for opening sealed records, six states had laws requiring mutual consent without a regis-
try, 17 had statutes providing for search and consent through a confidential intermediary, and
three states had laws authorizing the adult adoptee to obtain access to her birth records merely
upon request).
262 A survey of 3o adult adoptees found that approximately one-third thought about searching
for their biological parents "all the time" or "often." CHILDREN'S HOME SOCIETY OF
CALIFORNIA, THE CHANGING FACE OF ADOPTION 20 (1977); see also LOIS RAYNOR, THE
ADOPTED CHILD COMES OF AGE ioo (98o) (reporting that 22% of British adoptees desired
contact with their biological families).
263 See CLAYTON H. HAGEN, BARBARA H. NICHOLSON, EVELYN IVERSON & GAYLE
ADELSMAN, THE ADOPTED ADULT DISCUSSES ADOPTION AS A LIFE EXPERIENCE 20-21
(1968) (recounting feelings of adoptees "who were not told voluntarily by their parents that they
were adopted"); JEAN M. PATON, THE ADOPTED BREAK SILENCE (1954) (same).
264 See H. DAVID KIRK, SHARED FATE: A THEORY OF ADOPTION AND MENTAL HEALTH
36-81 (x964); LESLIE M. STEIN & JANET L. HOOPES, IDENTITY FORMATION IN THE
ADOPTED ADOLESCENT: THE DELAWARE FAMILY STUDY (1985); William Feigelman &
Arnold R. Silverman, Adoptive Parents, Adoptees, and the Sealed Record Controversy, 67 SOC.
CASEWORK 2 19 (1986); see also Knut W. Ruyter, The Example of Adoption for Medically Assisted
Adoption, in CREATING THE CHILD, supra note 17, at 177-78 (citing Norwegian studies finding
benefits in adoption openness, "especially in terms of the development of self identity and social
adaptation").
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adoptee's childhood. Adoption experts also argue that "[c]hildren are
entitled to know of their true origins."265
While the trend toward openness reflects a shift in our perceptions
of what is beneficial to children, adoption policy continues to be driven
by the view that "the child's welfare, her needs, and her interests are
the basic determinants of good adoption practice," and that "[h]omes
should be selected for children, rather than children selected for
homes. '266  Efforts are still made to "match" children and adoptive
parents on the premise that similarities between adoptive and biologi-
cal parents will benefit the child, and although the number of unmar-
ried adoptive parents has increased, age, marital status, and sexual
orientation are still used as factors in adoption decisionmaking;267
agency policies also typically provide that single applicants will be
considered "only for the placement of special-needs children." 268
Contemporary adoption law deviates from the law applicable to
sexual conception in a number of important ways. Most fundamen-
tally, adoption law addresses problems of rights transfer and parental
assignment, issues that do not arise when parental status is derived
from biology. Adoption law also regulates the child's relationships
with two potentially competing sets of parents; in this sense it shares
common ground with custody and visitation law, although adoption
presents additional issues not present in the latter context.
Despite these differences, adoption law manifests the same policy
values evident elsewhere in parentage law: across the field of marital,
nonmarital, and adoptive relationships, courts and legislatures have
taken steps to ensure that children have two parents with obligations
of care and support, and that children's interests take precedence over
those of their parents.
D. Children's Interests v. Parental Rights
The same preference for children's interests is evident in many ar-
eas of family law. One such area is the law of parental agreements, in
which courts have long held that contracts regarding children's care,
265 KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 576; accord Ruyter, supra note 264, at 178.
Courts, however, have thus far refused to recognize any constitutional right to know one's origins.
See, e.g., In re Roger B., 418 N.E.2d 751, 757 (Ill. 198i) (holding that adoptees do not have a fun-
damental right to examine their adoption records).
266 KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 533.
267 See CLARK, supra note 123, at gi. A few states have adoption statutes that explicitly for-
bid adoption by homosexuals. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.042(3) (West iggi); see also Sonja
Larsen, Annotation, Adoption of Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.5TH 54 (i995).
268 KADUSHIN & MARTIN, supra note 125, at 551 (quoting Child Welfare League of America
standards, which provide that "[i]n exceptional circumstances, when the opportunity for adoption
for a specific child might not otherwise be available, a single parent (who may be unmarried,
widowed, or divorced) should be given consideration').
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custody, and support are voidable; whether made before or after mar-
riage, or before or after the child's birth, such an agreement will be
honored only if it comports with the best interests of the child. 269  A
post-divorce custody or support agreement is similarly modifiable until
the child's majority if circumstances change and the agreement fails to
protect the child's interests. 270
Parenthood itself is increasingly seen as a functional status, rather
than one derived from biology or legal entitlement.27' This new, child-
centered perspective has led courts to limit the rights of parents who
have failed to accept responsibility for their children and to grant "pa-
rental" rights to nonparents who have done so in their stead.272 It has
also produced a shift in litigation involving children, with the child in-
creasingly viewed as a rights-bearing party entitled to legal representa-
tion, and not just the subject of a proceeding. 273  Today - perhaps
269 See sources cited supra notes 12 2-23.
270 See KRAUSE, ELROD, GARRISON & OLDHAM, supra note 226, at 712-14 (reviewing cus-
tody modification standards); id. at 967-68 (reviewing support modification standards); Joan G.
Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 76o-84 (1985).
Some courts permit modification of a custody agreement even without a change of circumstances
based on the best interests of the child. See, e.g., Elmer v. Elmer, 776 P.2d 599, 603 (Utah 1989)
("[Tlhe res judicata aspect of the rule must always be subservient to the best interests of the
child.").
271 See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE
BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 7-28 (973); Janet L. Dolgin, Just a Gene: Judicial Assump-
tions About Parenthood, 40 UCLA L. REV. 637, 690-94 (1993); Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking
Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in
Third-Party Custody Cases, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1045, io9o (1996); Lucy S. McGough &
Lawrence M. Shindell, Coming of Age: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third
Party Custody Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 241-44 (1978); Polikoff, supra note 12, at 468-73;
Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal
Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1643-5o (1991).
272 Some states have gone much further in this direction than others. See ALI PRINCIPLES,
supra note 212, § 2.21 cmt. a, reporter's note at 413-I5 (surveying cases and statutory standards);
see also ELLIAN, KURTZ & SCOTT, supra note 74, at 724-28 (summarizing cases and statutes);
KRAUSE, ELROD, GARRISON & OLDHAM, supra note 226, at 700-02, 710-I (same). For com-
mentary favoring the recognition of functional parents, see Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Par-
enthood as an Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the Nuclear
Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REV. 879, 902-19 (1984); and David L. Chambers, Stepparents,
Biologic Parents, and the Law's Perceptions of "Family" After Divorce, in DIVORCE REFORM AT
THE CROSSROADS 102 (Stephen D. Sugarman & Herma Hill Kay eds., 199o).
273 Pursuant to the federal Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5657
(1982), repealed by Anti-Drug Act of 1988, § 7263(a)(2Xc), 102 Stat. 4181, 4443 (1988), a Justice
Department advisory committee recommended standards for the administration of juvenile jus-
tice providing that a child should have independent legal counsel "in any proceeding at which the
custody, detention, or treatment of the juvenile is at issue." NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. FOR
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, STANDARDS
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE § 3.132, at 273 (I98O). Although most
states have not gone this far in providing children with legal counsel, the provision of counsel is
on the increase and the scholarly commentary is generally favorable. See, e.g., Tari Eitzen, A
Child's Right to Independent Legal Representation in a Custody Dispute: A Unique Legal Situa-
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more so than at any time in our history - courts and commentators
hold that parents' rights are secondary to children's interests.2 74
The emergence of a two-parent, child-centered family policy is not
unique to the United States. Recent revisions of Australia's family law
are premised, in part, on the view that "children have the right to
know and be cared for by both their parents regardless of whether
their parents are married, separated, have never married, or have
never lived together."'27s Family law reformation in the United King-
dom was premised on similar assumptions.2 76 And the United Nations
Convention on Rights of the Child has explicitly recognized that both
parents share responsibility for the upbringing and development of
their children. 77
Public opinion appears to be highly supportive of these policy
trends. Most Americans report that children need "both a father and
mother" and that children are better off in a two-parent household.2 78
tion, a Necessarily Broad Standard, the Child's Constitutional Rights, the Role of the Attorney
Whose Client Is the Child, ig FAM. L.Q. 53, 57-58, 64-67, 73-77 (1985); George H. Russ,
Through the Eyes of a Child, "Gregory K.": A Child's Right to Be Heard, 27 FAM. L.Q. 365, 378-
8o (I993).
274 See, e.g., Scott & Scott, supra note 138, at 2453-76 (discussing family law's evolution in the
direction of a more explicit linkage between parental rights and responsibilities).
275 Australian Family Law Reform Act of igg, ch. 6oB(2Xa); see also AUSTRALIAN FAMILY
LAW COUNCIL, PATTERNS OF PARENTING AFTER SEPARATION REPORT: A REPORT TO
THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS § 2.39, at 17 (1992) (advocating
change in family law based on the premises that most children want and need contact with two
parents, and that the well-being of children is advanced by their maintaining links with both par-
ents over time). Researchers who investigated public attitudes have reported strong support for
the shift in Australian law. See Kathleen Funder, The Australian Family Law Reform Act (z995)
and Public Attitudes to Parental Responsibility, 12 INT'L J.L. POL'Y & FAM. 47, 59 (1998) (re-
porting that all surveyed groups - the general population, resident parents, and nonresident par-
ents - voiced "strong assent to shared responsibility for the care, contact, and financial responsi-
bility for children"). More than 95% of respondents indicated that children should "always" or
"mostly" be in contact with married parents, while 90% so indicated when the parents were sepa-
rated or divorced, and more than 6o% did so when the parents had never lived together. See id.
at 56 fig.2. Approximately go% indicated that children should "always" or "mostly" be supported
by both parents when their parents were married, separated, or divorced, and 75% so indicated
when parents had never lived together. See id. at 57 fig.4.
276 See In re K., i W.L.R. 431, 432-37 (C.A. i989) (interpreting provisions of the Children's Act
of 1989).
277 See UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD at art. i8(i),
U.N. Doc. No. A/4 4/736, 1989. Article 7 also bestows on a child the "right. . ., as far as possible,
to know and be cared for by his or her parents." Id. at art. 7.
278 Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn, The Formation of Families, in FAMILY CHANGE
AND FAMILY POLICIES IN GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, NEW ZEALAND, AND THE UNITED
STATES 312, 331 tbl.3 (Sheila B. Kamerman & Alfred J. Kahn eds., 1997) (showing U.S. responses
to International Value Surveys in 1981-83 and 1990-93 and reporting that in the latter survey
72% of U.S. respondents agreed that a "child needs both father and mother," as compared to 6x%
in i98i-83); see also Voter/Consumer Research for the Family Research Council, National Tele-
phone Survey of zsoo Adults, Sept. 1993 [hereinafter Family Research Council Survey] (finding
that in response to the statement "[lit is better for a child to be born into a two-parent family than
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Almost nine out of ten respondents to one survey agreed that "[iut is
important for fathers to spend as much time with their children as
mothers,"279 while more than two-thirds of another group strongly fa-
vored joint custody of young children following divorce over sole cus-
tody by either parent.280 Americans also continue to rank family obli-
gations as the most important obligations;28' even when children are
financially better off than a nonresidential parent, they typically be-
lieve that the nonresidential parent should be obligated to help support
them.28 2
IV. APPLYING FAMILY LAW TO TECHNOLOGICAL CONCEPTION
A. Broad Themes and Specific Principles
Contemporary parentage law offers two general themes to guide
policymaking in the area of technological conception: children's inter-
ests come first and two-parent care is generally preferable to that of
one parent alone. Parentage law also offers some concrete rules and
principles to guide the policymaker.
to a single mother," 63% "strongly" agreed, 20% agreed "somewhat," 7% disagreed "somewhat,"
6% disagreed "strongly," and 4% reported that they were neutral or had no opinion).
279 Research & Forecasts for Ethan Allen, Inc., National Telephone Survey of2ooo Adults, Nov.
1985 (finding that 69% "strongly" agreed, while 20% agreed "somewhat"); see also Family Re-
search Council Survey, supra note 278 (noting that 94% of respondents reported that both parents
"are equally responsible" for "[tiucking a child in bed," while 76% thought both equally responsi-
ble for "[t]aking care of a child who is sick or injured").
280 See Princeton Survey Research Associates for Troika Productions & Lifetime Television,
National Telephone Survey of 6oo Adults, Mar. 199i (noting that "[iun a typical divorce case," 68%
thought "it is better to give [joint] custody of young children," while 14% favored the mother, i%
the father, and 17% indicated that they were undecided).
281 See MARy ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 105 (iggi) (citing Mark Mellman, Edward Lazarus & Allan Rivfin, Family lime,
Family Values, in REBUILDING THE NEST 73, 83 (David Blankenhorn, Steven Bayme & Jean
Bethke Elshtain eds., 199o)) (describing the results of a survey commissioned by the Massachu-
setts Mutual Life Insurance Company, in which most respondents ranked "[b]eing responsible for
your actions" and "[b]eing able to provide emotional support to your family" as their most impor-
tant personal values).
282 See Barbara R. Bergmann & Sherry Wetchler, Child Support Awards: State Guidelines vs.
Public Opinion, 29 FAM. L.Q. 483, 491 (1995) (reporting that the respondents in a Maryland sur-
vey would award support, albeit at lower average levels than required by the state guidelines,
when the nonresidential household had a lower income than the custodial parent); Nora Cate
Schaeffer, Principles of Justice in Judgments About Child Support, 69 SOc. FORCES 157, 170
(299o) (reporting that 84% of respondents presented with a scenario in which the mother earned
$x5oo per month, had remarried, and was supporting one child, while the father earned $io0o per
month and had not remarried, would award child support, as would 57% of those presented with
a scenario in which the mother earned $i5oo monthly and the father only $5oo monthly); Prince-
ton Survey Research Associates for Newsweek, National Telephone Survey of 753 Adults, Jan.
1995 (reporting that 93% of survey respondents agreed that "it is morally wrong... for a father
not to fulfill his financial obligations to his biological child").
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First, biological relationship should be neither a necessary nor a
sufficient condition for obtaining and retaining parental status: unmar-
ried fathers who fail to act like parents can lose their parental rights;
committed functional parents may displace uncommitted biological
parents; and a stepfather may obtain parental rights (and trump the
rights of a committed unmarried father) based on his socially preferred
marital relationship with the child's mother.
Second, outside the context of marriage, parental rights should pre-
sumptively be assigned to biological parents: in no case other than that
of an unmarried father does another claimant have standing to block a
biological parent's assertion of parental status; and, if he promptly as-
serts his rights, even an unmarried father can trump the claims of a
prospective adoptive parent able to offer the child greater advantages.
Third, no contracts concerning parental rights and obligations
should be per se enforceable: all such contracts, whether pre-marital,
post-marital, pre-conception, or post-conception, are now voidable
based on the child's interests. In the adoption context - the only one
in which the issue has been tested - waivers of parental rights are
unenforceable, even without a showing of the child's interests, if they
fail to comply with state standards.
Fourth, within limits, the state may prefer "desirable" to "undesir-
able" parental relationships: a committed functional parent may, in
some instances, override the claims of an uncommitted biological par-
ent; if the mother is married and plans to raise the child herself in the
marital household, even a committed father might be denied his paren-
tal status in the face of a claim by her husband. Similarly, although an
unmarried mother alone cannot block her child's father from asserting
his parental status even if he has long failed to "act as a father" to his
child, adoptive parents may deprive the father of parental rights if
they can make the same showing.
B. Three Easy Cases
Although the broad themes and specific principles that can be
gleaned from contemporary family law will not resolve every question
related to the parentage of technologically conceived children, they can
easily resolve some of them.
. Married Couples and AID. - If husbands who agree to act as
fathers to their wives' extramarital children (and wives who acquiesce
in the arrangement) are thereafter foreclosed from denying the hus-
bands' paternity - the result achieved by the marital presumption
and estoppel principles - they should be similarly foreclosed when
wives become pregnant through AID with their husbands' consent.
AID statutes conferring parental status on a consenting husband,
which have now been adopted in most states, simply apply traditional
family law principles to the AID context. Given that the relational in-
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terests are no different here than in a case of extramarital pregnancy,
the same standards should apply; in both cases, the estoppel approach
serves to ensure two-parent care in a socially preferred (marital) rela-
tionship. Moreover, the case for binding a husband and wife is per-
haps even stronger in the AID context than in that of sexual concep-
tion because the husband's consent is less likely to have been based on
factors such as a desire to preserve the marriage.
2. Married Couples and IVF with Donated Eggs. - If a husband's
consent to AID is sufficient to secure his parental status, a wife's con-
sent to IVF with donated eggs should suffice as well. 283 The marital
presumption does not, of course, apply directly here because the sexual
analog - an unfaithful husband who, with his wife's consent, plans to
rear his extramarital child in the marital household - is so rare that
there is no "traditional" law on the issue. But the basic relational facts
are the same as in a case of AID or extramarital conception by a wife:
in each instance, a married couple has decided to rear a child to whom
only one is biologically related; whether the child is conceived sexually
or technologically, the couple must cope with the issue of secrecy and
the stress associated with their differing relationships to the child. 28 4
Applying the AID rule to the IVF context would ensure that the child
has two legal parents in a socially preferred (marital) relationship.
Such an adaptation would also ensure gender neutrality with respect
to the marital legitimacy presumption, which may be constitutionally
required. 2 5
283 Thus far, only a few states have statutory law on this issue. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11
(West 1997) (creating an irrebuttable presumption of parenthood for children conceived by means
of either AID or IVF with donated eggs, "provided that both husband and wife have consented in
writing"); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-18-04 (i99); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § 554 (iggi); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § I51.102 (West 1996) (same as Florida); VA. CODE ANN. § 2o-i58(AXI)-(2) (Michie
Supp. 1999) (providing that "[tihe gestational mother of a child is the child's mother," and "[tihe
husband of the gestational mother of a child is the child's father" if he consents "to the perform-
ance of assisted conception").
284 These stresses are significant. Although the evidence suggests that most married AID users
plan to maintain secrecy, see, e.g., David M. Berger, Abraham Eisen, Jack Shuber & Kenneth F.
Doody, Psychological Patterns in Donor Insemination Couples, 31 CAN. J. PSYCHIATRY 818, 821
& tbl.i (1986) (reporting that, in a questionnaire survey of donor-insemination applicants, "the
large majority [(70%)] endorsed keeping the procedure secret from the DI child"); Julian N.
Robinson, Robert G. Forman, Anne M. Clark, Declan M. Egan, Michael G. Chapman & David
H. Barlow, Attitudes of Donors and Recipients to Gamete Donation, 6 HUM. REPROD. 307, 308
(i991) (reporting that in a British survey, "85% [of recipients of donor sperm] stated that they
would conceal the nature of their offspring's conception"), the Canadian Royal Commission on
New Reproductive Technologies concluded that "secrecy [about AID] places great strains on
families." PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note i9, at 464. Some fathers interviewed by the Com-
mission said that "they felt fraudulent about how they fit into the family narrative," and some
mothers indicated that "they felt they were 'living a lie.'" Id.
285 To withstand constitutional scrutiny, sex-based classifications must "serve important gov-
ernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Cali-
fano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 316-17 (,977) (per curiam) (quoting Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
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3. Surrogacy. - In a case like Baby M, the "surrogate" mother is
in fact no surrogate at all: she is the child's genetic and gestational
parent. An agreement under which the "surrogate" transfers her inter-
est in the child to another is thus nothing more than an adoption con-
tract. As such, its legality should be dependent on the parties' compli-
ance with state adoption requirements, including babyselling
prohibitions and restrictions on prenatal rights transfer. States should
clarify the mother's parental status, specifying that the surrogate is the
child's legal mother unless and until she transfers her parental rights
pursuant to state adoption law. The child's legal father should be de-
termined under the rules applicable to sexual conception. Thus, if the
surrogate mother is unmarried or state law permits an unmarried pu-
tative father to challenge the paternity of the mother's husband, the
sperm donor should be able to establish his parental rights; but if the
mother is married and state paternity law denies a putative father
standing to challenge her husband's paternity, he should not.2 86
C. A Case Resolvable Based on Available Research Findings
Technologically conceived children have the same informational
needs as adopted children. Both groups require information on
genetically-based health risks and, as adults, may want to learn more
about their biological parents or even establish contact with them.
Because current adoption laws recognize the informational needs of
adopted children,28 7 the informational needs of technologically conceived
children should be recognized to the same extent. As the Canadian Royal
Commission succinctly put it:
[t]he goals of adoption record keeping are based on a concern for the best
interests of the child. Full adoption records, kept on file for generations,
mean that genetically transmitted health problems can be identified and
traced; two family members can be prevented from marrying or conceiv-
ing a child unknowingly; and adoptive families can have enough informa-
tion about the child's biological background for their own psychological
needs. Record-keeping practices in the field of DI [(donor insemination)]
should have similar goals.288
The states are beginning to move in this direction. While few require
sperm banks and fertility centers to collect or maintain donor
197 (1976)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court has held that the preserva-
tion of traditional, gender-based family roles is an insufficient justification for a gender-based
classification. See United States v. Virginia, 5,8 U.S. 515, 540-46 (1996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268,
279-8o (x979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14 (1975).
286 See supra p. 886. The Baby M court gives short shrift to the paternity issue.
287 See sources cited supra note 261.
288 PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note ig, at 469.
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information, 2 9 at least eighteen have now adopted legislative standards
that permit AID children to obtain available information based on
satisfaction of a "good cause" or similar standard.
290
The informational interests of adoptees and technologically conceived
children are virtually indistinguishable. Although some commentators
have argued that technologically conceived children have fewer
informational needs because they are less likely to discover the facts of
their origin or to experience a sense of rejection by a donor parent,291 we
know that some technologically conceived children do want such
information, and want it badly.292 Moreover, only a small fraction of
adoptees ultimately seek the identity of their biological parents.293  No
one has ever supposed that the relative infrequency of requests is a good
reason for ignoring the needs of adopted children who do want
information about their biological families; there is no obvious reason to
take a different approach to the informational needs of technologically
conceived children.
Nor do parental privacy interests significantly differ depending on
whether a child is adopted or technologically conceived. While those
who become parents using AID or IVF seem less likely to tell their child
about her origins than do those who adopt, adoption information access
rules nowhere require adoptive parents to tell their child that she was
adopted. Applied to technological conception, this approach would
equally permit AID and IVF parents to maintain secrecy if they so wish.
289 See supra note 7. Experts also note that the "lack of [AID] donor recordkeeping is perhaps
unparalleled anywhere in medical practice." Walter Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The
Challenge for Family Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465, 500 (1983); see also Robert D. Nachtigall, Secrecy:
An Unresolved Issue in the Practice of Donor Insemination, 168 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNECOLOGY 1846, 1846 (1993).
290 See Andrews & Elster, supra note 7, at 138.
291 See J.K. Mason, MEDICO-LEGAL ASPECTS OF REPRODUCTION AND PARENTHOOD
221-22 (2d ed. 1998).
292 See Margaret R. Brown, Whose Eyes Are These, Whose Nose?, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 7, 1994,
at 12 (describing an adult AID child's desire for information about her biological father); Peggy
Orenstein, Looking for a Donor to Call Dad, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 28
(offering anecdotal accounts of AID children who want information about their biological fa-
thers); Karen M. Thomas, The Donor Connection: Families Are Chipping Away at the Taboos and
Secrecy that Once Surrounded Artificial Insemination, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov. 23,
1997, at iF (same).
293 See William Feigelman & Arnold R. Silverman, Adoptive Parents, Adoptees, and the Sealed
Record Controversy, 67 SOC. CASEWORK 219 (1986) (reporting that i5% of the children of sur-
veyed adoptive parents had asked to see their adoption records, and 4% had contacted birth
families); John "liseliotis, Obtaining Birth Certificates, in ADOPTION: ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
POLICY, LAW, AND SOCIOLOGY 34, 48 (Philip Bean ed., 1984) (reporting that during 198o-82,
adoptees' applications for access to birth records represented approximately 0.3% of adopted
adults in England and Wales and 0.7% in Scotland and estimating that, if these percentages held
constant, 2 1% of all adoptees might apply for birth records during their adult years). The propor-
tion of adoptees who think about requesting information appears to be considerably higher. See
supra note 262.
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With respect to biological parents, any differences in privacy interests
favor the biological parents of an adoptive child. Although less true
today, parents relinquishing children for adoption have often done so
because of the stigma attached to illegitimate birth; there is no such
stigma attached to sperm or egg donation.
Because the interests of children and their parents do not significantly
differ depending on whether a child was adopted or technologically
conceived, the argument against extending adoption registries to
technologically conceived children relies primarily on the fear that loss of
guaranteed donor anonymity would seriously reduce the number of AID
and IVF donors.2 94 Donor decisionmaking is not a significant issue in the
adoption context because parents who relinquish children for adoption
almost invariably do so because of an unplanned birth and inability to
provide adequately for the baby themselves. In the case of sperm and
egg donation, however, potential loss of anonymity might conceivably
have a significant impact on donor decisionmaking.
The available evidence on this point cannot be conclusively
interpreted - surveys have not assessed donor attitudes in a standard
manner and most rely on small samples at a single donation site - but
virtually all researchers have reported that half or more of respondent
donors would be willing to provide identifying information to their
children at the age of majority.295 Moreover, because state adoption
294 See Elizabeth L. Gibson, Artificial Insemination by Donor: Information, Communication
and Regulation, 30 J. FAM. L. I, 28-32 (1991-92); Richard J. Doren, Comment, The Need for
Regulation of Artificial Insemination by Donor, 22 SAN DIEGO L. REV. I193, 12o6 (i985).
295 On ovum donors, see John Leeton & Jayne Harman, Attitudes Towards Egg Donation of
Thirty-Four Infertile Women Who Donated During Their In Vitro Fertilization reatment, 3 J. IN
VITRO FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 374, 375-76 (x986) (reporting that, of 34
women who donated eggs without expectation of payment, approximately half would not mind if
the child contacted them later); and NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW,
ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
PUBLIC POLICY 368-69 (1998) (citing an unpublished study finding that 70% of surveyed ovum
donors were willing to meet a child produced with their donated eggs at adulthood). On sperm
donors, see Lori B. Andrews & Lisa Douglass, Alternative Reproduction, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 623,
661 (I991) (noting that 75% of the surveyed donors at a California sperm bank were willing to
provide identifying information to their child at the age of majority); Ken R. Daniels, Artificial
Insemination Using Donor Semen and the Issue of Secrecy: The Views of Donors and Recipient
Couples, 27 SOC. SCI. MED. 377, 379-81 (1988) (reporting that surveyed donors at six New Zea-
land AID programs were almost equally divided over whether the child has a right to identifying
information about them); Patricia P. Mahlstedt & Kris A. Probasco, Sperm Donors: Their Atti-
tudes Toward Providing Medical and Psychosocial Information for Recipient Couples and Donor
Offspring, 56 FERTILITY & STERILITY 747, 749-52 (iggi) (noting that 96% of surveyed donors
at two artificial insemination centers in Texas and Louisiana were willing to share nonidentifying
medical and psychosocial information with recipient families and that 6o% expressed a willing-
ness to meet with or to provide identifying information to their child at age i8); and Robyn Row-
land, The Social and Psychological Consequences of Secrecy in Artificial Insemination by Donor
(AID) Programmes, 21 SOC. SCI. MED. 391, 395 (1985) (indicating that 6o% of surveyed Austra-
lian donors indicated that they would be willing to have their AID children contact them after
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registry laws typically require consent by the biological parent or a
showing of need as a precondition to record access,2 96 donors would
confront only the possibility, not the certainty, that their identities would
ultimately be disclosed. The Swedish experience also suggests that a new
legal regime in which anonymity is not guaranteed might simply alter the
characteristics of the donor pool. Although sperm donations initially
declined after the Swedish law abolishing donor anonymity went into
effect, they soon returned to prior levels with sperm donors typically
older and more often married than previously.
297
Given these research findings, the risk of a significantly reduced
supply of donated sperm and ova does not appear serious enough to
reject the extension of adoption information access rules to
technologically conceived children. 298 The handful of jurisdictions that
offer all adult adoptees full access to identifying information about
biological parents might want to consider a cause or consent-based access
standard for technologically conceived children to ensure that donor
numbers are not seriously reduced, but other jurisdictions should be able
reaching the age of majority), see also MORGAN & LEE, supra note 82, at 163 (explaining that
only one-third of the donor respondents in a British poll were opposed to the release of identifying
information and that the other two-thirds were in favor of release or "reserved their position");
Robinson, Forman, Clark, Egan, Chapman & Barlow, supra note 284, at 30 (reporting that a ma-
jority of the active sperm donors (n=52) at two British artificial insemination centers were willing
to release their medical records with or without identifying information, but only i5% of surveyed
potential donors would donate if their anonymity were not maintained); Robin Herman, When the
"Father" Is a Sperm Donor: A New Look at Secrecy, WASH. POST, Feb. II, 1992, Health at io
(reporting that some American sperm banks offer donors a choice between anonymity and open-
ness and that directors of these banks claim that it is no more difficult to recruit donors for open
programs than for those guaranteeing anonymity). But see Bjorn Pedersen, Anders Faurskov
Nielsen & Jorgen Glenn Lauritsen, Psychosocial Aspects of Donor Insemination: Sperm Donors
- Their Motivations and Attitudes to Artificial Insemination, 73 ACTA OBSTETRICA ET
GYNECOLOG ICA SCANDINAVICA 701 (1994) (noting that 76% of active donors (n=26) at a Dan-
ish infertility clinic were willing to provide nonidentifying, phenotypic information to recipients
and offspring, but only 2o% expressed a willingness to continue donating if the current rules of
anonymity were revoked); Mark V. Sauer, M. Tan Gorrill, Kirsten B. Zeller & Maria Bustillo, At-
titudinal Survey of Sperm Donors to an Artificial Insemination Clinic, 34 J. REPROD. MED. 362,
363 (1989) (reporting that 71% of donor respondents (n=42) at a California clinic favored ano-
nymity).
296 See sources cited supra note 261; see also Pamela Smith, Regulating Confidentiality of Sur-
rogacy Records: Lessons from the Adoption Experience, 31 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 65, 78-93
(1992-93) (surveying state laws on the accessibility of adoption records and analyzing the applica-
tion of "good cause" standards).
297 See MORGAN & LEE, supra note 82, at 163-64. French law allows sperm donations only
from married men who have already fathered children; consent of the donor's spouse is also man-
dated. See Law No. 94-653 of July 29, 1994, J.0., July 30, 1994, p. 11o56; PHC 1994, L673-2; see
also Byk, supra note 84, at 348-49. Despite these restrictions, shortages of donated sperm have
not developed.
298 In light of the inadequacy of current donor recordkeeping, such laws should also mandate the
collection and maintenance of donor information in a central registry.
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to extend their adoption information access laws to technologically
conceived children without modification.
D. Three Harder Cases
The four cases just assessed using the interpretive approach are
relatively easy ones for two reasons: the application of contemporary
parentage law principles is straightforward and the results comport with
legislative trends.
The case of a single woman using AID is harder to resolve because
the application of parentage law principles does not harmonize with the
legislative trend on this issue. Unmarried women who conceive a child
sexually may neither prevent the child's biological father from assert-
ing his parental rights nor preclude the child from establishing the fa-
ther's paternity; the interpretive approach thus suggests that single
women who use AID should be similarly foreclosed from blocking pa-
ternity claims by and against the sperm donors. But although most
states have no statutory law on this issue, those that do deny sperm
donors all parental rights and responsibilities.
299
There are also cases in which traditional parentage law offers less
than certain guidance because a particular reproductive technique
produces a fairly novel legal issue. Gestational surrogacy is one such
case. Because the separation of gestation and genetic tie is impossible
when a child is conceived sexually, gestational surrogacy presents a
situation that courts simply did not confront prior to the advent of
technological conception. The fact that genetic tie is the prime deter-
minant of fatherhood suggests that biology should also take precedence
over gestation in determining motherhood, but there are numerous
cases - those involving the marital presumption of legitimacy, equita-
ble estoppel, laches - in which biology is given less weight.3°0 The
case of a donated preembryo (or both donated sperm and ova) presents
similar problems. If a married woman gestates such a preembryo, at
least two states currently assign parental rights to the gestational
"mother" and her husband. 30 1 But as neither marriage partner is ge-
netically related to the child, the marital presumption is not strictly
applicable in such a case. Because the couple has in essence adopted
prenatally,302 adoption law may be more relevant. The rules applica-
ble to gestational surrogacy must also be considered because the wife's
gestation of the child represents the couple's only role (other than
299 See Kristin E. Koehler, Comment, Artificial Insemination: In the Child's Best Interest?, 5
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 321, 332 & nn.79-80 (1996).
300 See supra pp. 884-85.
301 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.11 (West 1997); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 151.103 (West 1996).
302 Of course, both AID and IVF with a husband's sperm can also be analogized to prenatal
adoption, but the relevant analogy is a stepparent adoption. See infra section IV.D.3.
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commissioning and paying the various other contributors) in producing
the child's birth.30 3
This section provides a more detailed analysis of these three harder
and more controversial cases.
. Paternity of Children Born through AID to Single Women.
(a) Sexual vs. Technological Conception: Can Different Rules Be
Justified? - Because contemporary parentage law encourages two-
parent care even in the case of nonmarital childbirth, it would appear
that two-parent care should also be encouraged when a single woman
conceives using AID. Women who choose to become parents without
partners do so for varied reasons and become pregnant in varied ways.
But the end result is the same. Whether the mother conceives using
AID or with an anonymous or semi-anonymous sexual partner, her
prebirth relationship with the father is insignificant,3°4 and her child
will lack a paternal relationship and relations. Women who conceive
using AID may "replace" the absent father with other male figures or
even a second "mother," but so may women who conceive sexually.
And while women who use AID invariably intend to become pregnant,
women who conceive sexually with an anonymous partner may also
intend to have a child.305 In sum, because the mechanics of conception
are largely irrelevant to the relational realities of nonmarital parent-
child relationships, there is no obvious reason why paternity laws
should mandate different results when women conceive using AID and
when women conceive sexually.
Statutory identification of sperm donors as the legal fathers of chil-
dren conceived by single women using AID would not require a major
shift in the law; after all, the majority of state legislatures have dealt
with this issue simply by avoiding it.3o6 In these states, a known
303 See In re Marriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (determining the
legal parentage of a child born to a gestational surrogate with donated sperm and ova).
304 Experts estimate that approximately a quarter of nonmarital children are born to cohabiting
couples. See Larry L. Bumpass & James A. Sweet, Children's Experience in Single-Parent Fami-
lies: Implications of Cohabitation and Marital Transitions, 2, FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 256, 256
(iggo); Andrew J. Cherlin, The Weakening Link Between Marriage and the Care of Children, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 302, 303 (1988). Nor do the fathers of nonmarital children typically play a
responsible role in child rearing; less than 30% of them are even obligated to pay child support.
See LYDIA SCOON-ROGERS & GORDON H. LESTER, CHILD SUPPORT FOR CUSTODIAL
MOTHERS AND FATHERS: 2991, at 6-7, 12 tbl.F (Bureau of the Census, U.S. Dep't of Com-
merce, Series P6o-87, 1995) [hereinafter 199i CHILD SUPPORT REPORT] (reporting that 27% of
never-married mothers had been awarded child support in I99i).
305 See LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 34 (x994) (positing that "a higher pro-
portion of single mothers today enter that situation with some degree of volition").
306 Only iS states have enacted legislation dealing with AID use by unmarried women. See
supra note 52.
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sperm donor may sue or be sued to establish the paternity of his
child.30 7
Although sperm donors who favor anonymity frequently cite the
fear of future legal responsibilities as a primary basis for their prefer-
ence,308 AID paternity actions have, in fact, been commenced by
sperm donors themselves. All reported cases have involved known
donors, and litigation has typically occurred either because the mother
refused to honor an informal visitation agreement with the donor or
because the donor has decided, after the child's birth, that he wanted
to play a role in the child's life. 30 9 The cases illustrate two important
points. First, a man confronted with the fact of his fatherhood may
feel quite differently than the same man contemplating the possibility
of paternity.310 Second, although facially neutral, the law discrimi-
nates in practice between sperm donors who give directly to users and
those who give to sperm banks. Because sperm banks provide ano-
nymity to both donors and recipients, paternity litigation is effectively
foreclosed; women who want parenthood without partnership are thus
driven to banks and away from known donors.
31
It would, of course, be possible to abandon two-way anonymity
when AID is employed by a single woman and subject both AID par-
ents to potential claims by the other, as in the known donor cases. It
would also be possible to proscribe AID for women without partners.
Either of these approaches would be consistent with the law applicable
to sexual conception: the latter approach, like the marital presumption
of legitimacy, would virtually ensure that AID children have two legal
parents; the former, like the law now applicable to sexual conception
outside of marriage, would permit but not require paternity establish-
ment by the mother, father, or child. Laws that sever donor responsi-
307 In some states restrictive standing rules may preclude a paternity suit even by a known
sperm donor. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT §§ 4, 6, 9B U.L.A. 298-99, 301-03 (1973) (denying a
putative father standing unless he has attempted to marry the mother, received the child into his
home and held him out as his child, or filed a written acknowledgement of paternity that the
mother has not disputed within a reasonable period of time).
308 See Rowland, supra note 295, at 394 (noting that 6o% of donors would not object to contact
with their offspring provided that they were not financially liable for them); Doren, supra note
294, at 1211.
309 See Yaworsky, supra note 38, at 320-29.
310 An identical pattern is evident in adoption challenges, which in recent years have fre-
quently been brought by men who seem to have been fairly cavalier about paternity risk, but
who mounted full-scale efforts to establish a parental relationship once aware that they had be-
come fathers. See, e.g., In re Juvenile Action No. JS-849o, 876 P.2d 1137, 1139-41 (Ariz. 1994); In
re Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1217-18 (Cal. 1992); In re M.N.M., 605 A.2d 921, 922 (D.C. 1992); In
re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 18x, 182 (Ill. 1994); In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992); Robert 0.
v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, ioo-oi (N.Y. 1992).
311 See Stacey, supra note 43, at 12 (noting that "the AIDS epidemic and the emergence of
child custody conflicts ... led many lesbians to prefer the legally sanitized, medical route to
anonymous donors").
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bility or mandate donor-user anonymity, on the other hand, are incon-
sistent with traditional parentage law and policy because they ensure
that some technologically conceived children will have only one legal
parent.
Outside the United States, most legislatures have favored the pro-
scriptive approach. Although some countries (like the majority of
American states) have simply failed to address the problem, 12 of those
with legislation on AID use by single women, the vast majority have
adopted rules that require sperm banks to make AID available only to
married women and those with a long-term, heterosexual cohabitant
who has consented to the procedure. 313 The United Kingdom does
have laws that both explicitly grant single, noncohabiting women ac-
cess to sperm banks and sever the parental rights of sperm bank do-
nors,314 but single women's access to sperm banks is also qualified by
a requirement that "[a] woman shall not be provided with treatment
services unless account has been taken of the welfare of any child who
may be born as a result of the treatment (including the need of that
child for a father)."315
Is there a convincing justification for the adoption of paternity
rules for AID that are inconsistent with the paternity rules applicable
to sexual conception? Perhaps because most countries have dealt with
single women's use of AID through access rules, most of the commen-
tary fails to focus on this central issue. The Canadian Royal Commis-
sion, for example, recently recommended that single women without
partners have full access to AID and that all sperm donors' rights and
responsibilities be severed - but failed even to mention that adoption
of its recommendations would lead to one-parent families. Instead, it
urged that:
312 In some of these countries, professional medical standards largely preclude AID use by sin-
gle women. In Italy, for example, there is no legislation governing AID use, but guidelines of the
Association of Italian Medical and Dental Surgeons, binding on its 300,000 members, ban the
provision of AID to lesbian women. See Bruce Johnston, Italians Bar the Elderly from Fertility
reatment, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 4, 1995, at 12.
313 See Nielsen, supra note 84, at 3o (surveying European law and reporting that, in 1996,
"[t]he main rule seems to be that single women and lesbians may not benefit from medically as-
sisted conception" and describing Spain and Denmark as exceptions). The three Australian
provinces that have passed legislation on the issue have imposed similar restrictions. See Infertil-
ity Treatment Act, I995, chs. 8, '95 (Vict.); Human Reproductive Technology Act, 199i, ch. 23(c)
(W. Austl.); Reproductive Technology Act, i988, ch. 13 (S. Austl.).
314 See MORGAN & LEE, supra note 82, at 142-44.
315 Human Fertilisation & Embryology Act, 199o, ch. 37, § 13(5) (Eng.). A House of Lords
amendment to restrict the provision of services to married couples was defeated by one vote. See
MORGAN & LEE, supra note 82, at 142. It has been estimated that as few as six out of sixty
British centers offer AID to single women. See GILLIAN DOUGLAS, LAW, FERTILITY AND
REPRODUCTION 122 (1991).
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[flew women or couples are likely to choose [AID] without having given it
a great deal of thought or without having considered what the lifelong im-
plications of their choice will be. It will never be an easy decision or one
that is taken lightly .... For these reasons, we believe that relatively few
women, with or without a male partner, are likely to choose this way of
having a child; the availability of donor insemination is therefore unlikely
to imply major social change, because it will not change how the vast ma-
jority of children are conceived and families are formed.3 16
Some commentators favoring the Canadian approach have empha-
sized the fact that, given the rise of divorce and nonmarital parenting,
"there is no guarantee that children who have two heterosexual legal
parents will grow up in 'stable' households anyway."317 Others have
noted that single parents can sometimes adopt.318 Still others have
urged that the "adverse effects of being raised in father-absent homes
... do not constitute a reason against performing [donor insemination]
for single women unless they severely interfere with the child's oppor-
tunity for development."319 Finally, some have argued that the Cana-
dian approach is justified because "the risk that sperm donation to
unmarried women will increase welfare costs is very slight[, and o]ne
could reasonably conclude that this risk does not justify the reduction
in reproductive options for single women that imposing rearing costs
on sperm donors would create." 320
However, all of these arguments ignore the central issue: outside
the AID context, our legal system grants no parent, male or female, the
right to be a sole parent. Children of divorced and never-married par-
ents may well experience parental absence, but they nonetheless can
claim two parents and two sets of biological relatives - grandparents,
316 PROCEED WITH CARE, supra note i9, at 471-72. For a similar view, see CARSON
STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 95-96 (1997), see also
GLOVER, supra note 17, at 61-62 (recommending that lesbian women's access to technological
conception should be a matter of individual conscience for doctors and others); Henry, supra note
5i, at 286-87 (arguing that AID statutes should be reformed to protect the parties' pre-
insemination intentions); Schiff, supra note iii, at 527 (same).
317 Gabrielle Wolf, Frustrating Sperm: Regulation of AID in Victoria Under the Infertility
Treatment Act z995 (Vict), Io AUSTL. J. FAM. L. 71, 81-82 (1996); see also DOUGLAS, supra note
315, at 122 (suggesting that children born to single women after artificial insemination may be less
likely than children from other one-parent families to experience poverty or the trauma of their
parents' breaking up).
318 See Note, Reproductive Technology and Procreation Rights of the Unmarried, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 669, 683-84 (1985) (arguing that "because state legislatures have permitted single persons to
adopt children, denying such persons the right to become parents by other means seems inconsis-
tent").
319 STRONG, supra note 316, at 95; see also GLOVER, supra note 17, at 62 ("We take the view
that the restriction of liberty involved in any legal ban on reproductive help to lesbian couples
could only be justified by grounds for believing that harm would be done by that help. Because
the view that the children would be worse off than others is itself speculative, losses to others as a
result of their disadvantages are even more speculative.").
320 ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 128.
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uncles, aunts, cousins - whom they can identify as family and with
whom they may establish ties.32 1 Adoptive children all begin life with
parental claims against both a biological mother and father; indeed, if
the father has standing, he must consent to the child's adoption.
Adoption agencies seek to ensure that children continue to enjoy the
care of two parents, allowing single-parent adoptions only in the case
of hard-to-place children who are otherwise unlikely to be adopted at
all. 322 The choice of a single parent here represents not the view that
one parent is as good as two, but the view that one parent is better
than none at all. Such cases simply cannot justify a policy that will
invariably deprive technologically conceived children of two legal par-
ents.
The arguments for single-parent AID also misunderstand the basis
for state policy favoring two-parent child care. As we have seen, the
policy derives from the view that children are typically better off when
they have the opportunity to know and experience care from both of
their parents, a view that most Americans maintain 323 and that finds
support in the available evidence. 32 4 For children conceived sexually, a
two-parent preference thus does not depend on a showing of actual
harm to the child or the mother's failure to fully consider the conse-
quences of one-parent rearing.325 Nor does it depend on poverty or re-
ceipt of public assistance; although the threat of rising welfare costs
has certainly been an important factor in invigorating paternity law,
the paternity establishment rules apply to all cases of coital conception,
regardless of wealth. 326 A rich single mother who conceives sexually
- a Madonna or Mia Farrow, for example - cannot unilaterally rid
herself of her child's father simply by demonstrating lack of need or
disinterest in child support. There is no obvious reason why a woman
employing AID, rich or poor, should be able to do so either. After all,
child support is just one issue that turns on paternity establishment.
Once either party has established a parental relationship, the child is
entitled to all benefits - visitation, inheritance from the parent and
his biological relatives, maintenance of a wrongful death action, re-
ceipt of Social Security and other survivor's benefits - derived from
that status. 327
321 See supra pp. 885-89.
322 See sources cited supra notes 278-82.
323 See id.
324 See supra pp. 887-88.
325 See id.
326 Paternity cooperation rules, which require public assistance applicants to cooperate in es-
tablishing paternity and securing support, necessarily apply only to public assistance recipients.
See Legler, supra note 233, at 535.
327 See supra pp. 885-86. Of course, if the father fails to come forward promptly to act as a
father toward his child, the state need not, under Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983), recognize
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While most of the* justifications for the minority Canadian ap-
proach to single women's use of AID miss the point, it is certainly true
that either proscription or sperm donor responsibility would reduce
single women's reproductive options. Some commentators have thus
argued that the Canadian approach is justified because "[h]olding
sperm donors responsible for the costs of rearing offspring would re-
duce the opportunities of unmarried women to obtain sperm from phy-
sicians or sperm banks, thus relegating them to turkey baster insemi-
nations with sperm that has not been screened for infectious
diseases. '32 8  Although the claim that sperm donor responsibility
would relegate single women to the use of sperm unscreened for dis-
ease is clearly wrong - with either a known or anonymous donor,
women can utilize private physician assistance to obtain laboratory
screening tests32 9 - sperm donor responsibility would reduce the
number of donors available to single women. Donor responsibility
would also reduce the number of single women who choose AID, as
women who select this method of conception typically do so, at least in
part, precisely to avoid the possibility of conflict with a "mate" who
wants visitation rights and a role in the child's life.
33 0
The fact that donor responsibility would likely reduce the numbers
of both donors and users is not a sufficient reason to absolve donors of
parental responsibility, however. Women who want to parent alone
would undoubtedly find unprotected sexual intercourse more attractive
and have a wider choice of sexual partners if men who fathered chil-
dren sexually could forgo parental rights and responsibilities. But par-
entage law and policy has firmly opposed such an expansion of par-
enting possibilities. And while respect for procreative liberties suggests
his parental status, see id. at 267-68 (holding that a father who had never established a relation-
ship with his child could be accorded different legal rights than the mother).
328 ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE, supra note 54, at 128; see also NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 295, at 347 ("[T]he likelihood that notifying
semen donors of their potential rights and responsibilities as biological parents would deny un-
married women access to safe semen is a compelling reason ... to allow semen donors to relin-
quish their parental rights and responsibilities regardless of the marital status of the woman who
ultimately uses the semen.").
329 See STRONG, supra note 316, at 86-87 (noting that "single women ... approach physicians
with requests for DI [to] seek ... assurance that appropriate testing of the sperm ... has been
performed"). Cryopreservation, which ensures that a sperm sample does not carry diseases such
as the AIDS virus, can also be obtained through sperm banks by known donors. For an example,
see Hecht v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). Casual, unprotected
sexual intercourse does, of course, entail a risk of transmissible disease. Thus, to the extent that
women who prefer AID with an unknown donor choose unprotected intercourse rather than AID
with a known donor, disease risks would increase.
330 See FENWICK, supra note 68, at 271-77; MELISSA LUDTKE, ON OUR OWN: UNMAR-
RIED MOTHERHOOD IN AMERICA 128-31 (1997) (describing the decisionmaking process of a
woman who settled on AID);Cook, supra note 9, at 5 (describing how many single professional
women are choosing to become mothers through AID); Wisby, supra note i i, at i.
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that government should not countermand the decision to bear a child,
it hardly mandates state acquiescence in one parent's wish to deny the
existence of the other.331
It is also true, as some commentators have noted, that sperm donor
responsibility might produce more parental conflict and litigation than
a regime under which sperm donors have no rights or responsibili-
ties.332 But the risk of conflict is identical in cases of conception with
an anonymous or semi-anonymous sexual partner. Nor is the possibil-
ity - or even the reality - of parental conflict a sufficient basis for
severing parental rights in any other context. Instead, as we have
seen, the states have enacted rules designed to foster parent-child con-
tact and reduce conflict levels. 333  This approach is grounded in re-
search demonstrating that, although serious parental conflict does pose
risks to children's emotional health and development, 334 so does paten-
tal absence.331 Parents who have never played a role in their child's
life are undoubtedly less important than those who have been loved
and lost. But the fact that children adopted at birth - and AID chil-
dren - sometimes go to extraordinary lengths to learn about and meet
their paternal relatives strongly evidences the power of genetic connec-
tion.336
331 For similar conclusions based on unfairness to the child, see Daniel Callahan, Bioethics and
Fatherhood, 1992 UTAH L. REV. 735, 739-40 ("If [a donor whose sperm is used for artificial in-
semination] is thereby a biological father, he has all the duties of any other biological father. It is
morally irrelevant that (i) the donor does not want to act as a father, (2) those who collect his
sperm as medical brokers do not want him to act as a father, (3) the woman whose ovum he is
fertilizing does not want him to act as a father, and (4) society is prepared to excuse him from the
obligations of acting as a father."); and Herbert T. Krimmel, The Case Against Surrogate Parent-
ing, in WHAT PRICE PARENTHOOD?, supra note 17, at 54, 54 (arguing that to "intentionally de-
prive the child of a mother or a father.., is fundamentally unfair to the child").
332 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 295, at 334
("Some people ... argue that a semen donor's efforts to establish a relationship with his biological
child may intrude on the child's existing family structure.").
333 See supra pp. 888-89.
334 See PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN
ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 204 (1997) (reporting that divorce appears not to have negative
long-term consequences for the well-being of children whose parents had a high-conflict mar-
riage); Amato, supra note 240, at i51 (citing studies showing that children "in high-conflict two-
parent families are at increased risk for a variety of problems").
335 For descriptions of the research findings, see MICHAEL RUTTER, MATERNAL
DEPRIVATION REASSESSED 31-80 (2d ed. i981); Peggy C. Davis, Use and Abuse of the Power to
Sever Family Bonds, 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 557, 563-72 (j983-84); and Marsha
Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 455-60 (1983).
336 See DAVID M. BRODZINSKY, MARSHALL D. SCHECHTER & ROBIN MARANTZ HENIG,
BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFELONG SEARCH FOR SELF 71-82, 101-18, 139-48, 158-62, 170-74
(1992) (describing adoptees' searches for their biological parents); Marshall D. Schechter & Doris
Bertocci, The Meaning of the Search, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 62 (David M.
Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds., 19go) (same); Brown, supra note 292, at x2 (demon-
strating the "anger and confusion" that can attend an AID child's not knowing her biological fa-
ther); Orenstein, supra note 292, at 28-35, 42, 5o, 58 (describing the effects of anonymous donation
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Single AID users are undeniably a sympathetic group. Some are
women who would like to marry and share parenting responsibilities
but have failed to find a mate and feel that time is running out; others
are lesbian women who wish to share parenting responsibilities with a
female partner, a partner with whom they cannot possibly conceive. 337
All are women who deeply want a child.
But there are many would-be parents who equally deserve our
sympathy. Those who seek fertility treatments and those who seek to
adopt also desperately want children; many undergo extreme financial
and emotional hardship for the chance to be a parent. Except for
those willing to adopt a hard-to-place child who would otherwise have
no parent at all, none of these would-be parents is legally entitled to
parent alone.
There is simply no logical basis for a one-parent policy applicable
only to single AID users. The only interests ultimately served by such
a policy are those of the single woman who wants a child but does not
want that child to have a father. As much as we may sympathize with
single AID users in their desire to bear children, there does not appear
to be a valid basis for granting them an entitlement possessed by no
other parents.
(b) Proscription or Sperm Donor Responsibility? - As we have
seen, a two-parent policy might be applied to AID either through a
proscriptive law or through a law mandating identity exchange and es-
tablishing donor responsibility. Either approach would appear to meet
constitutional requirements. A sperm donor responsibility rule would
simply restate what has long been true for sexual conception: a man
who fathers a child born to an unmarried woman will be adjudicated
the child's legal father if a paternity action is commenced in a timely
matter by a party with standing.338 Such a rule would undeniably af-
fect the determination of parentage; but given that parthenogenesis is
not currently a human reproductive option,339 it would not restrict
procreative choice. Even a rule requiring a single woman to apply for
AID jointly with another adult who has consented to be her child's le-
on AID children). Adoptees and AID children wish to learn about their biological families to gain
both a sense of personal history and a better understanding of their genetic identity, which can
strongly influence not only appearance, but also psychological health and cognitive ability. See
Gerald E. McClearn, Boo Johansson, Stig Berg, Nancy L. Pedersen, Frank Ahern, Stephen A.
Petrill & Robert Plomin, Substantial Genetic Influence on Cognitive Abilities in T1vins 80 or More
Years Old, 276 SCI. 156o, 1562 (1997) (reporting that 62% of general cognitive ability in late life is
attributable to genetic factors).
337 For accounts of single women's motivations for using AID, see FENWICK, supra note 68, at
271-77; LUDTKE, supra note 330, at 3-19, 102-61; and Cook, supra note 9, at 5.
338 See supra pp. 885-86.
339 See 15 ACADEMIC AMERICAN ENCYCLOPEDIA 99-ioo (ig8o) ("Parthenogenesis is the
development of an unfertilized egg into an adult organism.").
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gal father3 40 would intrude upon procreative choice considerably less
than a fornication ban, which appears to be constitutionally valid.34'
Given our legal tradition's longstanding preference for marital par-
enting and the economic and social risks associated with single par-
enting,342 a joint application requirement should also withstand consti-
tutional scrutiny.
Although both proscription and donor responsibility appear to be
constitutionally viable, the two approaches offer very different advan-
tages and disadvantages. The principal advantage of the proscriptive
approach is effectiveness; because donor responsibility would merely
preserve the possibility of establishing donor paternity, it could not en-
sure two-parent care to the same extent as would a proscriptive rule.
The greater efficacy of proscription is undoubtedly a major reason for
its success internationally. But because AID can be performed pri-
vately without medical assistance, even proscription would fail to en-
sure two-parent care in all cases. Some women undoubtedly would
evade the law; others would engage in casual, unprotected sexual in-
tercourse with the hope of conceiving a child.
Given that consistency is a central aim of the interpretive ap-
proach, one can also make a strong case that a proscriptive approach
would go too far. As we have seen, contemporary family law strongly
encourages unmarried women to establish the paternity of their chil-
dren, but does not mandate it. Nor does current law require single
mothers to provide substitute fathers if they fail to establish the bio-
logical father's paternity. Indeed, in i99i, almost three-quarters of
never-married mothers surveyed by the U.S. Census Bureau reported
340 Under a proscriptive regime, the rulemaking authority would need to decide whether a sin-
gle AID applicant could satisfy the two-parent requirement by securing consent to serve as a par-
ent from another woman. The issue is of particular importance given the significant number of
lesbian couples who wish to raise a child together. Because same-sex couples cannot marry, nei-
ther the marital presumption of legitimacy nor the statutes assigning fatherhood to the consenting
spouse of a woman who conceives using AID apply. In states permitting adoption by the
mother's lesbian partner, see, e.g., In re Tammy, 61g N.E.2d 35, 315-17 (Mass. 1993); In re Jacob
& Dana, 66o N.E.2d 397, 400-01 (N.Y. 1995); see also Sonja Larson, Annotation, Adoption of
Child by Same-Sex Partners, 27 A.L.R.5TH 54 ('995), there is no obvious reason why a lesbian or
gay partner should not satisfy a two-parent AID requirement. In other states, however, any adop-
tion by a homosexual is illegal. See supra note 267. In these states consistency would require dis-
allowing a gay partner under the AID statute.
341 It is less clear whether the state could restrict AID access to married couples. While a stat-
ute may discriminate based on marriage if the classification is rationally related to a legitimate
governmental objective, see Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1977), a married-couple restric-
tion would seem to run afoul of Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (972), which struck down a
statute criminalizing the use of prescription contraceptives by unmarried individuals, see id. at
454-55. If the state cannot legitimately deny access to a means of avoiding pregnancy based on
marital status, it seems to follow that the state cannot deny access to a means of achieving preg-
nancy based on marital status.
342 See supra pp. 887-88.
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that they had not obtained support awards from their children's fa-
thers,343 and almost half reported as a reason for inaction that they
"had not pursued" or "did not want" an award. 344 Just as it seems un-
fair to grant to single women who conceive using AID privileges not
granted to single women who conceive sexually, it seems equally unfair
to impose on them more rigorous requirements.
It is true that public policy tolerates unmarried women's failure to
establish the paternity of sexually conceived children largely because it
is powerless to do anything about it. AID offers a context in which
dual parenting could far more reliably be enforced. Relying on this
fact and family law's strong policy preference for dual parenting, some
lawmakers may find that a proscriptive rule is justified. But given
that almost a third of U.S. births now occur outside of marriage, 345 a
donor responsibility approach seems, on balance, more consistent with
the rules that actually govern sexual conception.
2. Gestational Surrogacy. - The case of gestational surrogacy is
unique: in contrast to the reproductive techniques examined thus far,
there is no sexual analog to this particular form of technological con-
ception. Because pregnancy and birth are relatively public and undis-
puted, the law has rarely confronted the question of legal motherhood
at all. When it has - as in the case of babies stolen or mistakenly
switched in the hospital - courts have not typically distinguished ges-
tation from genetic tie for the simple reason that, for a child conceived
sexually, they are inextricably linked.
Courts have often resolved fatherhood claims, of course. Outside of
marriage, paternity was traditionally determined based on sexual ac-
cess to the mother.3 46  Blood tests have made it possible to separate
sexual access and genetic tie as determinants of fatherhood, and ge-
netic tie is clearly the winner. If a mother has had multiple sexual
partners during the period of conception, the partner genetically re-
lated to her child will be declared its legal father, even if another part-
ner had far more frequent sexual intercourse with her. But men do not
give birth and, as the marital presumption demonstrates, genetic tie
343 See I991 CHILD SUPPORT REPORT, supra note 304, at 13-17 tbl.x, 34-36 tbl.6 (showing
that 56% of all eligible mothers and 27% of never-married mothers had support orders). Even
when they obtain awards, never-married mothers, as a group, receive relatively low levels of sup-
port. See id. at 19-21 tbl.2 (showing mean i99! income from child support of $1534 for never-
married mothers and $301 i for all parents).
344 Id. at 13-17 tbl.i (reporting that, in 1991, 34.6% of custodial mothers who had not been
awarded child support said that they "did not pursue a child support award," 13.9% that they
"did not want child support," 20.5% that they were "unable to locate the other parent," and 16.1%
that the "other parent [was] unable to pay").
345 See 1996 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 9, at 76 tbl.93 (showing that in 1996, 32.4%
of U.S. births were nonmarital).
346 See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
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has been ignored when important policy interests are at stake.347
Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that, even with a proven ge-
netic tie, an unmarried father's rights need not be recognized if he has
failed to grasp the "opportunity ... to develop a relationship ... and
accept... some measure of responsibility for the child's future. '348
The policies that have prompted courts to disregard biology when
adjudicating paternity - supporting marriage, promoting two-parent
care, and protecting the child's established relationships - do not ap-
pear relevant in the case of gestational surrogacy, however, at least if
the case is adjudicated at or near the child's birth. At this point, there
are no established relationships to protect and the decisionmaker may
confront two marriages, two competing families offering dual parent
care, and two "mothers" prepared to accept responsibility for the
child.349 Because none of the policy-based exceptions to genetic par-
entage determination apply to a gestational surrogate, the interpretive
approach suggests that her claims should be rejected. 3 0
This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that use of gestation as the
determinant of motherhood would introduce a gender-specific element
into parentage law. Just as this seems undesirable in the case of AID
and IVF, it also seems undesirable here. Indeed, one can make an ar-
gument that the Equal Protection Clause mandates a similar approach
347 See supra pp. 883-84. Estoppel and res judicata principles have been used to achieve the
same result when the effect of examining genetic connection would be to deprive the child of an
established paternal relationship or support. See supra pp. 884-85.
348 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983).
349 Professor Janet Dolgin has suggested that to base legal parentage on genetic tie in gesta-
tional surrogacy cases would stand "in marked contrast to the message about the importance of
gestation underlying the unwed father cases." DOLGIN, supra note 7, at 128. But the unwed fa-
ther cases in fact convey no message about gestation; instead, they focus on parental responsibil-
ity. See supra pp. 885-86.
350 Commentators favoring an intention or contract-based approach to parentage determination
have reached the same result for different reasons. See SHALEV, supra note 30, at 120-45; Hill,
supra note 103, at 413-20; Schiff, supra note iii, at 549-70; Schultz, supra note iii, at 323;
Denise E. Lascarides, Note, A Plea for the Enforceability of Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 25
HOFSTRA L. REV. 1221, 1245-58 (1997). The contract approach poses the same problems here as
it does when used as a general decisionmaking standard. See supra pp. 859-66. The case of ges-
tational surrogacy also underscores some of the practical problems inherent in a contract-based
approach. For example, what if blood tests revealed that the gestational "surrogate" is in fact the
genetic mother and the intended mother does not want an unrelated child? If the contract is then
treated as unenforceable because the parties had in mind a child genetically related to the initiat-
ing mother, it is hard to see what practical advantages an intention-based or contract-based ap-
proach provides over one focused squarely on genetic tie. See Stiver v. Parker, 975 F.2d 261 (6th
Cir. 1992) (holding, based on blood tests revealing that the "surrogate" mother's husband was the
child's genetic father, that the surrogate and her husband were the legal parents of a severely
handicapped child wanted by neither the sperm donor nor the surrogate).
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to maternity and paternity determinations;351 the fact that a gestation-
based approach to maternity relies on traditional stereotypes of female
nurturance only lends weight to this argument.3 S2
Some commentators have nonetheless urged a gestation-based
standard. While the arguments in favor of such an approach are vari-
ous, none rely on claims of procreative right (it is not obvious who
possesses it) or contract (any contract would specify the genetic mother
as legal mother). Instead, commentators favoring the gestational
mother have relied on factual assumptions about the mother-child
bond.
One argument in favor of the gestational mother is based on the
claim that, while men's perceptions of parenthood are determined by
genetic tie, "[flor women, what makes the child ours is the nurturance,
the work of our bodies." 35 3 Women's and men's experiences of preg-
nancy and birth are undeniably different. But the evidence simply
does not support the assertion that women uniformly identify mother-
hood with pregnancy. Some pregnant women experience the fetus as
alien and invasive,3 4 while adoptive mothers typically feel strongly at-
tached to "their" children, even though they did not nurture them pre-
natally.35 And women who give birth to extremely premature infants
- infants who may be maintained in an incubator for as long as a
third of the gestational period - do not seem to feel any less motherly
because of their limited gestational role. More importantly, whatever
some women may feel about motherhood, women who make use of
gestational surrogates clearly connect motherhood with genetic tie: that
351 See Soos v. Superior Court, 897 P.2d 1356, 136o (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that the
Equal Protection Clause requires genetic determination of maternity in a case of gestational sur-
rogacy).
352 The Supreme Court has held that the preservation of traditional, gender-based family roles
is an insufficient basis for justifying a gender-based classification. See United States v. Virginia,
518 U.S. 515, 54o-46 (x996); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 279-80 (979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S.
7, 10 (1975).
353 BARBARA KATZ ROTHMAN, RECREATING MOTHERHOOD: IDEOLOGY AND TECHNO-
LOGY IN A PATRIARCHAL SOCIETY 44 (1989).
354 See ANN OAKLEY, WOMEN CONFINED: TOWARD A SOCIOLOGY OF CHILDBIRTH
207-13 (ig8o); John T. Condon & Carolyn Corkindale, The Correlates of Antenatal Attachment in
Pregnant Women, 70 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 359, 369-71 (1997); Margaret Erickson, Predictors
of Maternal-Fetal Attachment: An Integrative Review, 3 ONLINE J. KNOWLEDGE SYNTHESIS
FOR NURSING 1 (1996); Myra Leifer, Changes Accompanying Pregnancy and Motherhood, 95
GENETIC PSYCHOL. 55, 89-93 (1977).
3S5 See Femmie Juffer & Lizette G. Rosenboom, Infant-Mother Attachment of Internationally
Adopted Children in the Netherlands, 20 INT'L J. BEHAV. DEV. 93 (1997) (reporting that attach-
ment levels of adoptive mothers did not differ significantly from those of biological mother con-
trols); Leslie M. Singer, David M. Brodzinsky, Douglas Ramsay, Mary Steir & Everett Waters,
Mother-Infant Attachment in Adoptive Families, 56 CHILD DEV. 1543 (1985) (reporting no sig-
nificant differences in the quality of attachment in adoptive and biological parent-child relation-
ships).
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is why they have elected this method of becoming a parent. Nor are
these women unusual. Adoptive and AID children search for biologi-
cal parents because, at least in our culture, concepts of parenthood,
family, and identity are strongly linked to biological connection;35 6 in-
deed, a prime factor responsible for the rapid growth in use of repro-
ductive technologies has been the desire for genetically related chil-
dren.357
A second argument in favor of the gestational mother relies on her
crucial physical role in bringing the fetus to term.358 But this argu-
ment ignores the fact that the genetic mother's role is also crucial;
without her ovum, there would be no fetus to gestate. And while ges-
tation is undeniably an important form of care - no incubators capa-
ble of sustaining a fetus over the nine month period of gestation are
yet available - that care has not, at birth, induced affection or de-
pendency from the child.
A third argument focuses on the gestational mother's feelings of at-
tachment and loss. 35 9 But we have no evidence that the genetic
mother will feel less attached to her biological child than will the ges-
tational mother to the child she has carried, or that the genetic
mother's sense of loss at the prospect of not being able to rear her
child will be less profound. 360 Even if it could somehow be shown
356 See Hill, supra note 103, at 419 ("[A] fundamentally biological conception of parenthood is
ingrained deeply in the ethos of our culture [and] influence[s] our most profound intuitions con-
cerning the nature of parenthood and parental rights."); James L. Nelson, Genetic Narratives: Bi-
ology, Stories, and the Definition of the Family, 2 HEALTH MATRIX 71, 71-83 (1992) (discussing
the significance of genetic ties); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209,
214-23 (describing the cultural importance of genetic connection). For a sociological account of
the role of genetic tie in the American view of kinship, see DAVID M. SCHNEIDER, AMERICAN
KINSHIP: A CULTURAL ACCOUNT (2d ed. 98o).
357 See Kenneth D. Alpern, Genetic Puzzles and Stork Stories: On the Meaning and Signifi-
cance of Having Children, in THE ETHICS OF REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 147, 158 (Ken-
neth D. Alpern ed., 1992) (noting that, for most people, "adoption is a second choice" due to the
lack of "genetically based affinities of temperament, interest, . . . understanding[, and] physical
resemblance to the parents[, and because] an adopted child, it is generally felt, is just not, in the
fullest sense, one's own; one is not a real parent of the child"); see also FENWICK, supra note 68,
at 217-18; KAPLAN & TONG, supra note is, at 242; Hill, supra note 103, at 389.
358 See, e.g., NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 30, at 351
("[Elven without a genetic connection, a birth mother has a strong biological tie to her child as a
result of nurturing the child in her womb."); George J. Annas, Baby M: Babies (and Justice) for
Sale, 17 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 3 (1987) (arguing that the "gestational mother ... contributes
more to the child than the ovum donor does in the same way she contributes more to the child
than a sperm donor does"); Rothman, supra note 149, at 97-98, 244-45 (describing gestation as
social and noting the significance of the prenatal social relationship between the fetus and gesta-
tional mother).
359 See Rothman, supra note 149, at 97-98.
360 Most of the evidence comes from studies of women who give children up for adoption -
women who are both genetic and gestational mothers. See Anne B. Brodzinsky, Surrendering an
Infant for Adoption: The Birthmother Experience, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION, supra
note 336, at 295, 306-1o; Eva Y. Deykin, Lee Campbell & Patricia Patti, The Post-Adoption Expe-
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that gestation induced a stronger sense of loss than did genetic connec-
tion, this factor should not determine parental rights. Both when
granting parental rights to a nonparent and when denying a biological
parent the opportunity to evade parental obligations, parentage law
has been centrally concerned with the child's needs, not the parent-
claimant's feelings.3 61 There is no obvious reason to apply a different
approach to the problem of gestational surrogacy.
A final argument in favor of recognizing the gestational surrogate
as legal mother is based on deterrence: some commentators have ar-
gued that recognition of the genetic mother as the child's legal mother
would encourage gestational surrogacy, while recognition of the gesta-
tional mother would discourage it.362 But if the legislature does decide
to outlaw gestational surrogacy, recognition of the gestational surrogate
as legal mother is neither necessary nor sufficient to eliminate the prac-
tice. It is unnecessary because, in contrast to "ordinary" surrogacy,
gestational surrogacy invariably involves IVF, which requires the par-
ticipation of licensed medical personnel who will rarely be willing to
risk their licenses by performing illegal procedures. 363 It is insufficient
because, given that most gestational surrogates do not attempt to re-
tain custody of the children they have borne, many women who want
genetically related children will find the risk of a legal claim by the
surrogate acceptable.
rience of Surrendering Parents, 54 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 271, 278-80 (i986); Leverett
Millen & Samuel Roll, Solomon's Mothers: A Special Case of Pathological Bereavement, 55 AM. J.
ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 411, 413-18 (1985); Edward K. Rynearson, Relinquishment and Its Mater-
nal Complications: A Preliminary Study, 139 AM. J. PSYCH. 338, 340 (1982).
These women often experience long-term emotional difficulties, interpersonal conflict, and
even post-relinquishment infertility. The sense of loss that accompanies such a relinquishment
typically extends over a lengthy period; in one study, 65% of relinquishing mothers had initiated a
search for their children and 96% had considered searching. See Deykin, Campbell & Patti, su-
pra, at 274. There is also evidence suggesting that feelings of loss are exacerbated when a child's
surrender is involuntary. See id. (reporting that relinquishing parents were more likely to search
for a lost child when relinquishment was motivated by nonvolitional factors such as family pres-
sure).
361 See supra pp. 886, 892-94.
362 See NEW YORK STATE TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, supra note 30, at 35 1 (fa-
voring the gestational surrogate because, under the N.Y. surrogacy prohibition, "a birth mother
... may not relinquish her parental rights and responsibilities before the child is born"); Anne
Goodwin, Determination of Legal Parentage in Egg Donation, Embryo Transplantation, and Ges-
tational Surrogacy Arrangements, 26 FAM. L.Q. 275, 291 (i992) (concluding that gestational sur-
rogates should be recognized as legal parents because, "[o]nce parentage laws strip the pregnancy
of any legal significance for determination of maternity, the market will reduce the uniquely fe-
male capacity to gestate a fetus to a paid service").
363 An analogous case is that of organ sale, which is illegal in the United States. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 274(e) (1994). Because transplants require a licensed surgeon, illegal organ sales rarely, if ever,
take place, despite lengthy waiting lists for organs and the existence of organ markets in other
countries.
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Pregnancy and childbirth are extraordinary experiences, both
physically and emotionally. They are perhaps so bound up with per-
sonhood that, like sex and kidneys, their sale ought not be allowed.
The question of whether gestational surrogacy should be permissible is
simply beyond the scope of this article; I take no position here on this
important issue. But if the practice is allowed and parenthood must
be determined, it appears, on balance, that genetic tie should take
precedence over gestation. To rely on gestation as the determinant of
motherhood and genetics as the determinant of fatherhood would
undesirably introduce a gender-specific element in the determination of
parentage. None of the policy values that have been thought signifi-
cant enough to trump biology in determining fatherhood apply to ges-
tational surrogacy, nor is there reason to believe that the gestator's
sense of loss and parenthood is stronger than that of the genetic pro-
genitor. Perhaps most importantly, the gestator's contributions to fetal
development, while vital, do not induce the sort of attachment that has
led courts to protect children's established relationships. Courts re-
fusing to return a mistakenly switched baby to a genetic parent have
done so because years have passed and relationships formed; gesta-
tional surrogacy presents no such case.
364
3. Donated Preembryos. - The policies underlying contemporary
parentage law clearly support state rules assigning parental rights both
to a husband who has consented to his wife's artificial insemination
with donated semen and to a wife who has agreed to IVF with a do-
nated ovum and her husband's sperm. Such rules would reinforce the
marital presumption of legitimacy and the traditional policy emphasis
on marital childbearing; they would promote two-parent childrearing;
and they would ensure that the marital presumption is applied in a
gender-neutral manner.
The husband who consents to becoming the father of a child born
through AID and the wife who consents to becoming the mother of a
child conceived with a donated egg and her husband's sperm are in
many respects like husbands and wives who agree to adopt stepchil-
dren. But when conception is achieved using a donated preembryo or
donated sperm and ovum, neither the woman who gives birth nor her
husband is genetically related to the child. Such a case is analogous
not to a stepchild adoption, but to the adoption of an unrelated child.
364 See, e.g., Mays v. Twigg, 543 So. 2d 241 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). In Johnson v. Calvert,
85x R2d 776 (Cal. 1993), the Calverts relied on the switched baby cases: "Assuming this ... child
were confused with a number of other children in the hospital nursery .... only Crispina Calvert
could, by blood tests, prove her maternal connection to the child." Respondents' Brief at 45,
Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. I993) (No. So2372I), quoted in DOLGIN, supra note 7, at
146.
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In most states, stepchild adoptions are subject to different rules
than unrelated-child adoptions. Evaluation of an adopting stepparent
typically is not required, both because the biological parent - who is
not subject to state evaluation - has "selected" the adoptive parent
and because the child's living arrangements will remain constant,
whether or not the adoption is finalized. 365 By contrast, the adoption
of an unrelated child typically is highly regulated. In a few states,
such an adoption may not be effected except through a licensed state
adoption agency; in all states, judicial review and approval is re-
quired.3 66
The adoption analogy suggests that parentage determination in the
case of a donated preembryo should not be the same as in a case of
AID or IVF with husband sperm (IVF-H). If genetic tie is used to de-
termine legal motherhood in cases of gestational surrogacy, the argu-
ment for treating preembryo donation differently from AID and IVF-
H becomes even stronger: if both gestation and intention are inade-
quate to establish legal motherhood in the surrogacy context, consis-
tency suggests that these factors should not determine legal parentage
in the case of a donated preembryo.
But while use of a donated preembryo and adoption of an unre-
lated child are in many respects similar, there are also substantial dif-
ferences between these two methods of becoming a parent, differences
that counsel against extending current adoption rules to the preembryo
context. First, a preembryo is not a child or even a fetus in utero that
will in the natural course of events mature into a child. The preem-
bryo may never become a life in being; it has no legal status whatso-
ever.367 Second, many donated preembryos are "spares" created for the
potential future use of the couple whose sperm and ova were used to
produce them.368 "Spare" preembryos are not always used by their
creators, who sometimes donate them for the use of others. 369
365 See UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 4 cmt., 9 U.L.A. 103 (ig9); Joan Heifetz Hollinger, Adoption
Law, THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN, Spring 1993, at 43, 44 (noting that "[i]ntrafamily adoptions
are the least regulated type of adoption'.
366 See Hollinger, supra note 365, at 48 & n.31 (summarizing state adoption laws and reporting
that, in 1993, five states disallowed nonagency adoption placements and that "[iln both direct and
agency placements, a further prerequisite to the approval of an adoption is at least one favorable
evaluation of the placement during the time between placement and the entry of a final decree'.
367 The exception is Louisiana, which provides that an in vitro fertilized ovum is a legal person.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:12 1-9:133 (West 1992).
368 The creation of extra preembryos ensures that, if the couple wants to attempt a subsequent
IVF procedure, they can do so without the expense, inconvenience, and potential health risks as-
sociated with ovum retrieval. See Blair H. Smith & Ian D. Cooke, Ovarian Hyperstimulation:
Actual and Theoretical Risks, 302 BRIT. MED. J. 127 (I991) (describing medical risks). But see
Andrea L. Bonnicksen, Embryo Freezing: Ethical Issues in the Clinical Setting, in WHAT PRICE
PARENTHOOD?, supra note 17, at 28-29 (questioning benefits of preembryo storage).
369 See Davidoff, supra note 63, at 139-46; Owen, supra note 63, at 500-06.
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Because of these differences, rules commonly applied in unrelated-
child adoptions adapt poorly to the preembryo context. Provisional
adoptive placements and post-birth home studies, for example, seem
quite out of place in a preembryo donation case. So do rules that pro-
hibit pre-birth consent or mandate post-birth consent ratification. In
the adoption setting, such consent requirements are designed to ensure
that a rights waiver is informed, reflective, and uncoerced. But in the
preembryo context, such requirements would pose an extraordinary ar-
ray of problems. For example, a post-birth consent requirement would
not only necessitate maintaining contact with the preembryo's progeni-
tors over what might be a period of several years, but subject users of
donated preembryos to extraordinary risks: a woman who used a do-
nated preembryo to become pregnant would confront the possibility of
giving birth, only to face relinquishing the child.
Use of donated preembryos also presents policy issues that do not
arise when a couple adopts an unrelated child. For example, a couple
might use preembryo donation to engage in eugenic manipulation by
choosing sperm and egg donors with traits they deem particularly de-
sirable.370
In sum, neither AID statutes nor adoption law should simply be ex-
tended to married couples using IVF with donated preembryos. To
ensure consistency with the law applicable to sexual conception,
preembryo legislation should not rely on intention as the determinant
of parental status. And, assuming that the legislature has rejected ges-
tation as the basis for parental status in cases of gestational surrogacy,
it should also reject gestation as a determining factor here. Legislative
standards should also be sensitive to the interests of all parties.
These various requirements leave room for a variety of regulatory
regimes. One legislature might specify with some particularity the no-
tices and forms to be used when consent to donation is obtained, but
otherwise assimilate preembryo donation to AID; another might sim-
ply require preimplantation donor consent;37' yet another might couple
one or another donor consent requirement with various recipient man-
dates, for example, a preimplantation home study by an adoption
agency. The novelty of the issues posed by preembryo donation and
370 See, e.g., Ruth Bashinsky & William Sherman, So G Bounty for Human Eggs: As Prices In-
crease, So Do Questions of Ethics, DAILY NEWS, June 14, 1999, at 22 (reporting that, in 1998, a
couple placed ads in student newspapers at a number of prestigious universities offering $5o,000
for eggs from a donor at least 5 feet, io inches tall, who had scored at least 1,4oo on her SAT ex-
ams); Gina Kolata, Researchers Report Success in Method to Pick Baby's Sex, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
9, 1998, at Ai (reporting that sex selection is possible).
371 Such a requirement would help to deter embryo "theft." It would also help to ensure that
consent to donation is current and reflective; for example, the couple who had signed a standard-
ized donation form at the time of an initial IVF procedure may wish to withdraw their consent if
they have failed to have a child through IVF themselves.
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the fact that both adoption and AID differ from preembryo donation
in important ways suggest that legislative standards should reflect
both areas of law but imitate neither.
E. What the Interpretive Approach Offers and What It Does Not
The package of legislative standards that I have outlined would as-
similate technological conception within contemporary parentage law.
The proposed standards would base parental status on current family
policy and widely shared public values instead of the circumstances of
a child's conception. The suggested reforms pose no problems of fea-
sibility or cost-effectiveness. In most states they would not even re-
quire a major revision of current law; indeed, consistency is best as-
sured with minimal revision.
The reforms suggested by the interpretive approach are also fairly
comprehensive. In contrast to the global approaches examined in Part
II, the interpretive approach can be applied to all of the parental
status issues arising from technological conception. It is notable that
the arguments made for and against extending adoption registries to
technologically conceived children, permitting single women's use of
AID, and recognizing a gestational surrogate as legal mother - the
bulk of the "harder" cases we have examined - typically rely on vari-
ous facts or assumptions rather than a global theory. The reason for
this pattern is straightforward: a claim of reproductive rights can re-
solve none of these problems, 32 and contracts are typically employed
only in the case of gestational surrogacy (gestational surrogacy is also
the only case in which money typically changes hands). By contrast,
the interpretive approach can not only be utilized in all cases, but it
also offers a means of determining which facts, assumptions, and in-
terests are relevant; even when it fails to generate determinate an-
swers, it can guide the decisionmaker toward a reasoned analysis of
the problem.
In addition to these merits, the interpretive approach offers the
benefit of neutrality. It treats all would-be parents equally, without re-
gard to their choice of a method for becoming a parent. It does not
depend on any particular vision of family life or parental prerogatives,
except insofar as that vision has been accepted elsewhere within family
law and policy.
In recent years, family law and policy have been hotly debated, not
only in legislative chambers but also in academic journals, on the
campaign trail, during the daytime talk shows, andt over the family
372 A right to procreate cannot realistically be stretched to entail a right to confidentiality or to
divest the other progenitor of his procreational rights. With gestational surrogacy, an additional
problem is identification of the rights-holder.
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dinner table. Debate on issues like parental rights, nontraditional
family forms, and gender roles has been both impassioned and divi-
sive. The proposals I offer are not based on the view that either side
in the "war" over the family has got it right. I offer no brief for or
against single parenting, gay parenting, surrogate parenting, or mar-
ried parenting. While the approach I have offered is conservative in
that it supports reliance on tradition, it does not assume that current
law should remain static; if, for example, the law recognizes two-
mother parenting in the context of adoption, then there is no obvious
reason why it should not also recognize two-mother parenting in the
context of technological conception. 373 In this article, I do not argue
for or against such an outcome. My point is simply that parentage law
should chart a consistent course, without regard to the manner of a
child's conception.
Some commentators on technological conception have seen in these
new methods of family formation "the opportunity for ... experiment
[with] status-based parental responsibility [rules]. '374 Their views on
the law's direction here are colored by their dissatisfaction with the
law's direction elsewhere. The approach I have suggested does not as-
sume that contemporary standards are ideal, or that they should not be
debated and revised. As families and their needs change, so must
family law. And, in a pluralistic society like ours, division and debate
are to be expected and welcomed.
Because the interpretive approach takes no sides in the debate over
the family, it does not offer to resolve family law's most divisive issues.
Some will find it anemic and prefer an approach that is grounded in a
strong view of family form and function. But there is no obvious justi-
fication for legal experimentation based solely on the manner in which
sperm and ovum are combined. We have no reason to think that chil-
dren of a "surrogate" mother who has consented to their adoption by a
stepmother will experience remarkably different feelings than those
with a "regular" mother who has so consented, or that children of a
single woman conceived with sperm in a syringe will experience the
absence of a father in a profoundly different way from those born as
the result of a casual "one-night stand." To the extent that legislatures
categorize individuals and apply different standards by category, those
categories should have a rational basis that reflects relevant public
policy goals and the experiences of the affected individuals. Categori-
373 See supra p. 912.
374 Schultz, supra note xi ix, at 398 (urging that "[a] narrow experiment with chosen rather than
imposed responsibility could hardly come off worse than the dismal realities of abdication and
non-compliance that now confront us" and that intention-based parentage "has the potential to
create more gender-neutral avenues to parenthood").
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zation based on the mechanics of conception does not meet this stan-
dard.
In sum, although the reforms I have outlined would neither revolu-
tionize nor preserve the traditional family, they would do much to as-
similate technological conception within contemporary family law and
to ensure consistent treatment of both parents and children. We would
gain a good deal from these modest statutory revisions.
CONCLUSION
While medical science has revolutionized the process of conceiving
a child, it has not fundamentally altered the desires of would-be par-
ents or the relationships of children with those who care for them.
Many, perhaps most, of those who employ technological methods of
conceiving a child do so because they want a child genetically related
to at least one member of a planned family. Indeed, although recourse
to technological conception sometimes reflects the desire for an uncon-
ventional family form, often it is merely the next step after medical
treatments to facilitate sexual conception have failed. When techno-
logical conception employs genetic material from within the planned
family unit, its results are virtually identical to those of sexual concep-
tion. Like Louise Brown, children so conceived may feel gratified at
their parents' persistence, but are otherwise "ordinary" children with
"ordinary" relationships. Parents may have strong feelings about their
difficulties in conceiving a child but, in the end, they are "ordinary"
parents.
When technological conception employs genetic material from out-
side the planned family unit, however, it presents issues similar to
those that arise in other separated or "blended" families. All children
with unknown biological progenitors have informational needs; some
- whether adopted, technologically conceived, or simply abandoned
- may experience a sense of parental rejection and a need to find out
more about their biological parents. Social "parents" - stepparents,
adoptive parents, husbands whose wives have conceived during an ex-
tramarital affair, husbands whose wives have employed AID, single
AID users, single women who conceive through casual sex - will of-
ten wish to exclude from their families the "intruders" who are also
their children's genetic parents. And genetic parents - those who re-
linquish children for adoption, "surrogate" mothers, sperm and egg do-
nors - may experience an unexpected level of interest in their children
and profound grief at the prospect or reality of losing them.
Because a child's relationships and needs do not ultimately depend
on the manner of her conception, there is every reason to harmonize
the law of sexual and technological conception. Such an approach
would ensure consistency in our treatment of families. It would avoid
the fruitless sloganeering that has all too often characterized discussion
1Vol. 11x3:835
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of technological conception. And it would focus attention on family
policy, rather than technological novelty.
